චෞර රාජ්යය 2
Continuing his survey, Ivan shows how constitutions and laws are made to suit rulers, from J.R. Jayewardene’s 1977 amendment and Kumaratunga’s 2000 bid to change the electoral system by buying MPs to the UNP’s tax amnesty law challenged by Nihal Sri Ameresekere. He faults Attorneys General for serving governments, and the Bribery Commission for clearing Mangala Samaraweera and ignoring evidence of state resources used in the 2001 election. Short items follow on party discipline, the President’s tales, V. Anandasangaree’s defiance of the LTTE, the JVP and Anura Bandaranaike.
මරුවා සමග වාසේ
Ivan mocks the daily broadcasting of the inauspicious direction and the superstition peddled by television and even the JVP-backed paper Lanka. He turns the President’s lecture on the decline of politicians against her, tracing how every president since J.R. Jayewardene, including Premadasa, Wijetunga and Kumaratunga herself, used office for money or power, and attacks the costly upkeep of former presidents, now to be extended to former Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake.
A UNP-PA Coalition in Place of a JVP-PA Coalition?
This article analyzes the strategic political maneuvering between Sri Lanka’s major parties—the UNP, PA, and JVP—over the formation of coalitions and control of the government. It outlines the internal divisions within the PA regarding whether to form a permanent alliance with the JVP to topple the ruling government, or to feign an alliance to eventually form a national government with the UNP. The piece highlights the President’s reluctance for a snap election and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s counter-strategy: maintaining stability to secure international aid for the peace process with the LTTE, and proposing a national referendum on peace to isolate the JVP and foster a UNP-PA coalition.
ජේවීපි -පීඒ සභාගයක් වෙනුවට යූඑන්පී -පීඒ සභාගයක්
The piece maps the calculations behind the PA–JVP rapprochement: Mangala Samaraweera and Anura Bandaranaike pushed for a firm alliance to topple the government, Wimal Weerawansa championed it in the JVP, while the President, wary of a snap election and focused on her own political survival, would not commit. Ranil Wickremesinghe held on until the aid conference and internationalised the peace process; a referendum on it could isolate the JVP and lead to a UNP–PA coalition, which could be good or dangerous.
ජනතා විමුක්ති පෙරමුණේ භූමිකාව
The editorial says the JVP aims to ally with favoured SLFP figures, derail the peace process with the President’s help and use the resulting disorder to form a government it can steer, much as Sirimavo Bandaranaike and N.M. Perera did in 1964, with Mangala Samaraweera as go-between. It argues the JVP offers the SLFP little beyond votes, and warns that the power struggle may push Prabhakaran to prepare for war or to claim that only a separate state is left.
සාපරාධී අපහාස නීතිය හා විමල් වීරවංශ
Parliament repealed criminal defamation unanimously, though some PA and JVP members clearly opposed it. Replying to Wimal Weerawansa’s attack on Ravaya during the debate, the editorial says Ravaya lost faith in Chandrika Kumaratunga long ago, alleges that Mangala Samaraweera arranged a Press Council ruling for the JVP through its chairman Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, and challenges Weerawansa to answer questions on killings and assaults, the Malimbada shooting and corruption allegations against the President.
ජනතා විමුක්ති පෙරමුණට සිදුවූයේ කුමක්ද?
Rebutting Tilvin Silva’s claim of success, Ivan uses vote figures since 1994 to show the JVP lost 47 per cent of its 2001 vote in the local elections, worst in Colombo, Puttalam and Kalutara, which he blames on its nationalism and its alliance with the President. He traces how Chandrika Kumaratunga may steer the party through Somawansa Amarasinghe, whose relative Sirisena Cooray is said to have enabled his 1989 escape, citing General Cecil Waidyaratne.
විය හැකි දේ සහ විය යුතු දේ
Written on the eve of the local government elections, Ivan sets out what each side must prove against the 2001 results, and says a sharp JVP decline could mark the beginning of its end. He praises the government’s comparatively clean campaign, proposes reforming the executive presidency by removing the arbitrary dissolution power and simplifying removal of a president, and argues that Prabhakaran, like Mandela, could become a stronger leader by abandoning arms.
පැවැත්ම සමග කරන සූදුවක්
Ivan argues that the JVP is gambling its political survival by opposing Ranil Wickremesinghe’s peace effort as it once opposed the Indo-Lanka Accord. He recalls that the party called provincial councils a division of the country, killed people over them and then became their keen participants without apology, and now stays silent on the executive presidency and the President’s stalling of the 17th Amendment. Nationalism, he says, can wreck a settlement but no longer carries anyone to power.
එජාප ආණ්ඩුවක් යටතේ රාවය ක්රියාකරන්නට යන්නේ කෙසේද?
Ivan sets out Ravaya’s stance after the change of government. He rejects the claim that the paper makes and unmakes governments, explains why it backed the SLFP before 1994 and turned against Chandrika Kumaratunga after the 1997 and Wayamba election violence, and states its positions on the UNP government, the People’s Alliance, whose ruling clique he names, and the JVP. He also contests a Press Council ruling he says Mangala Samaraweera and Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe engineered.