ආණ්ඩුවේ ඉදිරි දැක්ම හා කාර්ය සාධනය
Ivan assesses the Rajapaksa government from its narrow 2005 victory to its unrivalled post-war dominance, crediting the defeat of the LTTE and real progress in resettlement and rehabilitation. He argues that the UNP’s opposition to the war destroyed its own base, that the government has given Tamils everything except their dignity, and that leaning towards China while breaking promises to India ignores the island’s geopolitical position. Mahinda Rajapaksa, he concludes, dreams like Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir or J.R. Jayewardene of development without democracy.
ක්රමයේ අර්බුදය උග්ර කරන පළාත් සභා මැතිවරණ
Hearing Sajith Premadasa promise better welfare for the rural poor under a UNP president, Ivan reflects that no change of president can rescue a system that has outlived its time. Prabhakaran’s defeat left the traditional political system without its enemy and exposed its decay: an economic crisis alongside lavish infrastructure spending, chaos in the energy sector, and mass recruitment of young people into state jobs to buy support. Holding provincial council elections piecemeal before their terms end, he argues, shows how deep the government’s crisis is.
යහපත් දේශපාලන ක්රමයක් සඳහා සිහින දැකීමේ අවශ්යතාව
Writing during the 2012 provincial council elections, Ivan examines the electoral system created in 1978. Quoting Election Commissioner Chandananda de Silva’s report on the 1989 election, he argues that the system hands the party holding the presidency control of Parliament and the public service, and that open vote-buying and campaigns costing billions have turned elections into auctions. He recalls watching money flow to Chandrika Kumaratunga’s campaigns and Leslie Goonewardene’s refusal of foreign funds for his party, and warns that the country’s richest people have made their fortunes by funding politicians and now rule from behind the scenes.
පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ පරිහානිය හා එය ජයගැනීම
Ivan’s submission to the parliamentary select committee on the conduct and discipline of MPs. He cites a survey in which only 12% of people trusted Parliament, and traces the decline through land grabs and permits, thugs and private militias, and black money in elections, contrasting today’s spending with the limits of 1965 and 1970. He recalls the L.M.D. de Silva and Thalgodapitiya commissions, which led to MPs being expelled, and argues that the assets and liabilities law should be enforced, with declarations published on a parliament website. He also proposes a German-style mixed electoral system instead of the plan of the Dinesh Gunawardena committee.
සෝභිත හිමිගේ පැතුම
Unable to attend Maduluwawe Sobitha Thero’s 70th birthday, Ivan honours him as one of the few learned people who never stayed silent in the face of wrongdoing. He recalls telling two vice-chancellors, G.L. Peiris and Arjuna Aluwihare, after the second JVP revolt that intellectuals’ silence was the cause of youth rebellion. Sobitha Thero called for abolishing the executive presidency and changing the electoral system in his lifetime, and Ivan notes a growing chorus — Maithripala Sirisena, Speaker Chamal Rajapaksa, government MPs, the Communist Party, the JHU — for change. He contrasts the old Westminster system, with by-elections, constituency MPs, spending limits and a Prime Minister in Parliament, with the executive presidency, which concentrates power in one person above the law and turns governance into a system of plunder.
ෆොන්සේකා නිදහස්! ඊළඟට කුමක්ද?
The President’s decision to release General Sarath Fonseka, whatever its motives, signals willingness to move towards a softer government and reform, Ivan writes. The prosecution looked to fair-minded people like the victor’s revenge, displeasing even those who voted against Fonseka. He traces the rift between Fonseka, the President and the Defence Secretary after the war, and argues that its breaking of the ruling triumvirate was good for the country, since a united trio might have produced a harsher, more militarised government, and a Fonseka victory in 2010 might even have led to dictatorship. Fonseka’s leap into politics at the head of anti-war forces was his greatest folly; abandoned by his allies except Karu Jayasuriya, he accepted a conditional release, yet history will remember him as one of the world’s great commanders.
හොඳම විසඳුම 13ද?-
India, the West, Tamil leaders and devolution advocates treat full implementation of the 13th Amendment as the best solution, but Ivan argues it was built for the North-East Tamils alone, on the unproven idea of a traditional Tamil homeland, and imposed on a reluctant J.R. Jayewardene under Indian pressure. Citing G.H. Peiris’s study of the Eastern Province and K.M. de Silva’s critique of separatist ideology, he says the homeland claim has never been rebutted, and warns that a solution resting on it will leave others feeling deceived. Sinhala and Tamil leaders should each apologise for their wrongs. He proposes village councils modelled on India’s panchayats, district councils able to merge into provincial and regional councils by popular consent, a smaller Parliament with a Senate, a human-rights charter, information rights, and strong election and anti-corruption commissions.
පෙරටුගාමී පක්ෂයේ ස්වයං විවේචනය
Amid the decay of every party, Ivan reviews the newly formed Frontline Socialist Party through its 445-page book on the JVP’s path from 1978 to 2012, billed as a self-criticism but really a critique of its parent party. Its young members are committed, he says, but their thinking still lives before the fall of the Berlin Wall, ending with Lenin on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The book romanticises JVP culture without asking why idealistic youth became executioners in 1988–89. He traces a thread through the JVP’s history: after Wijeweera’s disappointing 273,248 votes in 1982, the party never found a leader the public would accept, backing Rajapaksa in 2005 and Fonseka in 2010 for want of its own candidate — a dilemma rooted in race, caste and religion. The FSP must put knowledge before action.
දේශපාලන පාදඩකරණය හා කළු සල්ලි
Sri Lanka, Ivan warns, is falling into the grip of criminals and black-money barons: only 4% of criminal cases end in conviction, against 70% in India and 85% in Europe, because witnesses are unprotected, police corrupt and courts compromised. He traces how the JVP and LTTE insurrections led politicians to arm private security gangs drawn from local criminals, how rival underworld gangs rose and fell with changes of government — killings that foretold each change — and how criminals became MPs and councillors without abandoning extortion and drug dealing. Election costs have exploded, from one lakh in 1989 to 500 lakhs for a district seat, so parties and presidents depend on black money repaid from public funds. He calls for spending limits, audited accounts and caps on donations.
වාද කරන්නට පෙර ප්රකෘති සිහිය ඇති කරගැනීම වැදගත්ය
Answering Gamini Viyangoda and Jayatilaka Kammallaweera, who accused him of labelling them and of defending the Rajapaksa regime, Ivan restates his thesis: after losing socialism they adopted the ethnic crisis as their cause and lost their judgement when the LTTE fell, as he once feared a coup under Wijeweera’s spell before 1971. He rejects Viyangoda’s claim that he attacked individuals for twenty years and turned to ‘the system’ only to protect Rajapaksa, noting that his ‘Chaura Rajya’ series on reforming the predatory state ran in Ravaya in 2002, before ‘Chaura Rajina’ (2006), and listing earlier articles on system change. He recalls the Kaha Pati (yellow ribbon) campaign of 2000, the all-party talks on his reform draft in Parliament in 2001, and the 2006 Kobbekaduwa round table, and argues that reform must come by consensus, as Mandela achieved.