Degeneration of Parliament exposed
From the old house at Galle Face to the complex at Kotte: Victor Ivan argues that a Parliament whose members trade with the government they audit has forfeited its own legality.
Black Easter
The first column after the Easter Sunday bombings. Victor Ivan sets the attacks against a longer record of political murder and asks what kind of state failed to see them coming.
ලලිත් ප්රේමදාස ඝාතනය (II)
Part II recounts how an informant inside Sucharitha, Premadasa’s residence, telephoned Ivan at night; how the informant’s warnings proved true, including of a planned explosion at the UNP May Day rally that Ivan tried to expose in Ravaya; Mohideen’s revelations; the threats that followed; Bradman Weerakoon’s view of the Premadasa killing; the ‘Sudu Mahattaya’ of Wellampitiya; and why Hemantha Warnakulasuriya’s claims fail both legally and ethically.
ලලිත්-ප්රේමදාස ඝාතන
Replying to President’s Counsel Hemantha Warnakulasuriya, who told Mawbima and Ceylon Today that Ivan had hated Premadasa and set out to show that Premadasa, not the LTTE, killed Lalith Athulathmudali, Ivan recalls that Warnakulasuriya had defended Magistrate Lenin Ratnayake, whose rape case Ravaya exposed in August 1997. He restates his view of the 1993 killing of Lalith Athulathmudali, including a government news report three days earlier naming him as a suicide-bomber target, and his last conversation with Athulathmudali the night before.
දූෂණ මර්දනය හා ස්මෝල්ගේ ආදර්ශය
Reading the biography of W.J.T. Small, the principal who shaped Richmond College, Galle, Ivan recounts how Small overturned a cricket-captain election won by bribery, setting an example of integrity for the school. He contrasts it with the bribery allegation against the chairman of the Bribery Commission and argues that corruption is built into the executive presidency itself. Examples from his own experience follow: Lalith Athulathmudali’s account of how wealth flows from the presidency, a senior official’s confession, a customs officer punished for enforcing the law, and a young political star.
චෝගම්වලින් පසු ජනාධිපතිවරණයක්!
After a costly CHOGM that worsened Sri Lanka’s standing, Ivan predicts an early presidential election, called before a fragile economy — falling exports, heavy Chinese loans, banks lending to the state instead of business, finance companies near collapse — gives way. The government runs on three wheels, Mahinda, Basil and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, and the family is fraying over succession, as D.S. Senanayake’s preference for Dudley once split the UNP. With discontent in the SLFP, the JHU and all communities, he foresees a three-cornered contest: Karu Jayasuriya on a system-change platform, Chandrika Kumaratunga seeking to reclaim the SLFP, and an unpredictable royal battle.
මැතිවරණ කොමසාරිස් වත්කම් බැරකම් නීතිය
Elections Commissioner Mahinda Deshapriya collected candidates’ asset declarations with zeal, Ivan argues, only to lock them away, telling Ravaya that the public needs a court order to see them. The 1988 amendment to the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law gives anyone the right to certified copies for a fee. Ivan recounts how he first saw Lalith Athulathmudali’s declaration, the People’s Alliance’s broken 1994 pledge to publish ministers’ assets, the Speaker who complied and the President’s office that did not, and reproduces a 2005 letter from Deshapriya’s predecessor sending him six declarations — disproving the claim that there is no precedent.
මැතිවරණ ප්රතිඵල, දේශපාලන ක්රමය හා රනිල්
The government’s wins in two of the three provincial council elections surprise no one, Ivan argues: the post-1977 system is built so that the ruling party, drawing on the power of president, parliament, provincial councils and local bodies at once, almost always wins the elections between presidential polls. Tracing every contest from J.R. Jayewardene to Mahinda Rajapaksa, he says Ranil Wickremesinghe’s ridiculed position owes less to his personal failings than to a system that reduced even Sirimavo Bandaranaike to a political joke. The UNP, he concludes, is caught in the trap it set for others.
පිල්ලේගේ නිරීක්ෂණ
Whatever Sri Lanka gained by inviting Navi Pillay, Ivan argues, it lost through a media campaign that painted her as a blood-drinking demon and a minister’s lewd offer to marry her — insults recalling Premadasa’s jibe at Indira Gandhi. The government undoes its own good work, as in the North, and rules through a giant among dwarfs, unlike Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s or even J.R.’s cabinets. Pillay spoke within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Sri Lanka signed; her warning of drift towards authoritarianism is one Sri Lankans themselves can see.
මගේ සිහිනය
Answering websites that claimed the Rajapaksa government was buying Ravaya through Milinda Moragoda and paying Ivan a bribe, Ivan sets out Ravaya’s 27-year record of refusing favours: turning down Chandrika Kumaratunga’s offer of the Lake House chairmanship, free newsprint from the anti-Premadasa impeachment camp, and Harry Jayawardena’s private money. He describes his dream for Ravaya before he retires — staff as shareholders, new presses, a stronger paper and a web presence — and the conditions under which Moragoda would buy only a 40 per cent minority stake, inviting alternatives.