චන්ද්රිකාගේ ගැටලු ජයගන්නට රනිල්ට හැකි ද?
Ivan notes that President Kumaratunga still controls ambassadors, provincial governors, who would head any interim administration, and the power to dissolve Parliament after a year. Curbing these needs a two-thirds majority, and her strategy is to deny the government PA votes unless investigations into crimes of her era, which could threaten her and the Bandaranaike name, are dropped. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s political future, he says, depends on how he handles this.
ජනතාවගේ පරමාධිපත්යය බලය සමග සෙල්ලම් කිරීම
Ivan says the UNF government has failed to keep local elections civilised and has not appointed the promised inquiry into earlier poll malpractice, and traces state-level electoral fraud from the Dedigama by-election and the Jaffna development council poll through 1982 to its revival under Kumaratunga. A second section on the Constitutional Council recounts how the professionals’ draft was reshaped by Jayampathy Wickramaratne so that the President nominates key appointees, a trap the JVP fell into, and asks why the government has not corrected it.
ව්යවස්ථා සංශෝධනයක් අවශ්ය වුවත් එය සිදුකළ යුත්තේ පරිස්සමෙනි
With the UNF in government but President Kumaratunga holding decisive constitutional powers, including dissolving Parliament after a year, Ivan traces the cohabitation crisis to a 1978 constitution designed for one-party control, a flaw N.M. Perera foresaw. The government’s planned amendment to curb her powers needs PA votes for a two-thirds majority, and he warns that buying them could distort constitution-making, urging a broad consensual process for a new constitution instead.
ජනාධිපතිනියගේ මුක්තිය සීමා කිරීම
The proposed constitutional amendment would limit the President’s immunity, which Ivan welcomes. He argues that a head of state who commits crimes, fraud or wilful breaches of the constitution should be liable to prosecution and lose office on conviction without impeachment, noting that the President ignored the 17th Amendment and used her security staff against opponents under the shelter of immunity.
සාමයේ අනාගතය
As the President and the JVP line up against the government’s ceasefire memorandum of understanding with the LTTE, Ivan says Ranil Wickremesinghe misjudged her willingness to cooperate and failed to adapt the 1978 Constitution for cohabitation, as France did in 1986. He proposes constitutional reform giving domestic power to the Prime Minister, and urges that the chance for peace be seized after 18 years of war that neither side can win.
ජනාධිපතිනිය පෙනය පිප්පීම ඇරඹීම
Ivan notes that Chandrika Kumaratunga presents herself abroad as a supporter of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s peace effort while telling supporters at Horagolla that the UNP owes its victory to the LTTE and she will resist any sell-out. He faults the Prime Minister for not reforming his uncle J.R. Jayewardene’s constitution as France did for cohabitation, and proposes curbing presidential powers and simplifying the impeachment procedure, which he calls unique in the world.
Will the president be checkmated?
Using and misusing state resources to the utmost, a desperate PA played even its last trump card, the Tiger card, and the people disregarded all of it and defeated the government with the power of their innocent vote. What the President can still do, and what should be done to her office, is the question.
ජනාධිපතිනිය චෙක් මේට් වේද?
After the People’s Alliance defeat, Ivan weighs the options facing Chandrika Kumaratunga, who still holds executive power. Contrasting American practice and French cohabitation under Mitterrand and Chirac with Sri Lanka’s short 1994 experience, he sees three paths: resignation, a Wijetunga-style nominal presidency, or removal by the new majority through budget control or impeachment. He calls for constitutional reforms making the president accountable to Parliament and the courts and giving the Prime Minister full domestic authority.
පොදු පෙරමුණ පරාජය වුවහොත් විය හැක්කේ කුමක්ද?
Ivan considers cohabitation between a PA President and a UNP Parliament. He recalls how President Wijetunga cooperated with Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1994, quotes N.M. Perera’s 1978 warnings that a hostile Parliament could paralyse a president through its control of finance, and argues that a PA defeat would amount to a popular verdict against her. He concludes that she must accept the leader of the winning party as Prime Minister or face public revolt.
Powerless presidency and power of parliament
Under the 1978 constitution one party can hold the presidency while another commands parliament. That happened briefly between August and December 1994, and it is about to happen again — and this time the President will be at the greater disadvantage.