මුට්ටියට පෙර හොරා යැවීම
Ivan describes Mangala Samaraweera’s push for the President to seize power quickly, possibly driven by a pending case over an attack on poster-pasting youths during the last election, and reads her takeover of the Development Lottery Board as a test of the Prime Minister. He warns that a clash between presidential and parliamentary power could turn bloody, and urges a French-style cohabitation in which the President leaves domestic government to the majority, while faulting the JVP, PA and UNP for opportunism over the 1978 Constitution and the independent commissions.
ජනාධිපතිනිය යන්නේ කොයිබටද?
The President’s reply to the Prime Minister signals that she will ignore her opponents’ mandate and may reshape the Development Lottery Board or even the Cabinet at will. The editorial rejects the government’s rowdy resistance but also her claim that the President’s Fund was endangered, noting she diverted Mahapola scholarship money to it, and contrasts her with Mitterrand and D.B. Wijetunga, who ceded domestic power under cohabitation. It blames the government’s own inaction, including leaving the Chief Justice in place.
ප්රශ්න සමග චත්ගුඩ ගැසීම
With talks stalled and the LTTE rejecting the government’s proposed authority in place of an interim administration, the Japan aid conference will go ahead without it. The piece argues that Ranil Wickremesinghe’s strategy of holding on without resolving anything until the President’s term ends in 2005 cannot satisfy the LTTE or Tamils, that using American backing as a threat is futile, and that he should have reached an honest deal with the President or pro-peace PA forces and informed the public.
රටේ පැවැත්ම සමග සෙල්ලම් නොකළ යුතුය
The LTTE’s temporary withdrawal from talks does not mean imminent war, yet the President appears to be stoking public fear of one, ordering roadblocks back in Colombo and extra guards for Anuruddha Ratwatte and state television. The editorial argues that she has no right to risk bloodshed for political advantage and that the LTTE must be kept within the negotiating process.
A UNP-PA Coalition in Place of a JVP-PA Coalition?
This article analyzes the strategic political maneuvering between Sri Lanka’s major parties—the UNP, PA, and JVP—over the formation of coalitions and control of the government. It outlines the internal divisions within the PA regarding whether to form a permanent alliance with the JVP to topple the ruling government, or to feign an alliance to eventually form a national government with the UNP. The piece highlights the President’s reluctance for a snap election and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s counter-strategy: maintaining stability to secure international aid for the peace process with the LTTE, and proposing a national referendum on peace to isolate the JVP and foster a UNP-PA coalition.
ජේවීපි -පීඒ සභාගයක් වෙනුවට යූඑන්පී -පීඒ සභාගයක්
The piece maps the calculations behind the PA–JVP rapprochement: Mangala Samaraweera and Anura Bandaranaike pushed for a firm alliance to topple the government, Wimal Weerawansa championed it in the JVP, while the President, wary of a snap election and focused on her own political survival, would not commit. Ranil Wickremesinghe held on until the aid conference and internationalised the peace process; a referendum on it could isolate the JVP and lead to a UNP–PA coalition, which could be good or dangerous.
දේශපාලන අස්ථාවරභාවය
Although a sea clash did not wreck the peace talks, uncertainty persists over whether the President, now allying with the JVP, will dissolve Parliament. The editorial argues that an early election is unlikely because the PA lacks a firm base, victory with the JVP could bring a worse war, and the international community backs the peace process. It adds that the government has failed to win respect beyond the peace effort, and that lasting peace requires deep reform of the political system rather than a mere truce.
හදිසි ආණ්ඩු පෙරළියකට තිබෙන ඉඩ
With Parliament a year old, the editorial weighs the President’s options. Anura Bandaranaike says she can dissolve it once a pact with the JVP is reached, but an election soon after the last one could anger voters and the JVP is a poor partner in government. Counting seats, it shows the People’s Alliance and allies cannot reach 113 without UNP defectors, and argues that a coup would anger the international community and not serve her aim of amending the constitution to stay in politics.
ප්රභාකරන් හොඳ නම් ජනාධිපතිනිය පමණක් නරක ඇයි?
Ranil Wickremesinghe has reached agreement with Prabhakaran but not with Chandrika Kumaratunga, who leads the main opposition. Ivan argues that any settlement with the LTTE needs at least the main opposition’s support, and faults the government for wavering between confrontation and coexistence, leaving PA rebels stranded after the 19th Amendment failed. Citing de Klerk and Mandela, he says Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran must each win respect across communities and from the People’s Alliance.
හදිසි මැතිවරණයකට යෑමේ බිය පහවී නැත
From 5 December the President gains the power to dissolve Parliament at any time. The piece sets out the costs of a snap election: expense, a threat to the peace process and a return to war, administrative disruption, loss of investor confidence and the likelihood of another weak coalition. It doubts the President’s assurances, notes suspicions that she is working through the Muslim Congress, and concludes that she is subtly trying to break the government.