2008 ආණ්ඩුවට තීරණාත්මකය
Opening the 2008 columns, Ivan reads the year ahead as the test of the Rajapaksa administration. The military advantage over the LTTE is its strongest asset and simultaneously its greatest liability — it strengthens the government’s standing while eroding the rule of law, its human rights standing and the household economy, and the tax structure it has built cannot absorb any of that.
A Separate Tamil Nation:- Prabhakaran Has Got It Wrong.
Ivan argues that the separate-state goal adopted at the Vaddukoddai conference was imprudent and has brought the Tamil people mostly loss: India’s opposition, a homeland claim covering a third of the island, rival Tamil groups driven to the army as traitors, and a population now largely living outside the North and East. A movement that cannot turn back from a wrong path, he writes, cannot succeed.
Anton Balasingham: He left the Buddha and went to Marx
Written after Anton Balasingham’s death, the piece traces how the LTTE’s theorist moved from Buddhism to Marxism and gave the Tamil struggle the goal of a separate state. Ivan recalls a 1995 dinner in Jaffna with Balasingham, suggests he came to doubt the separatist idea late in life, and urges Tamil militants to reconsider it.
Whither Justice?
A retired army commander and a respected engineer petitioned the Supreme Court over judicial appointments made without constitutional council approval. Victor Ivan records what happened: a bench including the Chief Justice heard the petition and then directed the Attorney General to establish whether the petitioners had abused the judiciary by bringing it. The message, as he reads it, is that nothing the President does may be questioned, and that asking is itself an offence. Neither man belonged to the UNP or sought party advantage; they went to the last place open to a citizen with a grievance about governance. The Court’s first duty is to defend the constitution against an executive assuming powers it does not have, and by making the protection of the President its duty instead it has annulled the constitution without replacing it — leaving the country, Ivan writes, with no fundamental law at all. Similar cases from the Organization of Professional Associations and the People’s Movement for Good Governance have met the same immunity ruling. What strikes him most is who is fighting: citizens who know they will lose, while the UNP, the JVP and the Jathika Hela Urumaya say nothing and parliament will not even debate it. A judiciary that abandons its supervision of the executive, he concludes, brings the country closer to Prabhakaran’s Reich, where no authority may investigate Prabhakaran.
What Can Happen?
Victor Ivan returns to Johan Galtung’s warning that Sri Lanka might end up temporarily under United Nations administration if it fails to manage its crises. Having read Ivan’s An Unfinished Struggle, Galtung reasoned that a judiciary decayed to that degree implied equal decay elsewhere, and that only a failing state deteriorates so far. Ivan’s test is whether serious mistakes get corrected, and he finds no mechanism that does. An election was held without an elections commission because the President twice refused to approve a list the constitutional council had vetted and cleared; parliament and the judiciary both declined to intervene; and with the council’s own term expired, the police and public service commissions cannot be constituted either, making every transfer, promotion and disciplinary action in those services unconstitutional. A year after the tsunami, 6% of the required houses are built — seventeen years at that rate — and the country cannot yet say how many of its dead were men and how many women. He then reads the party system as collapsing: Thondaman reduced to seeking LTTE shelter, the UNP too decayed to reform itself, the SLFP surviving only on state power. Only the JVP and the LTTE retain vigour, and both, he argues, have spent their history accelerating the state’s decay.
වේළුපිල්ලේ ප්රභාකරන් හා රනිල් වික්රමසිංහ
The LTTE is turning from talks back to war, and it is still unexplained why it wanted Ranil Wickremesinghe defeated. Wickremesinghe trusted the TNA and the Tamils to back him without conditions; Ivan concludes that a Prabhakaran who was half-way to good has been pushed somewhere worse, and Wickremesinghe can no longer claim to be the leader who won Tamil trust.
ප්රභාකරන්ගේ වීර දින පණිවුඩය
President Rajapaksa reads Prabhakaran’s Heroes’ Day speech as an offer of friendship. Ivan argues that it was Prabhakaran, not the Sinhala voters or the SLFP, JVP or Hela Urumaya, who decided the election, blocking Ranil Wickremesinghe’s ‘peace with traps’ in favour of a candidate of ‘pure war’, and warns of a new Gemunu–Elara war or rebellions within the south.
Prabhakaran and the Presidential Election
Victor Ivan argues that the 2005 presidential election was decided not by the Sinhala people, the SLFP, the JVP or the Hela Urumaya but by Prabhakaran, who spoke on Heroes’ Day only after the result of his decision had been announced. Reading that speech, he traces why the LTTE leader wanted Wickremesinghe beaten: the ceasefire began boldly on both sides — roadblocks lifted, the ban withdrawn, a strategic route opened, demining agreed — but the Sri Lankan government would not even press for the Washington aid summit to be held on neutral ground, and talk of a ‘safety net’ confirmed a suspicion that nets are for catching fish. Campaigning on defeating separatism, invoking the lion flag while discussing federalism, and never once appealing on behalf of the Tamil people, Wickremesinghe lost, in Ivan’s phrase, both the branch he held and the branch he stood on. Prabhakaran instead installed the man the Sinhala people had chosen as their Dutugemunu against him. Ivan runs the Dutugemunu-Elara parallel through to its limits — this Elara is the younger man and will not request a duel — and sets out the options open to him, noting the warning that this was a final notice before a decisive struggle in the coming year.
මහින්දගේ ජයග්රහණය
Mahinda Rajapaksa won a close contest, helped by Prabhakaran’s boycott, ending the political careers of both Ranil Wickremesinghe and Chandrika Kumaratunga. For the first time the SLFP passes to a leader outside the Bandaranaike family; sections assess Wickremesinghe, Kumaratunga, the JVP and Prabhakaran, and predict that on the ethnic question Rajapaksa will end up on their path.
ජනාධිපතිවරණය ගැන සමාලෝචනයක්
Ranil Wickremesinghe faces only Mahinda Rajapaksa, but Rajapaksa faces Wickremesinghe and Chandrika Kumaratunga as well. His candidacy excites anti-UNP forces, though his pacts with the JVP and Hela Urumaya and the Bandaranaikes’ hostility cost him; two incalculable factors remain, Prabhakaran and Karuna.