එල්ටීටීඊ පරාජය හා දෙමළ ජනතාව යුද්ධයේ අවසානය හා රටේ අනාගතය
Because the war ended with the whole LTTE leadership destroyed rather than with a remnant intact, Ivan argues, the movement lost both the capacity and the confidence to regroup — which is why Prabhakaran’s death brought no violent reaction. He turns from there to what the peace should be used for: relaxing security, rebuilding villages, and setting the army to public works.
පෝද්දල ජයන්තට පහරදීම
After a television programme used footage of Poddala Jayantha and Sunanda Deshapriya while
alleging that some journalists were paid by the LTTE, Poddala came to Ivan and asked him to
intervene. Ivan describes what he did, what the president said when the question was put to
him, and why he thinks naming such journalists would have been ruinous — and argues that the
fault can only be corrected by looking critically back at the policy that produced it.
අගවිනිසුරුට ප්රීතිමත් විශ්රාම ජීවිතයකට සුබ පැතුම්
Continuing the previous week, Ivan asks what a review of Sarath N. Silva’s judgments would
find, and answers with the record of appointments, plunder of public property, the company
he kept and the ambition to become head of state. He reports the meeting at which senior
counsel advised Chandrika Kumaratunga against appointing him — and Aloy Ratnayake’s
prediction that one day he would turn on her — and closes with the long list of lawyers and
judges who signed against him.
විශ්රාම යන අගවිනිසුරුතුමෙනි. ඔබට ආයුබෝවන්
On the retirement of Sarath N. Silva, Ivan sets out the record: cases of relatives heard and
relieved, enemies punished to the limit, orders issued to the executive and the legislature,
and an injunction obtained against the Speaker through friendly counsel and a friendly bench
to stop an impeachment reaching the House. He goes back to the district court case brought
by a chemical engineer over the judge’s relationship with his wife, and to the officer
promoted before his punishment had expired.
අවතැන්වූවන් පිළිබඳ ප්රශ්න
Ivan calls the UN Secretary-General’s remark to CNN — that he had never seen camps as bad
anywhere — a bad statement, and notes that the Swedish opposition leader who visited the
same day was far less harsh. Housing three hundred thousand people is neither simple nor
quick; the camps are improving rather than worsening, the identification of cadres has to
finish before the army can hand them over, and the contractors’ opportunities to profit
should be cut back.
ශ්රේෂ්ඨත්වය පරිපූර්ණ කිරීම
Judging by the weapons taken and the infrastructure found, Ivan writes, another decade of
the LTTE would have been past imagining — and both the wars and the peace talks had
strengthened its de facto state rather than dissolving it. Mahinda Rajapaksa is therefore
the greatest of the country’s leaders since independence; but the greatness is not complete,
and completing it means opening every window to a national argument about what Sri Lanka
should now become.
ප්රභාකරන්ගේ විනාශය
Prabhakaran’s organisation was thought unbeatable and fell like a great tree. Ivan argues
that had he accepted defeat as Hitler did — taking his own life to release his followers —
the war could have ended without harm to the civilians, and that instead he made them his
shield. Setting him beside Wijeweera, he finds two able men whom a particular political
climate turned cruel, and asks what kind of country would not have done that to them.
වර්ග සංහාර භාෂණය ගැන වැඩිදුරටත්
Ivan returns to Bhashana, who reads the war as a long-planned extermination on the model of
Hitler’s and Rwanda’s, and notes that in all his writing since leaving the JVP for the
LTTE’s cause there is not one criticism of the LTTE. He sets the 730 days of Wijeweera’s
rebellion, fought with primitive weapons, against the 1,095 days of Prabhakaran’s, fought
with modern ones, and invites Bhashana to do the arithmetic of the dead himself.
ආණ්ඩුව හා විරුද්ධ පක්ෂය දෙපැත්තට ඇදීම
The government fought the war as a single-handed act and attacked the opposition through it;
the opposition worked to obstruct the war, likened it to Hitler’s, and sought to cut off
aid. Ivan traces the habit to the system J.R. Jayewardene built to keep an opposition
permanently out of power, follows it through the SLFP’s own years in the wilderness and its
quiet satisfaction at the JVP’s revolt, and ends by asking which matters more to either
side, the party or the country.
ත්රස්තවාදය ජයගැනීමෙන් නොනැවතී දේශපාලන ක්රමය ජයගත යුතුය
The Western Province result leaves the government stronger after three years than when it
began, the UNP down from 39 seats to 30 and the JVP from 22 to three. Ivan argues that the
moment to press for a change in the political system is precisely when the opposition cannot
win power by ordinary means, and that the president’s own promise to abolish the executive
presidency is the lever the opposition should use.