ජනාධිපතිවරණය, සුභ නැකත හා පාප්වහන්සේගේ සංචාරය
Ivan argues that the Eighteenth Amendment, poorly drafted, did not remove the two-term bar in a way that clearly lets the President stand again, and that a law-abiding leader would seek the Supreme Court’s opinion rather than rely on a friendly ruling. He criticises plans to time the election by an astrologer’s auspicious date despite the Pope’s planned visit in January 2015, and examines the history of presidential nominations and the Commissioner of Elections’ role.
අශීලාචාර 18 පරාජය කිරීම
Following up the previous column, Ivan tests Sarath Silva’s argument against the constitution. Transitional provisions in Chapter XXI of the 1978 constitution, including Article 160, show how J.R. Jayewardene was specially made eligible, and the Eighteenth Amendment, rushed through on the wave of war victory, has a technical flaw that is not easily corrected. Seeking a favourable ruling from the Supreme Court would put the judges in a trap; opposing injustice is a human duty, and all who want change should unite to defeat the Eighteenth.
සරත් සිල්වාගේ කාල බෝම්බය
Ivan, no admirer of Sarath N. Silva, nevertheless takes seriously the former Chief Justice’s argument that Mahinda Rajapaksa cannot contest a third term. Silva’s thesis, set out in nine points, is that the Eighteenth Amendment, passed in 2010 after Rajapaksa had already been sworn in for his second term, cannot give him a right to a third term that he did not have when re-elected. Ivan compares term limits under presidential systems in France, Brazil and elsewhere and argues that what matters is honouring the people’s sovereignty.
නව ව්යවස්ථාව හා පොදු අපේක්ෂකයා – 9
Part 9 turns to the opposition’s idea of a common presidential candidate who would deliver a new constitution within six months. Ivan questions whether the Seventeenth Amendment belongs in a new constitution, shows that some constitutions were written quickly but most were not, and argues that instead of a common candidate the opposition needs a common programme, agreed by all parties and set before the public, with a timetable for a new constitution; only this can prevent the slide into anarchy.
ව්යවස්ථා සංශෝධනය (ව්යවස්ථාවක් හදාගැනීමේ ප්රශ්නය – 5)
Part 5 compares how constitutions are amended in the United States and India, where fundamental provisions are hard to change and courts have restored constitutions after they were abused, with Sri Lanka, where all three constitutions were made by majority power rather than consensus. He surveys amendments to the 1978 constitution: the 1982 early presidential election and fraudulent referendum, the Sixth Amendment after Black July, the Thirteenth and Seventeenth, Kumaratunga’s failed draft, and Mahinda Rajapaksa’s Eighteenth.
රාජ්ය නිලධරතන්ත්රය
Politicians come and go but officials stay, Ivan argues, and a strong, law-bound bureaucracy is what has kept India’s democracy standing. Sri Lanka had one until the 1972 constitution weakened it and the 1978 constitution destroyed it. He traces the result through the forced resignation of Auditor General Wijesuriya, outsiders placed over the Elections Department, and Chief Justices chosen for loyalty from Wanasundera’s passing-over to Shirani Bandaranayake’s removal. Reviving the Seventeenth Amendment’s independent commissions is no cure, he says, because they had no power to punish a president who ignored them.
ඉන්දු-ලංකා ගිවිසුම ආපසු හැරී බැලීමක්
As the government retreats from diluting the Thirteenth Amendment before the Northern Provincial Council election, Ivan argues that the Indo-Lanka Accord is an international treaty that cannot be changed unilaterally — and that after the war India, as Shivshankar Menon told him, would have backed a better devolution scheme. Drawing on K.M. de Silva and J.N. Dixit, he corrects the popular belief that the Accord was forced on Sri Lanka by the 1987 airdrop: it grew from the 1985 Delhi Accord, and without the IPKF the state might not have survived two insurgencies.
19 වැනි සංශෝධන කෙටුම්පත ගැන
Ivan welcomes the campaign by Maduluwawe Sobitha’s National Movement for a Just Society to abolish the executive presidency, but argues its draft Nineteenth Amendment is a concept paper with a narrow vision. Every Sri Lankan constitution, and Chandrika Kumaratunga’s 2000 draft, was made by cunning or majority power rather than on the sovereignty of the people, as India and South Africa did. The draft ignores the unresolved question of who belongs to the nation, copies the flawed Constitutional Council of the Seventeenth Amendment, and keeps a simple-majority impeachment of judges.
අධිකරණයේ කාර්යභාරය විවේචනාත්මක විමසීමක්
As the clash between the courts and the government intensifies, Ivan defends judges’ right to fight for their independence but asks why Sri Lanka’s judiciary, unlike those of Britain, the United States and India, has not won public respect. He traces how the Supreme Court, fair in colonial times, failed at key moments: allowing the 1982 referendum to extend Parliament’s term, the handling of presidential term limits and crossovers, failing to rescue the 17th Amendment and approving the 18th, and weak orders on election law. The judiciary, he concludes, is paying for its own mistakes.
විය හැක්කේ කුමක්ද?
Ivan argues that Sri Lanka stands on the brink of the collapse of its political system, as N.M. Perera predicted of J.R. Jayewardene’s 1977 constitution. He cautions the new opposition Movement Against Lawlessness against idealising the 17th Amendment, since the constitution lets the president stand above the law as a constitutional dictator. The removal of limits on election spending has put black money in control of sectors from the stock market to energy, and even a change of government would not rescue the system. He draws a symbolic parallel between Prabhakaran’s rise by eliminating other Tamil leaders and what may be unfolding in the Sinhala South.