Person: Ranil Wickremesinghe

කැත කුණු තවරාගත් සුදු නෙළුම

Ivan recalls a private celebration at Temple Trees after the 1994 election, and Chandrika Kumaratunga’s repeated public claims of personal purity, including that she never stole a cent, and sets them against the record. He argues that had Ranil Wickremesinghe treated her as he treated Anuruddha Ratwatte, things might have turned out differently.

ප්‍රභාකරන්ගේ වීර දින පණිවුඩය

President Rajapaksa reads Prabhakaran’s Heroes’ Day speech as an offer of friendship. Ivan argues that it was Prabhakaran, not the Sinhala voters or the SLFP, JVP or Hela Urumaya, who decided the election, blocking Ranil Wickremesinghe’s ‘peace with traps’ in favour of a candidate of ‘pure war’, and warns of a new Gemunu–Elara war or rebellions within the south.

Prabhakaran and the Presidential Election

Victor Ivan argues that the 2005 presidential election was decided not by the Sinhala people, the SLFP, the JVP or the Hela Urumaya but by Prabhakaran, who spoke on Heroes’ Day only after the result of his decision had been announced. Reading that speech, he traces why the LTTE leader wanted Wickremesinghe beaten: the ceasefire began boldly on both sides — roadblocks lifted, the ban withdrawn, a strategic route opened, demining agreed — but the Sri Lankan government would not even press for the Washington aid summit to be held on neutral ground, and talk of a ‘safety net’ confirmed a suspicion that nets are for catching fish. Campaigning on defeating separatism, invoking the lion flag while discussing federalism, and never once appealing on behalf of the Tamil people, Wickremesinghe lost, in Ivan’s phrase, both the branch he held and the branch he stood on. Prabhakaran instead installed the man the Sinhala people had chosen as their Dutugemunu against him. Ivan runs the Dutugemunu-Elara parallel through to its limits — this Elara is the younger man and will not request a duel — and sets out the options open to him, noting the warning that this was a final notice before a decisive struggle in the coming year.

මහින්දගේ ජයග්‍රහණය

Mahinda Rajapaksa won a close contest, helped by Prabhakaran’s boycott, ending the political careers of both Ranil Wickremesinghe and Chandrika Kumaratunga. For the first time the SLFP passes to a leader outside the Bandaranaike family; sections assess Wickremesinghe, Kumaratunga, the JVP and Prabhakaran, and predict that on the ethnic question Rajapaksa will end up on their path.

ජනාධිපතිවරණය, මැතිවරණ කොමසාරීස්වරයා හා වත්කම් බැරකම් නීතිය

The Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law of 1975, amended in 1988, is the only strong law for scrutinising the wealth of politicians and officials, yet until 1999 it was applied almost only to officials. Ivan recounts how, as Ravaya’s editor, he asked the Elections Commissioner for the declarations filed by Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickremesinghe with their 1999 nominations.

ජනාධිපතිවරණය ගැන සමාලෝචනයක්

Ranil Wickremesinghe faces only Mahinda Rajapaksa, but Rajapaksa faces Wickremesinghe and Chandrika Kumaratunga as well. His candidacy excites anti-UNP forces, though his pacts with the JVP and Hela Urumaya and the Bandaranaikes’ hostility cost him; two incalculable factors remain, Prabhakaran and Karuna.

Trends in the Presidential Contest

Three weeks from the 2005 presidential election, Victor Ivan sets out what each outcome would produce. Defeat ends the political life of whichever man suffers it, and fragments his party. A Wickremesinghe victory brings immediate dissolution and a parliamentary election that would cut the JVP and Hela Urumaya down, after which Ivan expects him to seek an SLFP coalition anyway to shield his peace programme from objection. A Rajapaksa victory requires no dissolution, since the Hela Urumaya could simply be added to the Alliance — though Ivan finds him harder to read, uncertain whether he would accommodate the JVP and Hela Urumaya or pursue an agenda of his own. He then turns to the arithmetic: the Alliance’s 45.60% in 2004 falls some 500,000 votes short of a presidential majority, and its 2004 total merely preserved what the SLFP and JVP had polled separately in 2001 rather than adding to it. The UNP’s losses since 2001 match the Jathika Hela Urumaya’s gains almost exactly, making those voters decisive. And the Tamil National Alliance vote, which nearly doubled in 2004, rests with the LTTE — which may back neither candidate, in which case turnout in the north and east will fall.

ජනාධිපතිවරණයේ ප්‍රවණතා

With three weeks to go, Ivan argues that the winner’s side will stay dominant for a long time. If Ranil Wickremesinghe loses, his career ends and the UNP splits; if Mahinda Rajapaksa wins, he will want an early parliamentary election to weaken the JVP and the Hela Urumaya; and it is unclear what the LTTE will do with the Tamil vote.