ඉදිරි පළාත් සභා මැතිවරණයේ ගමන් මග
Ivan weighs the President’s plan to test her strength in early provincial elections, comparing the 2001 parliamentary results with the later local government polls, in which the JVP fell from about a million votes to under 600,000. Recalling vote-rigging by the UNP from 1977 to 1994, the 1982 referendum and the PA’s North Western Province poll, he argues that all three main parties prefer a ‘thieves’ system’ of election plunder, and reads the President’s remarks to editors about using thuggery as a sign of a looming fight to the death.
පළාත් මැතිවරණවලට පෙර ස්වාධීන මැතිවරණ කොමිසම ඇති කළ යුතුයි
The editorial observes that the People’s Alliance is preparing to test its strength in provincial council elections without the independent Elections Commission required by the 17th Amendment. The President unconstitutionally withholds approval of the Constitutional Council’s nominees, while the government, the JVP and the Supreme Court have all failed to act. It warns that future elections will become a frenzied plunder between two power blocs unless the commission is established and electoral law reformed first.
ස්වාධීන මැතිවරණ කොමිසම මරා දැමීම
Ivan argues that neither government nor opposition wants an independent Elections Commission: the President withholds approval of the Constitutional Council’s nominees and the Supreme Court declined to resolve the Elections Commissioner’s petition about his personal liability. Further sections criticise a campaign to build up Justice Shirani Bandaranayake as a future Chief Justice despite her role in the order restraining Parliament’s impeachment, and the President’s obstruction of Rajitha Senaratne’s scheme to issue freehold deeds for state land.
How will the struggle for power end?
In this article, Victor Ivan analyzes the escalating power struggle between President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. Facing the end of her term and unable to contest the next presidential election, the President seeks to overhaul the executive presidency to secure her continued political dominance, potentially by aligning with the JVP or utilizing Parliament as a constituent assembly. Conversely, the Prime Minister is determined to preserve the current system to claim the executive presidency for himself, plotting to render the President politically irrelevant. Ivan warns that this clash of ambitions, coupled with a lack of faith in the impartiality of the judiciary under Chief Justice Sarath Nanda Silva, risks plunging the nation into an extra-constitutional crisis and potential civil conflict.
බල අරගලයේ කෙළවර කුමක් ද?
Barred from a third term, Chandrika Kumaratunga now wants the executive presidency she once enjoyed reformed so she can keep her party leadership, while Ranil Wickremesinghe wants it untouched until he inherits it. Ivan traces her options, from a JVP alliance and a snap dissolution to a caretaker cabinet, and warns that with Sarath N. Silva controlling the courts the rivalry could slide into a civil conflict decided by which side the police and army take.
ආරක්ෂෂාව සඳහා පිස්තෝල ඉල්ලීම
PA members of the Southern Provincial Council are reported to be seeking pistols from the President. The editorial notes that Sri Lanka alone arms its legislators, a practice begun during the 1989–90 JVP insurrection and never stopped, and argues that it cheapens representative democracy and fuels violence and crime by MPs’ guards; protection should come from the police, and the promised disarming of MPs has not happened.
ජාතික ආණ්ඩුවක් හරහා හෝ අවුල ලිහාගත යුතු ය
The government lacks the constitutional power to grant the interim administration the LTTE demands, and the main parties’ power struggle blocks consensus. The editorial proposes a two-year national government to agree a solution, negotiate with the LTTE and identify principles for a new constitution, followed by an election open to the LTTE and a constituent assembly of all elected members.
ඉරාක යුද්ධය
The editorial welcomes a Supreme Court ruling, on a Batticaloa voter’s petition over 55,000 people in an LTTE-held area being prevented from voting, which ordered compensation from the army commander and censured the Elections Commissioner, recalling that the President was allowed to vote from her residence in 1999. It argues that senior officials such as the Elections Commissioner and Attorney General, who served ruling parties and stood by during Tony Fernando’s jailing, have done more harm than politicians.
A UNP-PA Coalition in Place of a JVP-PA Coalition?
This article analyzes the strategic political maneuvering between Sri Lanka’s major parties—the UNP, PA, and JVP—over the formation of coalitions and control of the government. It outlines the internal divisions within the PA regarding whether to form a permanent alliance with the JVP to topple the ruling government, or to feign an alliance to eventually form a national government with the UNP. The piece highlights the President’s reluctance for a snap election and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s counter-strategy: maintaining stability to secure international aid for the peace process with the LTTE, and proposing a national referendum on peace to isolate the JVP and foster a UNP-PA coalition.
ජේවීපි -පීඒ සභාගයක් වෙනුවට යූඑන්පී -පීඒ සභාගයක්
The piece maps the calculations behind the PA–JVP rapprochement: Mangala Samaraweera and Anura Bandaranaike pushed for a firm alliance to topple the government, Wimal Weerawansa championed it in the JVP, while the President, wary of a snap election and focused on her own political survival, would not commit. Ranil Wickremesinghe held on until the aid conference and internationalised the peace process; a referendum on it could isolate the JVP and lead to a UNP–PA coalition, which could be good or dangerous.