Reawakening of Tamil society
The Pothuvil to Polikandy march reads to Victor Ivan as a Tamil society waking up. He sets it beside the two Sinhala insurrections and the failure, since 1948, to build a nation any minority could belong to.
ව්යවස්ථාවක් හදාගැනීමේ ප්රශ්නය 3
The third part of Ivan’s series on constitution-making examines the Soulbury constitution, drafted around D.S. Senanayake’s wishes by Ivor Jennings, whose weak safeguards for minorities Lord Soulbury later regretted, and Colvin R. de Silva’s 1972 republican constitution, whose unitary state, primacy for Buddhism and Sinhala-only laws the Federal Party rejected. The Tamil representatives walked out, and the road led to the 1976 Vaddukoddai resolution for a separate state.
වර්ගවාදය හා නායකත්වයේ අර්බුදය
Lee Kuan Yew was right, this piece argues, that Sri Lanka failed because its leaders could not manage racial passions. Bandaranaike knew Sinhala Only without provision for Tamil was unjust, yet tore up his pact with Chelvanayakam under pressure from militant monks; Dudley Senanayake lacked the courage to see his own pact through; J.R. Jayewardene legislated District Development Councils but could not bear to see the TULF win Jaffna. Mahinda Rajapaksa had the golden chance after the war and let it pass. The Northern Provincial Council election is a silver lining, if leaders on all sides stop inciting their people.
පළාත් සභා මැතිවරණය ගැන
As the first Northern Provincial Council election approaches alongside polls in the North Western and Central provinces, Ivan warns the government not to repeat the blunder of the 1981 Jaffna District Development Council election, when its all-out bid to win led to violence, the burning of the Jaffna library and, with the 1982 referendum, the road to Black July and two insurrections. He expects the government to win in the South but with eroding support, as debt-funded white elephants, a squeezed economy, lost GSP+ and a rotting system shed flesh like a decaying body.
අන්තෝ ජටා බහි ජටා
Ivan asks why more than a hundred thousand deaths in two insurrections have left so little mark on Sri Lankan thought and literature, recalling conversations with Simon Navagattegama and Ediriweera Sarachchandra and a sharp exchange with Sugathapala de Silva. He argues that caste, not only race and class, drove both rebellions: Wijeweera and Prabhakaran came from parallel non-dominant castes and drew their foot soldiers from oppressed ones. Only Premadasa grasped this, and the chance to rebuild society after the LTTE’s defeat has been squandered.
බොරුව හා රැවටිල්ල ජාතික ලක්ෂණයක්ද?
Ivan asks whether deceit is a national habit, and finds it at every turn of modern history: D.S. Senanayake’s staged ‘farmers’ and the governor-generalship promised to Lord Soulbury, the 1962 ‘gin-and-tonic’ coup plot, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s Sinhala Only opportunism, and John D’Oyly’s bloodless capture of Kandy in 1815, whose native helpers’ descendants became the independence elite. Drawing on Marshall Singer, Henpitagedara Gnanaseeha and Robert Knox, he argues that leaders and people have deceived each other on language and religion until the country fell into an abyss.
දහතුනේ අවුල
To win India’s support against the LTTE, President Rajapaksa promised a ’13-plus’ political solution, and Tamil leaders, the UNP and the old Left now demand he keep it, while the JHU, JVP and NFF oppose it. Ivan argues that the President’s doubts are not unreasonable, because the ethnic question is one expression of a larger failure of the political system. He traces how Tamil demands grew from modest regional councils in the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam and Senanayake–Chelvanayakam pacts to the 1976 separate-state resolution, the 1977 mandate, Black July, the Thimpu principles and the Indo-Lanka Accord, and says the provincial council system was hastily designed under LTTE pressure. He proposes instead village councils like India’s panchayats, district councils (with a provincial council for the North if needed), a smaller Parliament and a Senate.
පූර්ණ ප්රතිසංවිධානයක අවශ්යතාව
Ivan argues that Sri Lanka’s schools of thought still see the ethnic question as they did while Prabhakaran lived, arguing only over how much of the 13th Amendment to grant. The root problem, he says, is the failure after 1948 to build a united nation and a democratic society to sustain the state and democracy inherited from Britain: Burghers were driven out, Indian Tamil plantation workers lost their citizenship, Tamils lost language rights, and the 1972 and 1978 constitutions completed the decay of governance. With terrorism defeated, the rot is visible and the moment has come to rebuild nation and state together. He sets out an eighteen-point agenda — from abolishing caste discrimination and fixing national policies to curbing corruption, criminalised politics and inequality — for a four-to-five-year national programme involving all parties.
සටනකට පෙර ස්වයං විවේචනයකට
Responding to a public statement by a group of Tamil intellectuals led by the Bishop of Mannar, Rayappu Joseph, which urges the Tamil National Alliance to reject the 13th Amendment, boycott talks and stay out of the Northern Provincial Council election, Ivan argues that they are again pointing Tamils down the road to ruin. Before any new struggle, he says, the Tamil leadership must honestly ask why the last one failed: the separate-state goal was a fantasy of the traditional leaders, the 1977 mandate was far from overwhelming, J.R. Jayewardene’s 1978 Constitution met many language grievances, and Prabhakaran killed more Tamils than the security forces did. Like Gandhi’s Congress or Martin Luther King’s movement, Tamils should seek equal rights within a Sri Lankan nation and a democratic society.
දෙමළ කැරැල්ලක් ආවේ ඇයි? සිංහලයින් ද ආපසු හැරී බැලිය යුතුය
Having asked where the Tamil struggle went wrong, Ivan turns the question on his own
community. He puts the direct cost of the war to 1998 alone at 423 billion rupees and traces
the language question from the cross-party agreement of the early fifties — broken when Sir
John Kotelawala promised parity in Jaffna and the backlash swept both major parties into
Sinhala Only — through Bandaranaike’s twenty-four-hour pledge, the fast of F.R. Jayasuriya,
the unimplemented Tamil Language Act and standardisation.