ජනතා විමුක්ති පෙරමුණට සිදුවූයේ කුමක්ද?
Rebutting Tilvin Silva’s claim of success, Ivan uses vote figures since 1994 to show the JVP lost 47 per cent of its 2001 vote in the local elections, worst in Colombo, Puttalam and Kalutara, which he blames on its nationalism and its alliance with the President. He traces how Chandrika Kumaratunga may steer the party through Somawansa Amarasinghe, whose relative Sirisena Cooray is said to have enabled his 1989 escape, citing General Cecil Waidyaratne.
විය හැකි දේ සහ විය යුතු දේ
Written on the eve of the local government elections, Ivan sets out what each side must prove against the 2001 results, and says a sharp JVP decline could mark the beginning of its end. He praises the government’s comparatively clean campaign, proposes reforming the executive presidency by removing the arbitrary dissolution power and simplifying removal of a president, and argues that Prabhakaran, like Mandela, could become a stronger leader by abandoning arms.
පැවැත්ම සමග කරන සූදුවක්
Ivan argues that the JVP is gambling its political survival by opposing Ranil Wickremesinghe’s peace effort as it once opposed the Indo-Lanka Accord. He recalls that the party called provincial councils a division of the country, killed people over them and then became their keen participants without apology, and now stays silent on the executive presidency and the President’s stalling of the 17th Amendment. Nationalism, he says, can wreck a settlement but no longer carries anyone to power.
උපාධිධාරින්ගේ රක්ෂෂා ප්රශ්නය
About 30,000 graduates are said to be unemployed, and police reportedly attacked a group protesting at Temple Trees, while the government blames the JVP. Ivan points to a mismatch between university education and the job market, calls for rapid vocational training, notes the World Bank condition limiting the public wage bill, and argues that job growth depends on peace, so graduates should support it while the government hires on merit without political influence.
සාමයේ අනාගතය
As the President and the JVP line up against the government’s ceasefire memorandum of understanding with the LTTE, Ivan says Ranil Wickremesinghe misjudged her willingness to cooperate and failed to adapt the 1978 Constitution for cohabitation, as France did in 1986. He proposes constitutional reform giving domestic power to the Prime Minister, and urges that the chance for peace be seized after 18 years of war that neither side can win.
සාමය සඳහා දරන උත්සාහයට බාධා නොකළ යුතු ය.
The editorial says Sri Lanka can recover only by ending the war, and urges all parties not to obstruct the new government’s peace effort. It criticises the JVP, itself once outside the democratic mainstream, for opposing the process from the start, arguing that if Sinhala youth could leave armed struggle for democracy, Tamil youth deserve the same chance.
මීළග පාර්ලිමේන්තුවෙහි සංයුතිය කුමක් වෙයි ද?.
Ahead of the December 2001 election, the piece examines how the departure of the Muslim Congress, the Ceylon Workers’ Congress and the NUA costs the People’s Alliance about 15 seats. It works through the 2000 district results to show how bonus seats, the 5 per cent cut-off and remainders gave the JVP its ten seats, argues that the JVP is unlikely to become kingmaker, and projects a UNF vote near 50 per cent if rigging and violence are held in check.
සෝමවංශ අමරසිංහ ජවිපෙ රැගෙන යන්නේ කොයිබටද?
Ivan questions Somawansa Amarasinghe’s fitness to lead the JVP. He recounts Amarasinghe’s arrest in the botched 1971 plan to seize Sirimavo Bandaranaike and his switch from anti- to pro-Wijeweera views in prison, and cites Vas Tillekeratne’s statement on Iraqi funding. He asks how Amarasinghe alone escaped in 1989, possibly helped by his relative Sirisena Cooray, notes the JVP’s shifts towards the PA, and criticises a leadership drawn from his home district of Kalutara.
සමසමාජ මග හා ජවිපෙ මග
The piece compares the JVP’s ‘probationary’ pact with Chandrika Kumaratunga’s government in 2001 with the LSSP’s 1964 coalition with Sirimavo Bandaranaike. It sets out the LSSP’s internal debate, the talents of its leaders such as N.M. Perera, and its ideological fit with the SLFP, and contrasts these with the JVP’s lack of debate and weak rationale. Both governments, it notes, then fell to parliamentary defections, in 1964 over the Press Bill.
තරමක් අංගවිකලයි ඒත් නරකම නෑ
Ivan welcomes the 17th Amendment but lists its flaws: no public debate, no published draft, brief review by a three-judge bench, and passage without a final draft before Parliament. He faults the UNP’s weak first draft and lack of vigilance, credits the JVP for securing the reform but says it accepted a presidential nominee on the Constitutional Council and backed Jayampathy Wickramaratne’s plan to drop Mark Fernando and A.R.B. Amerasinghe from the Judicial Service Commission. The government, he says, kept the council, the Chief Justice and state media within its reach.