Two Aspects of Political Opportunism
In this article, Victor Ivan examines the mutual political opportunism and power struggle between President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe leading up to the dissolution of parliament. Ivan argues that Kumaratunga’s political strategy—including formalizing a permanent alliance with the JVP, taking over key ministries, and shrewdly calculating her election and oath dates—was driven entirely by her desire to avoid political invalidation at the end of her second term. Conversely, Wickremesinghe’s passive strategy was to defend the existing system and allow the President to serve out her terms so that she would naturally be invalidated, clearing his path to the executive presidency. This calculation ultimately prevented him from actively challenging her controversial appointments to the judiciary and the elections commission, allowing her to consolidate power.
විනාශය කරා යන රටක්
Neither main bloc looks able to win enough seats to govern alone. The editorial warns that a constitution shaped for one-man rule has bent every institution to it, leaving a country without wise leaders, an independent public service, an independent judiciary or a responsible press.
බලපොරයේ අවසානය කුමක් ද?
Voters face a third parliamentary election in four years, called not because Parliament’s term ended or the government lost its majority but because of a power struggle. The editorial argues that the conditions for a peaceful, civilised election could have been met first, and questions the practice of handing ministries across the party divide.
රනිල් වික්රමසිංහට වැරදුණේ කොතැන ද?
The President’s takeover of three ministries and dissolution of Parliament were undemocratic and arbitrary, but Ranil Wickremesinghe’s handling of the crisis was not strong either. Ivan weighs the Prime Minister’s record, including his peace initiative, and asks whether he will now fight the system itself or simply try to oust her.
රට යන්නේ විනාශයටය
The President wants to avoid political irrelevance at any price; the Prime Minister wants to keep the executive presidency so that he can inherit it. The editorial warns that this power struggle could end in anarchy and in the LTTE gaining freedom to act without a negotiated settlement.
සන්ධානය කොයිබට ද?
The JVP–SLFP alliance, formed after the President took over three ministries, has not inspired the public. The editorial finds mistrust built into the pact, notes that the JVP’s clean personal habits are shared by the LTTE and prove nothing about respect for life, and argues that an immediate dissolution and election would at least have forced the partners to work together.
මැඩම්ට ජයවේවා
A set of six short notes. The President, now in control of the police, applies the law to the sons of UNP ministers accused of assaulting relatives of Minister Kabir Hashim, which she never did in her own government; the ‘national heroes’ of the Soma Thera campaign now face bribery and criminal charges; the Elections Commissioner cannot even retire because the 17th Amendment commission has not been set up; the President challenges the Prime Minister over the peace process and defence; and the secret second swearing-in to extend her term.
Towards A Solution
In this article, Victor Ivan analyzes the constitutional deadlock resulting from President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s takeover of three cabinet ministries, arguing that the crisis stems from structural flaws in a system where executive power and parliamentary control belong to opposing parties. Ivan critiques Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe for attempting to sideline the Executive President and leveraging the peace process primarily to fuel his own 2005 presidential ambitions. The author notes the irony in the President now calling for independent commissions and state media oversight—reforms the Prime Minister failed to enact earlier—while demanding an equal seat at the table in peace negotiations. Ultimately, Ivan asserts that the only way to avert national catastrophe is to establish a bipartisan power-sharing agreement that includes the President in decision-making on peace.
නඩුත් හාමුදුරුවන්ගෙ බඩුත් හාමුදුරුවන්ගෙ
Ivan examines the Chief Justice’s disclosure to the Daily Mirror that the President took a second, secret oath before him in November 2000, arguing the constitution requires no such oath for a second term, as J.R. Jayewardene’s delayed 1983 swearing-in shows, and that it serves to extend her term to 2006. Further sections criticise her new media task force, contrasting her unkept 1994 promises with the Wickremesinghe government’s repeal of criminal defamation and draft Freedom of Information Act, and argue the Prime Minister lost ground by leaving the judiciary unreformed.
What must happen
In this article, Victor Ivan addresses the major constitutional crisis triggered by President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s unilateral takeover of three key government ministries—including the Defense Ministry—while Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe was abroad. Ivan characterizes the President’s actions as an immoral, well-planned “constitutional coup,” while simultaneously criticizing the Prime Minister and cabinet for sabotaging political co-habitation by attempting to marginalize the President while willingly cooperating with LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. Warning that the deadlock threatens both the national economy and the peace process, Ivan asserts that the crisis cannot be solved through street protests or snap elections. Instead, he argues that the crisis must serve as a catalyst for a bipartisan agreement on structural constitutional reforms, electoral changes, and the revitalization of independent commissions.