සිය කැමැත්තෙන් හිරවීම
Ivan calculates that even repeating its presidential vote would give the People’s Alliance and allies only about 115 of 225 seats under district proportional representation, and 103 if its vote fell ten percent. Intra-party preference contests make rigging harder, hence the push for a mixed system, which needs a two-thirds majority, a referendum and six months. A hostile Parliament could elect the Speaker, impeach the President or cut her funds, a trap of the President’s own making.
බිත්තර නොකඩා ඔම්ලට් හැදිම
Ivan recalls that J.R. Jayewardene’s 1978 constitution concentrated power in an executive president, subordinating Parliament, the courts and the public service, and that Sirimavo Bandaranaike vowed to fight any resulting dictatorship. Quoting the People’s Alliance 1994 manifesto and Chandrika Kumaratunga’s January 1995 address pledging abolition, he notes that she now offers to change everything except the presidency, which would end only with her term, and contrasts this with F.W. de Klerk.
A self-created impasse
The average number of votes a candidate needed to become an MP was 35,305 in 1994 and 32,492 in 1999. From that arithmetic the column works forward to the impasse the government has built for itself, and to what the courts could and could not do about extending a parliament.
පාර්ලිමේන්තු මැතිවරණයකට කෙරෙන ගණන් බැලිම
With Parliament’s term ending on 24 August, Ivan weighs the government’s options. Extending the term would unite the UNP, JVP and Sihala Urumaya; under proportional representation even 4.3 million votes would give the alliance only about 115 seats. He explains the proposed mixed system of 260 members designed to curb the JVP and Sihala Urumaya, which would need a two-thirds vote and a referendum, and the crisis a hostile Parliament would pose for an executive president, as N.M. Perera foresaw.
මැතිවරණයට පෙර සර්ව පාක්ෂික සාකච්ඡාවක්
Ivan argues that dealing with Prabhakaran requires first arresting the decay of the whole political system. Public trust in leaders and institutions has collapsed, the executive has captured legislative and judicial power, and even the Elections Commissioner and Auditor General fail in their duties, as the unauthorised gas company compensation shows. He proposes an all-party dialogue before the election to agree on reform principles binding whoever wins.
දිකිරට බලලූන් සාක්කි දිම
Ivan responds to the French ambassador’s intervention in the dispute over the President’s educational qualifications. He faults her for ignoring the President’s office calling a questioning editor a ‘worm’, and uses The World of Learning directory and an OECD training inventory to argue that Sciences Po and the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales were not then part of the University of Paris and that an école diploma is not equivalent to a university degree.
අභිමත බලය කොයිබටද?
Ivan questions the appointment of businessman Harry Jayawardena, a close Bandaranaike family friend and 1994 campaign financier, to the Securities and Exchange Commission while facing customs fraud cases against Stassen Exports and inquiries over Hatton National Bank dealings. He also criticises the choice of Rienzie Arsecularatne as Director General of the Bribery Commission despite past controversies, and warns that such use of presidential discretion, with opposition silence, is ruining the country.
When will wisdom dawn on them?
Even after being elected to it, the President has several times called the executive presidency a dreadful cancer introduced into the body politic. By now proposing to keep that cancer to the end of her own term while reforming the constitution, she has turned the whole reform project into a selfish and ridiculous farce.
Political solutions or political opportunism
Making a constitution implies that the people of a country reach a consensus on the kind of government that suits them. In Sri Lanka it is being done behind their backs: they do not know what is proposed, and the document looks likely to reach them for discussion only after every agreement has been struck.
රාවයට වැරදුණේද? ආපසු හැරි බැලීමක්
Ivan defends Ravaya’s critical stance before the presidential election. He explains that the paper promoted Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1992–94 for her reform programme, which she never implemented, and rejects her claim to have ended the fear of death and granted media freedom, recalling how Ravaya defied J.R. Jayewardene and Ranasinghe Premadasa, including publishing the 1988 election petition verdict in advance. He lists corrupted polls under her rule and maintains her win was not a clean mandate.