Prabhakaran and the Presidential Election

December 1, 2005
Publication:
Victor Ivan argues that the 2005 presidential election was decided not by the Sinhala people, the SLFP, the JVP or the Hela Urumaya but by Prabhakaran, who spoke on Heroes' Day only after the result of his decision had been announced. Reading that speech, he traces why the LTTE leader wanted Wickremesinghe beaten: the ceasefire began boldly on both sides — roadblocks lifted, the ban withdrawn, a strategic route opened, demining agreed — but the Sri Lankan government would not even press for the Washington aid summit to be held on neutral ground, and talk of a 'safety net' confirmed a suspicion that nets are for catching fish. Campaigning on defeating separatism, invoking the lion flag while discussing federalism, and never once appealing on behalf of the Tamil people, Wickremesinghe lost, in Ivan's phrase, both the branch he held and the branch he stood on. Prabhakaran instead installed the man the Sinhala people had chosen as their Dutugemunu against him. Ivan runs the Dutugemunu-Elara parallel through to its limits — this Elara is the younger man and will not request a duel — and sets out the options open to him, noting the warning that this was a final notice before a decisive struggle in the coming year.

Prabhakaran’s Heroes’ Day speech has been understood in different ways by different people. President Mahinda Rajapaksa seems to have taken it as one in which Prabhakaran offers his hand of friendship to the President. 

At this Presidential election, the question as to who should become the President was finally decided; not by the Sinhala people, the SLFP, the JVP or the Hela Urumaya, but by Prabhakaran. He made his speech after he had already decided who the President of the land of the Sinhalese should be, and after the result of that decisión had been announced. 

He said that the Sinhala people had no understanding at all about the right of self determination, that they do not have the capacity to understand it, that the Sinhala people would never give the Tamil people the right of self determination, and that it was a right that the Tamil people had to win by fighting for it. 

In that speech Prabhakaran had tried to analyze to some extent the reasons for his desire to defeat Ranil Wickremesinghe. His observation was that the peace negotiations had been a process of peace talks with some traps. Mr Ranil Wickremesinghe had functioned as the trapper. 

This shows that Mr Ranil Wickremesinghe’s approach to peace had not pleased Prabhakaran or the LTTE although it might have pleased the Tamil people. It may be said that the process of initiating the peace negotiations had happened in an extremely positive manner. 

After signing the Ceasefire Agreement, a number of extremely bold steps were taken by the leaders of both the parties in order to give meaningfulness to the peace process. 

Mr Ranil Wickremesinghe removed the road blocks and also did away with the ban on the LTTE. Mr Velupillai Prabhakaran not only opened the route, disregarding its strategic importance, but also gave his assent to a program of removing the land mines in the north. Mr Ranil Wickremesinghe had a strong beginning but the middle of the process had no strength. 

In the matter of the Washington aid summit, the Government of Sri Lanka did not even stand for the necessity of holding the aid summit in a neutral land. This transaction breached the LTTE’s confidence in Mr Ranil Wickremesinghe that had been built. Thereafter Mr Ranil Wickremesinghe went to the extent of speaking about a ‘safety net’. A net is required for the purpose of catching or trapping fish. Thereafter they saw that the entire peace process of Mr Ranil Wickremesinghe was a cunning attempt to entrap them. 

In the Presidential election campaign Ranil Wickremesinghe called his program a plan for defeating separatism. Although that designation might have been meant to gain credibility among the Sinhala people, the LTTE must have understood that signal in a different way. Mr Ranil Wickremesinghe also spoke about the lion flag while discussing a federal state. Throughout his election campaign he spoke about the peace talks and a federal set up but nothing about the problems the Tamil people are facing. He did not even make an appeal on behalf of the Tamil community. 

At the end, Prabhakaran prevented Mr Ranil Wickremesinghe, who stood for tricky peace, from winning, and put in power Mr Mahinda Rajapaksa who stood for pure war. 

This means that Mr Ranil Wickremesinghe, the political thinker, lost both the ‘branch which he held by his hand and the branch on which he stood’ (the Sinhala people and the Tamil people). 

In the end, Prabhakaran put in power Mr Mahinda Rajapaksa whom the Sinhala people had chosen as a Dutugemunu against him (Prabhakaran). Now Mr Mahinda Rajapaksa, the President of the Sinhala state, and Mr Velupillai Prabhakaran, the President of the Tamil state are facing each other. 

Elara of yore was an old man while Prince Dutugemunu was a young man. It was the old Elara who wanted a duel between the two, considering the harm that a war would cause to the people in general. 

Dutugemunu and the Elara of the present may be considered middle aged leaders who are not young or old. However, the Elara of the present is younger to the present Dutugemunu. The Elara of the present is unlikely to ask for a duel. 

Prabhakaran’s oration on Heroes’ Day, in addition to being one addressed to the international community, may be considered a speech addressed to the newly anointed president of the land of the Sinhalas by the president of the land of the Tamils. In his speech he addressed President Rajapaksa with due respect, and did not forget to say that Mr Rajapaksa had an understanding of the right of self-determination. At the same time he said that this was his last notice to the Sinhala government and that if there was no proper response, he would start the decisive struggle for self determination in the coming year. (He did not say exactly when, it might be any time from January to December next year.) 

Now President Mahinda Rajapaksa says that the Ceasefire Agreement will be protected and that peace talks will be initiated as soon as possible. He does not say that the facilitator (Norway) will be dispensed with. It is not clear what the JVP and the Hela Urumaya are going to say or do next. 

Unlike Elara, Prabhakaran has a number of options open to him: 

To declare his willingness to discuss, with the new President of the Sinhala nation, the existing problems, and if there is no fruitful outcome, to withdraw from the Ceasefire Agreement and to proceed to capture Jaffna, and to request peace talks again;

To promise that he will not interfere with the affairs of the Sinhala state and to act with mutual understanding in order to keep the Sinhala state in a position of non-interference in the affairs of the Tamil state; or

To preclude a duel, unlike Elara, to start a direct war.  

If there is no Gemunu-Elara war, a situation might arise in which the Theraputtabhayas and the Velusumanas will rebel.