A UNP-PA Coalition in Place of a JVP-PA Coalition?
This article analyzes the strategic political maneuvering between Sri Lanka’s major parties—the UNP, PA, and JVP—over the formation of coalitions and control of the government. It outlines the internal divisions within the PA regarding whether to form a permanent alliance with the JVP to topple the ruling government, or to feign an alliance to eventually form a national government with the UNP. The piece highlights the President’s reluctance for a snap election and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s counter-strategy: maintaining stability to secure international aid for the peace process with the LTTE, and proposing a national referendum on peace to isolate the JVP and foster a UNP-PA coalition.
ජේවීපි -පීඒ සභාගයක් වෙනුවට යූඑන්පී -පීඒ සභාගයක්
The piece maps the calculations behind the PA–JVP rapprochement: Mangala Samaraweera and Anura Bandaranaike pushed for a firm alliance to topple the government, Wimal Weerawansa championed it in the JVP, while the President, wary of a snap election and focused on her own political survival, would not commit. Ranil Wickremesinghe held on until the aid conference and internationalised the peace process; a referendum on it could isolate the JVP and lead to a UNP–PA coalition, which could be good or dangerous.
දේශපාලන අස්ථාවරභාවය
Although a sea clash did not wreck the peace talks, uncertainty persists over whether the President, now allying with the JVP, will dissolve Parliament. The editorial argues that an early election is unlikely because the PA lacks a firm base, victory with the JVP could bring a worse war, and the international community backs the peace process. It adds that the government has failed to win respect beyond the peace effort, and that lasting peace requires deep reform of the political system rather than a mere truce.
සිංහයා, වෘකයා, කැනහිලා හා නිලමැස්සා
Tony Fernando’s jailing and beating shocked the world but not Sri Lanka’s conscience. Ivan notes Param Cumaraswamy’s appeal to the Bar Association, the President’s refusal to pardon Tony, which he ties to her mutual protection pact with Sarath N. Silva, and the Prime Minister’s indifference. He attacks three newspapers backed by the President and Mangala Samaraweera for smearing Tony and Ravaya, recalls their defence of PA-era crimes, and ends with a fable of scavengers to rank their journalists.
අඳ-ගොළු-බිහිරි පාර්ලිමේන්තුව
Ivan argues that Parliament, unlike legislatures elsewhere, ignores citizens’ complaints and media exposures. His examples include the Bribery Commission’s ruling on Mangala Samaraweera’s credit-card spending, its refusal to act on his own complaint against the Chief Justice, and Ravaya’s 2001 exposure of abuses by the Public Trustee, including misuse of the Samarakoon fund meant for poor couples’ dowries. He cites the Marga survey and the IBA report on the judiciary, which Parliament never debated, and the UNP’s silence on the Chief Justice now it is in government.
දූෂණයට වඩා වගකිව යුත්තේ දේශපාලකයා ද රාජ්ය නිලධාරියා ද
Using the purchase of armoured vehicles for the President, where Rs 2,400 million was spent against a parliamentary allocation of Rs 63 million on used BMWs bought through an intermediary, Ivan argues that senior officials bear greater blame than politicians because their posts are permanent and they are bound to uphold the law. He criticises the Treasury Secretary and the Auditor General, including over the President’s Fund, privatisation and Mangala Samaraweera’s credit-card spending, and calls for top officials and politicians to be prosecuted and jailed.
ජනතා විමුක්ති පෙරමුණේ භූමිකාව
The editorial says the JVP aims to ally with favoured SLFP figures, derail the peace process with the President’s help and use the resulting disorder to form a government it can steer, much as Sirimavo Bandaranaike and N.M. Perera did in 1964, with Mangala Samaraweera as go-between. It argues the JVP offers the SLFP little beyond votes, and warns that the power struggle may push Prabhakaran to prepare for war or to claim that only a separate state is left.
අල්ලස් හා දූෂණය
Ivan explains the 1994 laws that created the Bribery Commission and the offence of corruption, and why they failed: the President appointed commissioners freely and was excluded from the definition of public servant, as the 48 security vehicles bought in 2000, 13 missing, show. He criticises the Commission’s handling of the Channel 9, Mangala Samaraweera credit-card and misuse-of-state-resources complaints, its reference to the 1975 rather than the amended 1988 assets law, and proposes reforms.
මාධ්ය නිදහස ප්රජාතන්ත්රවාදය
Taking up Lasantha Wickrematunge’s criticism of editors for hiding wrongdoing by the powerful, Ivan welcomes the repeal of criminal defamation and planned media reforms but says freedom means little without responsibility. He recounts how most papers protected magistrate Lenin Ratnayake and Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva, and faults the Editors’ Guild for silence on the Leader ban, the President’s claim that a minister plotted to kill two editors, and the layered cover-up of attacks on journalists under the last government.
සාපරාධී අපහාස නීතිය හා විමල් වීරවංශ
Parliament repealed criminal defamation unanimously, though some PA and JVP members clearly opposed it. Replying to Wimal Weerawansa’s attack on Ravaya during the debate, the editorial says Ravaya lost faith in Chandrika Kumaratunga long ago, alleges that Mangala Samaraweera arranged a Press Council ruling for the JVP through its chairman Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, and challenges Weerawansa to answer questions on killings and assaults, the Malimbada shooting and corruption allegations against the President.