ඝාතන සංස්කෘතියේ අත්තිවාරම්
The article opens by correcting two printing errors in the first part, published in the previous issue: Che, not ‘me’, was killed after being taken into custody, and the number of LTTE cadres in detention should have read more than ten thousand rather than more than a thousand. What follows is an anatomy of how a culture of killing was built.
දෙමළ සමාජය ගැන
Three and a half hours with a delegation from the Tamil diaspora — all of them long-standing opponents of the LTTE — gives Ivan an account of the north he could not get otherwise: the local elections, the caste composition of Jaffna now that most Vellala families live abroad, and the widespread refusal to believe Prabhakaran is dead.
රට යන්නේ කොයිබටද? සමාන අයිතිවාසිකම් පිළිගැනීම
For the first time in thirty years the argument is being conducted by mouths rather than by gun barrels, and Ivan surveys the range of it: implement the 13th Amendment, go beyond it, or solve the question without devolving anything at all. He grants the case against provincial councils — an Indian import, unloved and inefficient — and argues that if a new constitution is made it must be treated as a social contract rather than a party’s instrument.
ප්රතිවාදී නායකයන් අඟුටුමිට්ටන් බවට පත්වී ජනාධිපති යෝධයකු බවට පත්වීම
An analysis of the Sri Lankan political landscape following the 2009 provincial council elections. The article discusses how Mahinda Rajapaksa solidified his power, rendering opposition leaders like Ranil Wickremesinghe politically impotent and crippling the UNP and JVP. The author urges the President not to misuse this massive mandate like J.R. Jayewardene did, but instead use it to dismantle the corrupt political system, establish private universities, eradicate ethnic divisions, and build a truly democratic nation.
Weerawansa, as Well as Somawansa, is a Bequest of Wijeweera
Written as the JVP split between Wimal Weerawansa and Somawansa Amarasinghe, the piece argues both sides inherit habits Rohana Wijeweera built into the party: raising money from businessmen, hiring out the party’s services and hiding its finances. Ivan recounts what the businessman Yasasiri Kasthuriaratchi told him about his dealings with Wijeweera.
ද්රෝහියෙකු ලෙස අභිෂේක කිරීමට නියමිත විමල් වීරවංශ
Weerawansa is the largest political figure the JVP built after its second insurrection, Ivan writes, and he built himself — training his voice and his gestures on recordings of Wijeweera. The article follows him from that apprenticeship to the edge of expulsion, and sets his rise against the rural, under-privileged, low-caste base that both the JVP and the LTTE have drawn into violence and buried.
සෝමවංශ සේ ම වීරවංශ ද
The argument inside the JVP matters, Ivan writes, because until it began the party’s spokesmen described it as the cleanest in the country. He reads the sources — Nandana Gunathilaka’s series, Somawansa’s speech at the 1971 commemoration, Weerawansa’s answer in parliament — and works back through the party’s money to the years when its leaders needed intermediaries and protection.
යක්ෂයාට ගිය ජවිපෙ සදාචාරය
Starting from a gift of Li Zhisui’s memoir of Mao, Ivan turns to the morality the JVP claims for itself: the party that says it is the cleanest in the country, and the accounts of extortion from businesses, the sale of party services, and the misuse of money that its own internal quarrel has now brought into the open.
ජනමාධ්ය බිය ගැන්වීම
Threats to journalists used to come from the government; now they come from the government and from gangs. Ivan follows the Rupavahini affair from the attack on a programme producer to the armed group that told another employee’s mother he would be killed, and sets it beside the JVP’s habit of calling violence against ordinary people a campaign against a foreign army.
A UNP-PA Coalition in Place of a JVP-PA Coalition?
This article analyzes the strategic political maneuvering between Sri Lanka’s major parties—the UNP, PA, and JVP—over the formation of coalitions and control of the government. It outlines the internal divisions within the PA regarding whether to form a permanent alliance with the JVP to topple the ruling government, or to feign an alliance to eventually form a national government with the UNP. The piece highlights the President’s reluctance for a snap election and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s counter-strategy: maintaining stability to secure international aid for the peace process with the LTTE, and proposing a national referendum on peace to isolate the JVP and foster a UNP-PA coalition.