Will a Parliamentary Election be a Solution to the Problem?
Victor Ivan evaluates whether holding a parliamentary general election will resolve the political deadlock between the President and the Prime Minister. Using electoral data under Sri Lanka’s Proportional Representation system, Ivan projects that neither a PA-JVP alliance nor the UNF can win an absolute parliamentary majority on its own. Consequently, any future government will be forced to rely on Tamil representatives from the North and East—most notably the LTTE-backed TNA—to form a majority. Ivan warns that this creates a severe governance paradox: a government reliant on LTTE-aligned MPs for its survival would struggle to credibly negotiate peace with the LTTE while maintaining public trust, ultimately leading to an even deeper political stalemate than before.
Towards A Solution
In this article, Victor Ivan analyzes the constitutional deadlock resulting from President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s takeover of three cabinet ministries, arguing that the crisis stems from structural flaws in a system where executive power and parliamentary control belong to opposing parties. Ivan critiques Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe for attempting to sideline the Executive President and leveraging the peace process primarily to fuel his own 2005 presidential ambitions. The author notes the irony in the President now calling for independent commissions and state media oversight—reforms the Prime Minister failed to enact earlier—while demanding an equal seat at the table in peace negotiations. Ultimately, Ivan asserts that the only way to avert national catastrophe is to establish a bipartisan power-sharing agreement that includes the President in decision-making on peace.
What must happen
In this article, Victor Ivan addresses the major constitutional crisis triggered by President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s unilateral takeover of three key government ministries—including the Defense Ministry—while Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe was abroad. Ivan characterizes the President’s actions as an immoral, well-planned “constitutional coup,” while simultaneously criticizing the Prime Minister and cabinet for sabotaging political co-habitation by attempting to marginalize the President while willingly cooperating with LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. Warning that the deadlock threatens both the national economy and the peace process, Ivan asserts that the crisis cannot be solved through street protests or snap elections. Instead, he argues that the crisis must serve as a catalyst for a bipartisan agreement on structural constitutional reforms, electoral changes, and the revitalization of independent commissions.
අන්තර් පාලන ගැටලුව
India’s view that any interim administration for the North and East must be linked to a final settlement matches the SLFP’s position. The editorial notes that apart from the JVP and Sihala Urumaya all parties and India favour an interim administration, expects the LTTE to open with a confederal demand in the hope of a better bargain, and argues that it can be brought down to a federal model only if the state argues strongly for one, with safeguards for eastern Muslims and Sinhalese.
අන්තෝජටා බහිජටා තත්ත්වයක්
Ivan argues that anti-government and nationalist forces are converging: after the SLFP–JVP alliance talks collapsed, pro-alliance elements in the SLFP are pushing the President back towards the JVP, which now demands through Wimal Weerawansa that the SLFP drop devolution. He likens her position to her father’s after the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam pact, notes the JVP’s drift from the red flag to the lion flag, and blames Ranil Wickremesinghe for ceding public debate on reform to nationalists, risking an independent North and a bloodstained South.
An Utterly Complicated Situation
In this article, Victor Ivan examines the volatile political maneuvering between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Driven by factions eager to topple the ruling government, efforts to form a JVP-SLFP alliance ultimately stalled due to President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s reluctance to commit to a permanent coalition. Ivan draws a historical parallel to the President’s father, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who was forced by chauvinist pressures to tear up the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact. The author highlights the JVP’s alarming ideological shift away from Marxism toward blatant racism and Sinhalese chauvinism, explicitly demanding that the SLFP abandon its policies on the devolution of power. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe is criticized for remaining passively silent, hoping the President loses credibility—a dangerous strategy that Ivan warns could empower racist factions, destroy the peace process, and ultimately result in a divided and bleeding nation.
වත්ත බද්දට දි ඇස්සට දත නියවීම
The editorial argues that the government’s peace process is proceeding without any public debate on reforming the nature of the state, so that it appears to be merely a settlement of the Tamil problem. It lists wider failures, from a corrupt political system and judiciary to a preferential voting system that pushes MPs towards illicit income, warns that silence cedes public opinion to nationalist forces, and likens the government’s self-serving approach to J.R. Jayewardene’s.
ආර්ථිකය, සාමය හා දේශපාලනය
The piece notes a buoyant economy under the ceasefire, with the share index above its 1994 peak, rising investment, exports and tourism, and a peace process continuing without major bloodshed. Politics, however, is stagnant: the independent commissions are collapsing and the committee on the judiciary has not met. It warns that Ranil Wickremesinghe is following his uncle J.R. Jayewardene’s path and Chandrika Kumaratunga her mother’s, risking a fractured SLFP, authoritarian rule and gains for the JVP. A final section discusses the health workers’ strike.
ප්රචණ්ඩ අරගලයේ දුෂ්ට චක්රය
Writing in the first person, Ivan defends a view that angered Tamil intellectuals at a seminar: that the LTTE’s demand for absolute power should be met but confined to Tamil areas. He argues that every violent movement ends by devouring its own dissenters, citing Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky and Bukharin, the JVP’s killing of former comrades and the LTTE’s murder of Amirthalingam and Neelan Tiruchelvam, and advises dissident Tamils to stand aside while Prabhakaran is judged by the Tamil people.
ශ්රී ලංකාවේ දේශපාලනය පිළිබඳ අර්බුදය
A theoretical analysis, framed through the views of ‘social democrats’, of Sri Lanka’s failure since 1948 to build a political structure acceptable to all groups. It identifies three conflicts, Sinhala versus Tamil nationality, minority rights and a struggle among power-holders, rejects the realpolitik maxim ‘si vis pacem, para bellum’, and argues for conflict transformation, a protracted peace-building process and a devolved, consociational state built on rebuilt social capital.