ඊලගට විය හැක්කේ කුමක්ද
Ivan says the government treats its crisis as a simple numbers problem that Sarath N. Silva or the JVP’s ten votes might solve, while the UNP and JVP resemble a jockey clinging to a bolting horse. With the referendum postponed to 18 October, he sets out the President’s options, warns of Philippine-style street protest or a heavy election defeat, and urges an all-party interim government that turns Parliament into a constituent assembly, following South Africa’s example of agreeing principles first, including on talks with the LTTE.
අලුත් හෙට දිනක්
The piece argues that the crisis can only end well through an all-party government focused on essential reforms, which the government’s rejection has made the basis of the no-confidence motion. It asks the main opposition to set out clearly the nature of the government it would form, how the presidency would be reformed, what beyond five independent commissions it proposes, how it would settle the war, how power would be shared and for how long, since such a chance may not recur.
කතාව දෝලාවෙන් ගමන පයින්
Any settlement with Prabhakaran requires renewing the social contract with real power-sharing, but the government’s fine words on devolution are contradicted by its conduct. Moving from Hobbes to Rousseau and modern pluralism, the editorial lists how the President denies power to ministers, the judiciary, the Elections Commissioner and the Auditor General, meddles in the Kataragama Basnayake Nilame election and the cricket board, and strips Colombo’s UNP council, so Tamils cannot trust her promises.
සතුරන් සේම මිතුරන්ද සැකයි
Ivan describes a People’s Alliance government paralysed by fear of a no-confidence motion. Its margin has shrunk from 37 seats before the 2000 election to nine, with no outside support, so six defections would bring it down. Thondaman, Hakeem and even S.B. Dissanayake are restive, the President accuses allies of taking LTTE money, and the Prime Minister blocked lifting the LTTE ban. The opposition must act before October, when the President may dissolve Parliament.
සාම කතා ඇරඹීම
Peace talks with the LTTE are due in early May, driven by international pressure after foreign help stopped the Tigers taking Jaffna. Ivan argues that the LTTE now knows Eelam will not be accepted and has softened its claim to be the sole representative of Tamils, but doubts the government’s maturity: it lacks an opposition consensus, a secure majority and internal unity. He urges state reform, accountability of the presidency and the independent commissions as the basis for consensus.
ප්රභාකරන්ගේ ඊළග පියවර කුමක් ද?
The editorial argues that the LTTE is trapped not by military strength but by a world order that no longer legitimises armed struggle, as the fall of Elephant Pass and the outside help that saved Jaffna showed. Mandela, the PLO, the IRA and the JVP adapted; governments that crush just grievances also face isolation. It assesses Prabhakaran as a gifted but ruthless commander, groups him with Wijeweera, Premadasa and Vijaya Kumaratunga, and says a turn to peace would multiply his strength.
ආණ්ඩුව ඉන්නේ අන්තෝ ජටා බහි ජටා තත්ත්වයකය
Ivan says the People’s Alliance is trying to hide its sins behind peace talks without preparing the ground. It rewarded poll offenders, its pledge to recall MPs’ liquor licences is a lie when some ministers hold seven, and the President ties the four commissions to her constitution. He recounts the farce of cabinet-making, from Anuruddha Ratwatte’s return as Deputy Defence Minister to the splitting of the deputy finance post between G.L. Peiris and S.B. Dissanayake. With a four-vote majority and a failing economy, he expects the Chief Justice’s impeachment to be the first shot.
සාම ප්රයත්නයේ අභියෝග
EPDP leader and minister Douglas Devananda told a Sinhala daily that he does not oppose talks with the LTTE but that a northern and eastern settlement is possible without it if the other Tamil parties agree. The piece likens this to the views of the JVP, the Sihala Urumaya and Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, notes Dinesh Gunawardena’s silence, and argues that Devananda, who prospered under Premadasa and now the People’s Alliance, owes his armed guard and power to the war, casting doubt on the government’s sincerity.
විසඳුමක් අවශ්ය වුවත් එය සමග සෙල්ලම් කරන්නට යාම භයානකය
Ivan argues that peace in a long war fuelled by mutual hatred requires a serious, systematic effort, while politicians talk of peace mainly to please donors. Playing with the problem can make it worse, as the collapse of the Indo-Lanka Accord and the southern bloodshed showed. Before talks, the government must build a political climate through reforms that reduce hostility among parties and revive democracy.
ප්රශ්නය විසඳදිමේ හැකියාවක් ඉන්දියාවට ඇත්නම් මැදිහත්වීමත් යහපත් ය
India says it has a package to end the war based on an undivided Sri Lanka and a fair settlement of Tamil grievances. The editorial welcomes any Indian solution acceptable to both sides, since mutual hatred rules out an internal settlement, and sets out the cost of the war: defence spending doubled from Rs 25 billion in 1994 to 50 billion and has risen to 75 billion since Elephant Pass, dwarfing health, education and transport budgets.