ආචාර්ය නිර්මාල්ගේ දයලෙක්තික අච්චාරුවාදය
Ivan replies to Nirmal Ranjith Dewasiri’s critique (17 June) of his column ‘Is the Thirteenth Amendment the Best Solution?’. Listing his earlier Ravaya pieces on the national question from 2006 onwards and his debate with Kumar David, he rejects the charge that he has turned against devolution, and cites the Asia Foundation survey and the ICES study ‘Seeking Space for State Reform’, in which about 80% of Sinhalese backed reform, to argue that a solution must be built with, not against, public opinion.
දේශපාලන ප්රතිසංස්කරණ මගහැරයෑමේ හැකියාවක් නැත
Had the country reorganised itself after the war, Ivan argues, it would have satisfied its people and reduced foreign pressure. Three insurrections have cost over 100,000 lives and many of the best leaders — a foreign scholar told a friend that no comparable country had lost so many — yet the causes were never addressed and the Youth Commission’s findings, including on caste, were ignored. Every institution has decayed: Parliament, a discredited judiciary with a 4% conviction rate, schools reliant on tuition, hospitals short of drugs, chaotic buses, a tangled public pay system. Taxes on flour and fuel fall on ordinary people without matching services; corruption is built into a system of black-money elections; and the President stands above the law, which is why the 13th and 17th Amendments were never binding. Only a fundamental reorganisation, including a fair settlement with the Tamils, can prevent permanent division.
විදේශ ප්රතිපත්තිය නිවැරදි කරගැනීම
The government appears to be retreating from its strongly anti-Western foreign policy, built on the belief that world power is passing to China. That shift, Ivan argues, is neither imminent nor China’s alone, since India is also rising, and the US works to weaken states aligned with rival powers. A small country on a strategic sea lane should stay out of rival camps, stay friendly with all, and above all keep India’s trust. He recalls how J.R. Jayewardene’s hostility to India, including an insult to Indira Gandhi, led India to back Tamil militants, halt the Vadamarachchi operation and air-drop supplies, and how India’s support was decisive in the final war. Having promised 13-plus, Sri Lanka must either deliver or offer a credible alternative, and build friendship with Tamil Nadu as well as New Delhi.
හොඳම විසඳුම 13ද?-
India, the West, Tamil leaders and devolution advocates treat full implementation of the 13th Amendment as the best solution, but Ivan argues it was built for the North-East Tamils alone, on the unproven idea of a traditional Tamil homeland, and imposed on a reluctant J.R. Jayewardene under Indian pressure. Citing G.H. Peiris’s study of the Eastern Province and K.M. de Silva’s critique of separatist ideology, he says the homeland claim has never been rebutted, and warns that a solution resting on it will leave others feeling deceived. Sinhala and Tamil leaders should each apologise for their wrongs. He proposes village councils modelled on India’s panchayats, district councils able to merge into provincial and regional councils by popular consent, a smaller Parliament with a Senate, a human-rights charter, information rights, and strong election and anti-corruption commissions.
ඥානාන්විත වියයුතු තරමට ඥානාන්විත නොවීම
The government’s counter-campaign against the US resolution at the UN Human Rights Council, Ivan argues, damaged Sri Lanka’s image. It had a clear strategy to win the war but none for what followed: an angry Tamil diaspora that saw the defeat as genocide, a rift with the US after Colombo first agreed and then refused a plan to evacuate Prabhakaran and other leaders, and a drift towards China, Iran and Russia. Just as Western pressure eased to a call to implement the LLRC’s recommendations, the government failed to adapt. He names four failures: no nation-building reorganisation after the war, neglect of relations with the Western markets, broken promises to India over 13-plus, and slowness in restoring normality, ending abductions and withdrawing the forces from civilian life.
දහතුනේ අවුල
To win India’s support against the LTTE, President Rajapaksa promised a ’13-plus’ political solution, and Tamil leaders, the UNP and the old Left now demand he keep it, while the JHU, JVP and NFF oppose it. Ivan argues that the President’s doubts are not unreasonable, because the ethnic question is one expression of a larger failure of the political system. He traces how Tamil demands grew from modest regional councils in the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam and Senanayake–Chelvanayakam pacts to the 1976 separate-state resolution, the 1977 mandate, Black July, the Thimpu principles and the Indo-Lanka Accord, and says the provincial council system was hastily designed under LTTE pressure. He proposes instead village councils like India’s panchayats, district councils (with a provincial council for the North if needed), a smaller Parliament and a Senate.
සටනකට පෙර ස්වයං විවේචනයකට
Responding to a public statement by a group of Tamil intellectuals led by the Bishop of Mannar, Rayappu Joseph, which urges the Tamil National Alliance to reject the 13th Amendment, boycott talks and stay out of the Northern Provincial Council election, Ivan argues that they are again pointing Tamils down the road to ruin. Before any new struggle, he says, the Tamil leadership must honestly ask why the last one failed: the separate-state goal was a fantasy of the traditional leaders, the 1977 mandate was far from overwhelming, J.R. Jayewardene’s 1978 Constitution met many language grievances, and Prabhakaran killed more Tamils than the security forces did. Like Gandhi’s Congress or Martin Luther King’s movement, Tamils should seek equal rights within a Sri Lankan nation and a democratic society.
රටට වෙනස්කම් අවශ්යද?
Given how rotten the political system and state administration had become, Ivan writes, winning the separatist war should be counted a miracle — the armed forces and police included people working for the LTTE for money, which shows how far the institutions had decayed. The question now is whether to go forward with that rot or reform it. Every important part is corroded: legislature, executive, electoral system, courts, public service, public services, media. The President has accepted change is needed but has set out no philosophy beyond the voting system and cabinet size, and it is unclear whether he means to win two-thirds by agreement with the opposition or by buying its members across. Ivan lists what remains unresolved — the executive presidency, a German-style mixed electoral system, the constitutional council killed after the 17th Amendment, judicial power used oppressively, customs revenue of which perhaps a quarter reaches the treasury, and education adrift.
නව ආණ්ඩුක්රම ව්යවස්ථාවක් ඇතිකර ගැනීම
Constitutional reform deserves more of the public’s attention than the parliamentary election itself. The government asks for a two-thirds majority to change the system, but Ivan argues it does not need one: a constitution is a social contract, and no single party represents the whole of a society made up of the SLFP, the UNP, the JVP, the Tamil National Alliance, the Hela Urumaya and much else. Sri Lanka’s record here is poor — three constitutions since independence and now a fourth, where countries write them to last centuries. America has the world’s shortest and has not tired of it in two hundred years; India has the longest and credits it with meeting each challenge. Bandaranaike in 1970 and Jayewardene in 1977 both used their majorities to exclude the opposition; Nehru, with a comparable majority, spent three and a half years including everyone. Rajapaksa should not repeat their mistake.
පාර්ලිමේන්තු මැතිවරණයෙන් පසු
With the opposition’s enthusiasm spent and its forces fighting the parliamentary election separately, Ivan expects the government to take 130 to 135 seats. He argues this is the historic moment for constitutional reform, and that it will only command respect if the opposition is brought in rather than bypassed by buying UNP members across. His programme: a mixed German-style electoral system, internal democracy in parties, publication of asset declarations on a website for continuous public scrutiny, the information act Milinda Moragoda has proposed, and opening parliamentary committees to the press. On devolution he proposes abandoning the province as the universal unit — keeping it only for the North, where the Tamil majority is overwhelming, and using the district everywhere else, with village councils on the Indian panchayat model beneath. He notes the President won 58 votes in every hundred and his opponent 40, and that reform must include the 40.