ජයග්රහණය හා ඉදිරි ගමන
Rajapaksa’s re-election was large but its limits are visible. Ivan contrasts Wickremesinghe’s acceptance of defeat in 2005, decided by 180,786 votes, with Fonseka’s refusal to concede without explaining why the result is dishonest — a soldier new to politics who misread his crowds and campaigned believing defeat impossible. Both sides broke the law: the government used state media and resources as every government has since 1977, while the opposition used overseas websites and an FM station to spread false reports that the President had fled to India and the Elections Commissioner was under house arrest. The alliance behind Fonseka was held together by nothing but hostility to Rajapaksa, and included men who had accused him of Lasantha Wickrematunge’s murder. The anti-Rajapaksa revolt was largely urban, and the victory drew almost no Tamil, up-country Tamil or Muslim support. Infrastructure spending in the north and east has not answered the political question beneath it.
විය යුත්තේ කුමක්ද?
Two days before the poll, Ivan states plainly that he does not want Fonseka to win — not because Rajapaksa’s administration deserves protection, but because a change driven by hatred rather than a vision would leave the country in disorder, and anarchy is worse than bad government. Defeat would not finish Fonseka: he would become opposition leader and could acquire the political schooling he lacks, having entered politics straight from the battlefield and now flying on wings borrowed from two other parties. Ivan argues the opposition’s deeper failure is squandering parliament’s committee system, where members sign the attendance sheet for the allowance and leave, breaking quorum and sending summoned officials home with their files unopened. He sets out what Rajapaksa must change: shed the relatives beyond Chamal, Gotabaya and Basil, build an anti-corruption commission on the Hong Kong model, and stop overriding the independent commissions.
දූෂණය සනාථ කළයුත්තේ කටකථාවලින් නොව නිශ්චිත සාක්ෂිවලිනි
Corruption is the loudest subject of the campaign and the worst argued. Ivan says any administration’s corruption deserves scrutiny at an election, then insists the opposition move from rumour to specific proof — and gives his own examples, among them a broadcasting licence written into a regulator’s own name and sold on. Assets declarations filed with nominations, he notes, are documents anyone may examine.
දේශපාලන ක්රමය වෙනස් කිරීම!
Abolishing the executive presidency is not the simple act it is being sold as. Ivan traces the underlying philosophy of the system, the cost the country pays for its irregularity, and the size of the cabinet — quoting the United Front’s own 1994 manifesto promising no more than twenty ministers against the fifty-four it appointed — and concludes that the change is possible, but complex, and needs people who understand what they are changing.
ජනරාල් මුහුණදී තිබෙන දේශපාලන උභතෝකෝටිකය
The General’s arrival lifted the anti-government forces but has not yet built him a position to win from. Ivan reads the signs — the JVP still absent from his poster campaign, the UNP machine uneasy beneath its enthusiasm, no answer on the minorities or on abolishing the executive presidency — and says a man flying on two borrowed wings that beat in opposite directions may not fly straight.
සේනාපති හා සේනාධිනායකයා අතර තරගය
The UNP and the JVP brought the General forward partly to force a parliamentary election first, Ivan argues, and the president wrong-footed them by calling the presidential one early. He compares the two men as political animals — one seasoned and cured, the other still an apprentice — and says that is the factor that will decide it, for and against the General alike.
ජනාධිපති මහින්ද රාජපක්ෂගේ අනාගතය
Winning the election will not save a president who cannot look back honestly at his own record, Ivan argues. He sets the strengths against the limits — the war won, the family’s grip, the corruption and nepotism, the scale of the cabinet — and says the victory was an opening to build a political system worth the name, an opening the president has so far declined.
යුද වීරයන් දෙදෙනකු අතර කෙරෙන්නට නියමිත ශුද්ධ වූ සංග්රාමය
The victory over the LTTE made Mahinda Rajapaksa a giant and every other politician a dwarf, so the opposition answered a hero with a hero. Ivan weighs General Fonseka’s candidacy — the silence about what he stands for, the JVP’s and the UNP’s incompatible expectations of him, and the record of soldiers who entered politics and did not stay democrats.
බල තරගයේ හැඩතල
The picture has changed from one in which the government would win any election easily to one in which it must fight for them. Ivan traces the crisis to the scale of the president’s own coming victory, and argues that the country turned a policy of taking help from the anti-American world into publicly campaigning for it — going so far as to attack Obama, which even China, Iran and Venezuela did not do.
ඉදිරියේ විය හැක්කේ කුමක්ද?
State power is gathered around the executive presidency, so the presidential election matters more than any other, and the system is built so that whoever holds the office can arrange every other election to suit. Ivan works through the court judgment, the Sarath Fonseka factor, where the Tamil vote will go, and the steady evaporation of the war’s pleasure.