අල්ලස් දූෂණ, දේශපාලනය හා යුක්තිය පසිඳලීම
At a Transparency International seminar Ivan asked Bribery Commission chairman S. Ananda Coomaraswamy why the commission had cleared Mangala Samaraweera over a Rs. 500,000 credit card from a state body. He contrasts the commission with former commissioner Neelum Gamage, who resisted pressure from President Wijetunga over Wack Silva, and argues that politicians enriched by corruption will never accept an independent commission. A second section criticises the legal community’s belated alarm at Mark Fernando’s early retirement and describes the decay of the judiciary under Sarath N. Silva.
මරුවා සමග වාසේ
Ivan mocks the daily broadcasting of the inauspicious direction and the superstition peddled by television and even the JVP-backed paper Lanka. He turns the President’s lecture on the decline of politicians against her, tracing how every president since J.R. Jayewardene, including Premadasa, Wijetunga and Kumaratunga herself, used office for money or power, and attacks the costly upkeep of former presidents, now to be extended to former Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake.
ජනාධිපති අගමැති ගැටුම කෙළවර කුමක් ද?
Tracing the Development Lottery Board dispute back to the 1978 Constitution, Ivan quotes N.M. Perera’s warning that split control of presidency and Parliament would paralyse the state and invite dictatorship. He recalls Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake turning against the executive presidency, the PA’s 1994 pledge to abolish it, D.B. Wijetunga’s peaceful handover of domestic power, and Kumaratunga’s broken promise to the JVP. Wickremesinghe, a defender of the office he hopes to hold, failed to strike a deal at the height of his mandate and now faces a dilemma.
ජනාධිපතිනිය යන්නේ කොයිබටද?
The President’s reply to the Prime Minister signals that she will ignore her opponents’ mandate and may reshape the Development Lottery Board or even the Cabinet at will. The editorial rejects the government’s rowdy resistance but also her claim that the President’s Fund was endangered, noting she diverted Mahapola scholarship money to it, and contrasts her with Mitterrand and D.B. Wijetunga, who ceded domestic power under cohabitation. It blames the government’s own inaction, including leaving the Chief Justice in place.
චන්ද්රිකා + රනිල් ඒකත් ජයසිරී මංගලම්
With the 19th Amendment blocked, Ivan sees a stalemate that could push Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickremesinghe into a temporary political marriage: he to protect the peace process, she to halt inquiries into corruption and crimes linked to her security division and to secure her family’s political future. A second section argues she has turned to wrecking the peace process and defends talks with Prabhakaran. A third questions Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva’s handling of complaints against himself and his alliance with Hemantha Warnakulasuriya.
අර්බුදයේ මුල ඇත්තේ ව්යවස්ථාවේය
Ivan traces the clash between the President and the UNF government to the 1978 Constitution, which J.R. Jayewardene modelled on de Gaulle’s while ignoring the need for power to alternate. Comparing the American, Indian and Swiss constitutions with Sri Lanka’s three in fifty years, he recounts how crisis was postponed until 2001, and argues that Chandrika Kumaratunga should follow Mitterrand in 1986 by ceding domestic power to the Prime Minister.
කෙළවර කුමක් ද?
Ivan explains that the 1978 Constitution assumed one party would hold both presidency and Parliament, and recalls how France and D.B. Wijetunga avoided conflict under cohabitation. Chandrika Kumaratunga could have conceded power or resigned after 2001 but chose confrontation, while the Prime Minister’s investigations of her corruption and crimes now give him the advantage. He sets out the likeliest course of the conflict, ending in impeachment, an election or her loss of office.
ජනාධිපතිනිය චෙක්මේට් වීමට ආසන්නයි
Ivan argues that Chandrika Kumaratunga ruled as a hereditary queen rather than an elected leader, flouted the 17th Amendment in the 2001 election she led, and should have resigned or sought a fresh mandate, or stepped back as D.B. Wijetunga did. Now she is cornered, and he predicts the crisis will cost her the presidency and the Bandaranaikes their hold on the SLFP, and says punishing PA-era crimes, though double-edged, is worthwhile.
ජනාධිපතිනිය චෙක් මේට් වේද?
After the People’s Alliance defeat, Ivan weighs the options facing Chandrika Kumaratunga, who still holds executive power. Contrasting American practice and French cohabitation under Mitterrand and Chirac with Sri Lanka’s short 1994 experience, he sees three paths: resignation, a Wijetunga-style nominal presidency, or removal by the new majority through budget control or impeachment. He calls for constitutional reforms making the president accountable to Parliament and the courts and giving the Prime Minister full domestic authority.
පොදු පෙරමුණ පරාජය වුවහොත් විය හැක්කේ කුමක්ද?
Ivan considers cohabitation between a PA President and a UNP Parliament. He recalls how President Wijetunga cooperated with Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1994, quotes N.M. Perera’s 1978 warnings that a hostile Parliament could paralyse a president through its control of finance, and argues that a PA defeat would amount to a popular verdict against her. He concludes that she must accept the leader of the winning party as Prime Minister or face public revolt.