පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ පරිහානිය හා එය ජයගැනීම

Ivan’s submission to the parliamentary select committee on the conduct and discipline of MPs. He cites a survey in which only 12% of people trusted Parliament, and traces the decline through land grabs and permits, thugs and private militias, and black money in elections, contrasting today’s spending with the limits of 1965 and 1970. He recalls the L.M.D. de Silva and Thalgodapitiya commissions, which led to MPs being expelled, and argues that the assets and liabilities law should be enforced, with declarations published on a parliament website. He also proposes a German-style mixed electoral system instead of the plan of the Dinesh Gunawardena committee.

වාද කරන්නට පෙර ප්‍රකෘති සිහිය ඇති කරගැනීම වැදගත්ය

Answering Gamini Viyangoda and Jayatilaka Kammallaweera, who accused him of labelling them and of defending the Rajapaksa regime, Ivan restates his thesis: after losing socialism they adopted the ethnic crisis as their cause and lost their judgement when the LTTE fell, as he once feared a coup under Wijeweera’s spell before 1971. He rejects Viyangoda’s claim that he attacked individuals for twenty years and turned to ‘the system’ only to protect Rajapaksa, noting that his ‘Chaura Rajya’ series on reforming the predatory state ran in Ravaya in 2002, before ‘Chaura Rajina’ (2006), and listing earlier articles on system change. He recalls the Kaha Pati (yellow ribbon) campaign of 2000, the all-party talks on his reform draft in Parliament in 2001, and the 2006 Kobbekaduwa round table, and argues that reform must come by consensus, as Mandela achieved.

The Third Reading of the Budget: What might happen?

After the government survived the second reading of the 2008 budget, Ivan weighs the UNP’s chances of defeating it at the third. He argues that even a defeat would not force a dissolution, that MPs want to finish their terms, and that party leaders should stop fighting over a rotten system and agree to change it.

අපරාධය හා දඬුවම

S.B. Dissanayake went to court on the 14th expecting a suspended sentence and went to prison. Ivan recalls meeting him with Nihal Jayawickrama in November and warning him that, compared with Rauff Hakeem or the Hela Urumaya monks, he mattered little to the Chief Justice, and describes how S.B. walked into the trap of his own accord.

The UPFA Government’s Future

Two months after the 2004 general election the UPFA still lacks 113 seats, and Victor Ivan sets out why it may never reach them. Thondaman’s CWC is gone, the TNA route is closed by the JVP’s line on the LTTE, and the crossover rule strips defecting MPs of their seats — except the JHU’s bhikkhu MPs, who contested without a party constitution and so cannot be disciplined, though poaching them would provoke the JHU into fury. Until the government proves its majority it can do nothing else, including the new constitution the President dissolved parliament to obtain, and only fourteen months remain before the presidential election. Ivan then turns to the economy, arguing the UNF lost because ordinary people saw no dividend from peace while the business community did, and warning that the end of the garment quota system in December threatens an industry supplying 60% of export income and up to 150,000 jobs at home and in the Middle East. The JVP, he concludes, has shown a clean lifestyle but not yet the maturity its mandate demands, and its fate may prove more tragic than the traditional left’s.

ව්‍යවස්ථාව සමග වළ කජු ගැසීම

Ivan traces how politicians have toyed with the constitution: the authoritarian features of J.R. Jayewardene’s 1978 charter, rushed through as urgent; Chandrika Kumaratunga’s broken promise to abolish the executive presidency and her transitional clauses keeping her in power; the 2000 attempt to pass a new constitution by buying UNP votes; and the distortion of the 17th Amendment by Jayampathy Wickramaratne. He notes the Speaker signed the wrong draft, leaving commissions in legal limbo, and argues the proposed 19th Amendment is too narrow.

උරුමයේ කරුමය

Ivan agrees with Anura Bandaranaike that the SLFP is a Bandaranaike family fiefdom in which Mahinda Rajapaksa is only a capable retainer, but warns that the country is not a fiefdom too. Further sections mock the ‘jobless’ President’s prison visit to her guards at Bogambara and her complaint that cabinet meetings drive her mad, note an unrevealed secret Mangala Samaraweera told S.B. Dissanayake, and describe how powerful remand prisoners end up in hospital rather than cells.

දැලි පිහියෙන් කිරි කැම

Ivan likens Ranil Wickremesinghe’s rapid push for peace to a Lasker-style chess attack that ignores control of the centre, in a game with many live players, from the President and JVP to Prabhakaran, Hakeem and Thondaman. He recalls how Mandela won respect across racial lines, finds international and business conditions favourable, but warns that the Prime Minister must negotiate while the army answers to a hostile President.

ජනාධිපති ක්‍රමය හා ඇටිකෙහෙල්

Comparing the executive presidency to seeded bananas, tasty but hard to digest, Ivan recalls N.M. Perera’s warning that the 1978 system would produce crises once president and legislature diverged. He traces the Premadasa impeachment attempt and Wijetunga’s restraint, then argues that Chandrika Kumaratunga’s arrogance towards her ministers and the opposition, capped by Rauff Hakeem’s dismissal and the prorogation, has trapped her and may pit a hostile new government against her.

ජනතා විමුක්ති පෙරමුණේ පරිවාස වැඩපිළිවෙළ

Ivan questions whether the JVP can win the five independent commissions by giving oxygen to a dying People’s Alliance government. He recalls its seats on the rigged North Western Provincial Council and support for PA provincial administrations, and gives the numbers: the government fell from a majority to 109 against 115 after Rauff Hakeem’s group left, and JVP support brings it back to 119. He argues that the pact’s ban on peace talks, privatisation and price rises clashes with the IMF standby agreement and risks another LTTE attack like Katunayake.