සටන් කිරීම හා අවසාන සටන
Ivan sets out the principles that let him win most of his battles: a just cause, a clear philosophy and plan, careful assessment and preparation, and knowing when not to fight, as Gandhi refused to hamper the Allies in wartime. He recalls how J.R. Jayewardene ordered him to stop his ‘Kalinga’ column during the second JVP insurrection and how a calm reply won the President’s respect; how he refused JVP requests for help and armed protection, backed the state against the rebels though opposed to the UNP, and saw every such crisis as no time for regime change. He contrasts Gandhi’s respect for his opponents with the hatred driving Sri Lankan struggles, then tells how he defeated the parliamentary privileges committee’s power to punish journalists by refusing its summons, enlisting Mrs Bandaranaike and international pressure, until the committee adjourned indefinitely.
අද්විතීය බවේ උභතෝකෝටිකය
The government expects a large win in the south, where its base is, but the south is also the most critical province in the country and the uncritical loyalty of six months ago has gone. Ivan sets the president’s standing beside Sarath Fonseka’s — a man made equally singular by the same victory, for whom no office in the country was large enough — and notes how much local politicians’ cut-outs are costing the government in public patience.
ව්යවස්ථා සභාව, උයන්ගොඩ හා විග්නේෂ්වරම්
The Jathika Hela Urumaya objects to Jayadeva Uyangoda’s nomination to the Constitutional
Council because he once served a twelve-year sentence, and the prime minister to C.V.
Wigneswaran’s. Ivan answers that the 1977 government repealed the law Uyangoda was sentenced
under and gazetted that it should not follow him, that Gandhi, Mandela and D.S. Senanayake
were all imprisoned men, and that being Tamil does not make a retired Supreme Court judge a
separatist. The deeper fault, he argues, is a constitution written to place the president
above itself.
ප්රභාකරන් හොඳ නම් ජනාධිපතිනිය පමණක් නරක ඇයි?
Ranil Wickremesinghe has reached agreement with Prabhakaran but not with Chandrika Kumaratunga, who leads the main opposition. Ivan argues that any settlement with the LTTE needs at least the main opposition’s support, and faults the government for wavering between confrontation and coexistence, leaving PA rebels stranded after the 19th Amendment failed. Citing de Klerk and Mandela, he says Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran must each win respect across communities and from the People’s Alliance.
සහජීවනය කොයිබටද?
Ivan welcomes talk of cohabitation between the President and the Prime Minister but says it must rest on principles. The 1978 Constitution breeds conflict when power is divided, the President has refused to respect the new mandate, and the UNP still covets the presidency. He rejects the idea of forgetting her alleged killings, PSD violence and the vehicle purchases, and points to South Africa’s truth commission, which examined abuses by both sides.
විය හැකි දේ සහ විය යුතු දේ
Written on the eve of the local government elections, Ivan sets out what each side must prove against the 2001 results, and says a sharp JVP decline could mark the beginning of its end. He praises the government’s comparatively clean campaign, proposes reforming the executive presidency by removing the arbitrary dissolution power and simplifying removal of a president, and argues that Prabhakaran, like Mandela, could become a stronger leader by abandoning arms.
දැලි පිහියෙන් කිරි කැම
Ivan likens Ranil Wickremesinghe’s rapid push for peace to a Lasker-style chess attack that ignores control of the centre, in a game with many live players, from the President and JVP to Prabhakaran, Hakeem and Thondaman. He recalls how Mandela won respect across racial lines, finds international and business conditions favourable, but warns that the Prime Minister must negotiate while the army answers to a hostile President.
Will Prabhakaran take the peace path?
The LTTE and its leader are stuck in a quagmire and finding it hard to keep the violent struggle going. Whether Prabhakaran can take the path of peace, and what it would cost him to try, is the question — and Ivan’s answer is neither hopeful nor hostile.
ප්රභාකරන්ගේ ඊළග පියවර කුමක් ද?
The editorial argues that the LTTE is trapped not by military strength but by a world order that no longer legitimises armed struggle, as the fall of Elephant Pass and the outside help that saved Jaffna showed. Mandela, the PLO, the IRA and the JVP adapted; governments that crush just grievances also face isolation. It assesses Prabhakaran as a gifted but ruthless commander, groups him with Wijeweera, Premadasa and Vijaya Kumaratunga, and says a turn to peace would multiply his strength.
Reforms process: it’s a matter of trust
If Tamil and Muslim people saw the President’s attempt at a new constitution as a genuine effort to settle the ethnic question, its failure must pain them. And if she had succeeded, it might have brought not a solution but bloodshed between communities — because the thing missing was never the document.