ජනාධිපති අගමැති ගැටුම කෙළවර කුමක් ද?
Tracing the Development Lottery Board dispute back to the 1978 Constitution, Ivan quotes N.M. Perera’s warning that split control of presidency and Parliament would paralyse the state and invite dictatorship. He recalls Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake turning against the executive presidency, the PA’s 1994 pledge to abolish it, D.B. Wijetunga’s peaceful handover of domestic power, and Kumaratunga’s broken promise to the JVP. Wickremesinghe, a defender of the office he hopes to hold, failed to strike a deal at the height of his mandate and now faces a dilemma.
ජනතා විමුක්ති පෙරමුණේ භූමිකාව
The editorial says the JVP aims to ally with favoured SLFP figures, derail the peace process with the President’s help and use the resulting disorder to form a government it can steer, much as Sirimavo Bandaranaike and N.M. Perera did in 1964, with Mangala Samaraweera as go-between. It argues the JVP offers the SLFP little beyond votes, and warns that the power struggle may push Prabhakaran to prepare for war or to claim that only a separate state is left.
කෙළවර කුමක් ද?
Ivan explains that the 1978 Constitution assumed one party would hold both presidency and Parliament, and recalls how France and D.B. Wijetunga avoided conflict under cohabitation. Chandrika Kumaratunga could have conceded power or resigned after 2001 but chose confrontation, while the Prime Minister’s investigations of her corruption and crimes now give him the advantage. He sets out the likeliest course of the conflict, ending in impeachment, an election or her loss of office.
ව්යවස්ථා සංශෝධනයක් අවශ්ය වුවත් එය සිදුකළ යුත්තේ පරිස්සමෙනි
With the UNF in government but President Kumaratunga holding decisive constitutional powers, including dissolving Parliament after a year, Ivan traces the cohabitation crisis to a 1978 constitution designed for one-party control, a flaw N.M. Perera foresaw. The government’s planned amendment to curb her powers needs PA votes for a two-thirds majority, and he warns that buying them could distort constitution-making, urging a broad consensual process for a new constitution instead.
Powerless presidency and power of parliament
Under the 1978 constitution one party can hold the presidency while another commands parliament. That happened briefly between August and December 1994, and it is about to happen again — and this time the President will be at the greater disadvantage.
පොදු පෙරමුණ පරාජය වුවහොත් විය හැක්කේ කුමක්ද?
Ivan considers cohabitation between a PA President and a UNP Parliament. He recalls how President Wijetunga cooperated with Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1994, quotes N.M. Perera’s 1978 warnings that a hostile Parliament could paralyse a president through its control of finance, and argues that a PA defeat would amount to a popular verdict against her. He concludes that she must accept the leader of the winning party as Prime Minister or face public revolt.
ජනාධිපති ක්රමය හා ඇටිකෙහෙල්
Comparing the executive presidency to seeded bananas, tasty but hard to digest, Ivan recalls N.M. Perera’s warning that the 1978 system would produce crises once president and legislature diverged. He traces the Premadasa impeachment attempt and Wijetunga’s restraint, then argues that Chandrika Kumaratunga’s arrogance towards her ministers and the opposition, capped by Rauff Hakeem’s dismissal and the prorogation, has trapped her and may pit a hostile new government against her.
සමසමාජ මග හා ජවිපෙ මග
The piece compares the JVP’s ‘probationary’ pact with Chandrika Kumaratunga’s government in 2001 with the LSSP’s 1964 coalition with Sirimavo Bandaranaike. It sets out the LSSP’s internal debate, the talents of its leaders such as N.M. Perera, and its ideological fit with the SLFP, and contrasts these with the JVP’s lack of debate and weak rationale. Both governments, it notes, then fell to parliamentary defections, in 1964 over the Press Bill.
17 වැනි ව්යවස්ථා සංශෝධනය හා ශ්රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණය
Ivan argues that constitutional amendments should not be rushed or sent to court before the public sees the draft, citing N.M. Perera and faulting Batty Weerakoon and Jayampathy Wickramaratne. He contrasts the seven- and nine-judge benches that reviewed earlier amendments with Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva’s small benches that left out Mark Fernando, A.R.B. Amerasinghe and Ranjith Dheeraratne, and objects to his ruling that ITN, Lakhanda and Lake House, as companies, fall outside the Elections Commission’s powers.
ජනාධිපතිනියගේ ඒබ්රහම් ලින්කන් ආදර්ශය
Ivan examines President Kumaratunga’s 22 July racecourse speech calling the 1978 Constitution a death trap and citing Abraham Lincoln as a leader who acted outside the constitution to end slavery. He argues the referendum is a ploy to avoid a no-confidence vote; that crossing the floor is lawful and was done by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, D.A. Rajapaksa, Mahanama Samaraweera and the LSSP leaders; that the Constitution has allowed stable governments; and, recounting the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment, that Lincoln acted within the constitution.