ෆෙඩරල් අපභ්රංසය
Prompted by the LTTE’s statement that it would drop the demand for a separate state in return for internal self-rule under a federal system, Ivan argues that constitutional debate should not be confined to ethnic grievances, since discontent with the political system is widespread. He then sets out the basic features of federalism with examples from the United States, India, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and Belgium, covering amendment procedures, second chambers, division of powers and dispute resolution, and rebuts popular myths such as a federal unit’s supposed right to secede.
රාජ්යය ප්රජාතන්ත්රවාදි කිරීම
The LTTE’s move from a separate state to a federal system of internal self-rule offers an easier basis for a settlement. Ivan argues that minorities pushed aside by the majority seek to break away, and that the state must be democratised so the majority cannot override their rights, citing Nehru’s creation of Tamil Nadu. He links the insurrections of Prabhakaran and Rohana Wijeweera to caste domination as well as ethnic and class grievances, and calls for a new constitution through broad national dialogue.
Democratization of the Country
This article explores the deeper socio-political fractures in Sri Lanka, arguing that the nation’s violent conflicts have been driven as much by caste oppression as by ethnic divisions. The author points out that both Prabhakaran in the North and Wijeweera in the South led armed rebellions that fundamentally challenged the entrenched dominance of the Vellala and Govigama castes. Highlighting historical examples of political exclusion based on caste—such as C.P. de Silva being denied party leadership—the article contends that Sri Lanka’s rigid political framework fails to accommodate marginalized voices. Ultimately, the author calls for a new, flexible constitution that guarantees true democratic participation and protects all minority groups from the tyranny of the majority.
ඔලුවෙන් සිටුවා ඇති ස්වාධීන කොමිෂන්
Ivan argues that the government’s proposed 18th Amendment, shielding the Constitutional Council from fundamental-rights suits, ignores the real flaw in the 17th: Jayampathy Wickramaratne’s redraft for the President left her the power to nominate holders of key posts. He recounts the civil-society origins of the reform and the JVP and UNP roles in its passage, notes Priyani Wijesekera as its first victim, and proposes public vetting of Council members, barring them from legal practice and letting the Council investigate complaints against senior judges.
19 වැනි සංශෝධනය
The government seeks a 19th Amendment to remove the President’s power to dissolve Parliament after one year, while the President resists. The editorial supports the change, citing France, but warns against repeating the hasty 17th Amendment and lists further defects to fix: the President’s right to hold cabinet portfolios, presidential immunity and the distorted Constitutional Council. It urges a transitional programme that does not make the opposition fear a two-thirds majority.
ව්යවස්ථාව සමග වළ කජු ගැසීම
Ivan traces how politicians have toyed with the constitution: the authoritarian features of J.R. Jayewardene’s 1978 charter, rushed through as urgent; Chandrika Kumaratunga’s broken promise to abolish the executive presidency and her transitional clauses keeping her in power; the 2000 attempt to pass a new constitution by buying UNP votes; and the distortion of the 17th Amendment by Jayampathy Wickramaratne. He notes the Speaker signed the wrong draft, leaving commissions in legal limbo, and argues the proposed 19th Amendment is too narrow.
17 වැනි සංශෝධනය ඔළුවෙන් සිටුවීම
The idea of a Constitutional Council, advanced by professional bodies and backed by pro-democracy and media groups, was meant to take appointments to key posts out of the head of state’s arbitrary hands. The editorial argues that the version of the 17th Amendment drafted with JVP mediation reverses this, leaving the President to nominate and the Council merely to approve, a distortion it attributes to the President, the Chief Justice and Jayampathy Wickramaratne, with the UNP assisting through carelessness.
අනාගැනීම
Ivan argues that Ranil Wickremesinghe wasted his mandate at its peak by not negotiating terms of cohabitation, letting the President keep her choice of IGP, ambassadors, governors and service chiefs. Now she asserts that no one may investigate her or dissolve Parliament but herself. He says the government cannot pursue her Rs 2,445 million vehicle spending while protecting Treasury Secretary Jayasundera, and that her offer to abolish the presidency entirely is a time-wasting trap.
තවත් මැතිවරණයක් අවශ්ය ද?
The editorial argues that the 1978 Constitution breeds endless crises because it ignores the possibility of the presidency and Parliament being held by different parties. Two decades of experience show that the presidency must be amended or abolished, including the arbitrary powers of dissolution and over the cabinet. An election now would damage the peace process and the economy; instead the parties should agree on reform, and the President should accept that her rivals hold the mandate.
සාපරාධී අපහාස නීතිය අවලංගු කිරිමෙන් පමණක් යහපත් රාජ්ය පාලනයක් ඇති නොවේ
Repealing the criminal defamation law, used by the executive against journalists, is an important step, but good governance also needs an independent judiciary, public service, audit commission and elections commission. Despite the 17th Amendment and the Constitutional Council, the impeached Chief Justice remains, local polls showed free elections are not yet assured, and the Bribery, Human Rights, Finance and Public Service commissions still run with their old members. The Council must move faster.