දේශපාලන පාදඩකරණය හා කළු සල්ලි

Sri Lanka, Ivan warns, is falling into the grip of criminals and black-money barons: only 4% of criminal cases end in conviction, against 70% in India and 85% in Europe, because witnesses are unprotected, police corrupt and courts compromised. He traces how the JVP and LTTE insurrections led politicians to arm private security gangs drawn from local criminals, how rival underworld gangs rose and fell with changes of government — killings that foretold each change — and how criminals became MPs and councillors without abandoning extortion and drug dealing. Election costs have exploded, from one lakh in 1989 to 500 lakhs for a district seat, so parties and presidents depend on black money repaid from public funds. He calls for spending limits, audited accounts and caps on donations.

රට තිබෙන්නේ අර්බුදයක මුවවිටය

Ivan credits the government with six years of growth, infrastructure and controlled inflation, but says it was bought with borrowing and an expensive defence of the rupee. Floating the rupee and sharply raising fuel prices marks a forced change of course, yet the government is patching one or two parts of a worn-out engine. The Petroleum Corporation’s losses from political price-fixing, subsidies and corruption, and grossly one-sided thermal-power contracts at the Electricity Board, are symptoms of a wider decay. A falling rupee and rising prices could bring inflation, closures and political unrest. The opposition should not treat the crisis as a chance to topple the government; only a national reorganisation of the political and administrative system, with all parties, can save the country.

දේශපාලන ක්‍රමය නිරුවත් කිරීම

Ivan argues that the collapse of the J.R. Jayewardene system, which N.M. Perera called a ‘hotchpotch’ of presidential systems, has only accelerated even under a popular President. Chandrika Kumaratunga seized control of public finance from Parliament and used Sarath N. Silva to break the independence of the judiciary; corruption and politicians’ reliance on local criminals for security did the rest. While Wijeweera and Prabhakaran threatened the country, the public could not see the rot; Prabhakaran’s defeat has stripped the system naked. Ivan lists fifteen recent ‘scenes’, from the Golden Key and Sakvithi collapses to the Tangalle murder of a British tourist, and calls on the President to lead a national reorganisation with all parties.

2005-2010 දක්වා ආපසු හැරී බැලීමක්

The years 2005 to 2010 were a period crowded with events: a great war between the government and the LTTE, and alongside it a great conflict between the government and the opposition movements. Ivan had wanted for some time to write a review of the conflict between those two sides in those five years, and of his own part in it.

දඩිබිඩි එළවළු විප්ලවය

It is not a lie that vegetables carried in sacks are crushed and bruised and that the waste is large; investigations into it began as far back as the 1970s. The waste needs preventing, and the way it is being tackled is not good: first identify the problem properly, then find the right remedy, then explain its value to every party concerned, and then try it in selected places rather than nationally at one stroke.

අනුරුද්ධ රත්වත්ත

Anuruddha has died, and as a man who was close to him for a time Ivan thinks it important to set down a note about him. What follows is a personal account, including the plain observation that neither Anuruddha nor Chandrika appears to have had full confidence in the other when she was brought into the SLFP.

රාජපක්ෂ පාලනයේ හත් අවුරුද්ද

Mahinda Rajapaksa can be counted the most argued-about and the most powerful head of state Sri Lanka has produced since independence; before him that place belonged to J.R. Jayewardene. Five sections follow: social and family background, power and resolve, the lust for power, importance and power, and where it went wrong.