රනිල් හා චන්ද්රිකා: විධායක ජනාධිපති ක්රමයේ ඊළග දගර නැටුම
The UNP has finally spoken about the President’s secret second swearing-in. The editorial asks why Ranil Wickremesinghe never fought the executive presidency when he held a parliamentary majority, and says that backing real reform would be his best answer to the belief that he too is an autocrat.
ශිෂ්ට සම්පන්න භාවයේ තරම
The Human Rights Committee has ruled against Sri Lanka again, this time over Nallaratnam Singarasa, jailed for 35 years under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, while Tony Fernando’s case is pending. Ivan holds President Kumaratunga responsible for appointing Sarath N. Silva as Chief Justice, and Ranil Wickremesinghe for allowing the system to take root.
ත්රස්තවාදය ගැන ජනාධිපතිනිය
President Kumaratunga’s view of terrorism, given to the UN General Assembly after George W. Bush spoke, is judged sound, and more careful than Ranil Wickremesinghe’s earlier speech there. But the editorial reminds her that her government can do nothing without the JVP and cannot move a step without a settlement of the ethnic conflict.
Alliance Government Crosses A Difficult Hurdle
Thondaman’s CWC has brought eight MPs to the Alliance, and with three from the SLMC and one JHU monk the government reaches 118 — enough to govern, but thirty-two short of what the President actually wants. Victor Ivan credits her nerve: she dissolved a parliament the UNP controlled, broke her promise to the Speaker, allied with the JVP at the risk of her own party, and won a gamble that had her survival at stake, while the leader of the opposition remained in a world of his dreams. Her remaining aim is to avoid invalidation at the end of her second term, and Ivan judges that despite her stated preference for abolishing the executive presidency she will instead seek to amend it to permit three terms — a course she can justify to the minorities, to her own party and to the JVP in turn. The arithmetic runs through Prabhakaran: satisfying him on the ISGA delivers the TNA’s twenty-two MPs and brings a two-thirds majority within ten UNP defections. The difficulty is pleasing Prabhakaran and Wimal Weerawansa at once.
What Can Happen?
Reading the April 2004 election result, Victor Ivan opens with a fable of three fish: the green fish stripped of its dominance by a blue-and-red alliance, and the victors fused into one distorted creature, the red fish triumphant but immobilised by the half of the blue fish it cannot finish swallowing. Beneath the allegory he argues that a real change has begun — the system in which either main party’s turn in office amounted to an official permit to plunder public property may not survive the JVP’s new strength. But he judges the JVP’s positions on the economy and the ethnic question neither progressive nor practical: it accepts decentralisation while rejecting devolution, when only maximum devolution can settle the war, and its coercive route to constitutional change invites Prabhakaran to conclude that a minority may also impose its way. With the SLFP reduced to a dwarf and both leaders’ ambitions evaporating, Ivan proposes an all-party interim administration on an agreed reform programme.
What is going to happen?
Writing days before the April 2004 parliamentary election, Victor Ivan argues that no result can reduce the country’s instability. Two nationalist blocs have each split — the Jathika Hela Urumaya’s monks drawing away from the JVP’s claim to represent Sinhala nationalism, and Karuna’s break dividing the Tamil National Alliance between north and east. If no party reaches 105 seats, the balancing seats cannot come from the TNA, since courting Prabhakaran means fighting Karuna and courting Karuna means fighting Prabhakaran. Ivan sets out the manoeuvres open to Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickremesinghe in each scenario, warns that a prolonged failure to form a government would weaken the economy and the rule of law and choke off international aid, and notes that Prabhakaran — who had watched the earlier crisis with amusement — is now as bogged down as the two leaders he was observing.
Two Aspects of Political Opportunism
In this article, Victor Ivan examines the mutual political opportunism and power struggle between President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe leading up to the dissolution of parliament. Ivan argues that Kumaratunga’s political strategy—including formalizing a permanent alliance with the JVP, taking over key ministries, and shrewdly calculating her election and oath dates—was driven entirely by her desire to avoid political invalidation at the end of her second term. Conversely, Wickremesinghe’s passive strategy was to defend the existing system and allow the President to serve out her terms so that she would naturally be invalidated, clearing his path to the executive presidency. This calculation ultimately prevented him from actively challenging her controversial appointments to the judiciary and the elections commission, allowing her to consolidate power.
මැතිවරණයෙන් කුමක් සිදුවේ ද?
An analysis of the April 2004 general election. Taking peace, the cost of living and corruption as the issues voters care about, Ivan works through the 2001 results district by district, adding PA and JVP votes together, to estimate whether the new alliance can beat the UNP and what that would mean for the North-East.
රනිල් වික්රමසිංහට වැරදුණේ කොතැන ද?
The President’s takeover of three ministries and dissolution of Parliament were undemocratic and arbitrary, but Ranil Wickremesinghe’s handling of the crisis was not strong either. Ivan weighs the Prime Minister’s record, including his peace initiative, and asks whether he will now fight the system itself or simply try to oust her.
රට යන්නේ විනාශයටය
The President wants to avoid political irrelevance at any price; the Prime Minister wants to keep the executive presidency so that he can inherit it. The editorial warns that this power struggle could end in anarchy and in the LTTE gaining freedom to act without a negotiated settlement.