නිදහසේ උභතෝකෝටිකය
On the 54th Independence Day, Ivan laments that freedom won without struggle left Sri Lanka without the attitudes or institutions to hold its communities together. Contrasting its record with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and India, he cites negative growth, 15 per cent inflation, war costs and some 100,000 deaths, and argues that no leader since 1948, Sinhala or Tamil, has won the respect of all communities.
ජනාධිපතිනිය චෙක් මේට් වේද?
After the People’s Alliance defeat, Ivan weighs the options facing Chandrika Kumaratunga, who still holds executive power. Contrasting American practice and French cohabitation under Mitterrand and Chirac with Sri Lanka’s short 1994 experience, he sees three paths: resignation, a Wijetunga-style nominal presidency, or removal by the new majority through budget control or impeachment. He calls for constitutional reforms making the president accountable to Parliament and the courts and giving the Prime Minister full domestic authority.
පොදු පෙරමුණ පරාජය වුවහොත් විය හැක්කේ කුමක්ද?
Ivan considers cohabitation between a PA President and a UNP Parliament. He recalls how President Wijetunga cooperated with Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1994, quotes N.M. Perera’s 1978 warnings that a hostile Parliament could paralyse a president through its control of finance, and argues that a PA defeat would amount to a popular verdict against her. He concludes that she must accept the leader of the winning party as Prime Minister or face public revolt.
රාවයට වසර 15යි
Marking fifteen years, the piece traces Ravaya from a monthly magazine under J.R. Jayewardene to a broadsheet weekly. It says the paper helped bring Chandrika Kumaratunga to power but then opposed her government, which subjected it to bomb attacks and record criminal defamation cases. It pledges the same scrutiny of a coming UNP government and continued pursuit of Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva, and recalls how Jayewardene and Premadasa responded to its criticism.
හවුල් ආණ්ඩු දේශපාලනය
The editorial argues that the People’s Alliance government will be remembered for arrogance, inefficiency and corruption. It contrasts the hopes placed in Chandrika Kumaratunga with elections won by thuggery since 1997, development stalled and the Electricity Board’s savings turned into debt, and a one-woman government in which she took the finance portfolio and alienated her own cabinet.
ජනාධිපති ක්රමය හා ඇටිකෙහෙල්
Comparing the executive presidency to seeded bananas, tasty but hard to digest, Ivan recalls N.M. Perera’s warning that the 1978 system would produce crises once president and legislature diverged. He traces the Premadasa impeachment attempt and Wijetunga’s restraint, then argues that Chandrika Kumaratunga’s arrogance towards her ministers and the opposition, capped by Rauff Hakeem’s dismissal and the prorogation, has trapped her and may pit a hostile new government against her.
සමසමාජ මග හා ජවිපෙ මග
The piece compares the JVP’s ‘probationary’ pact with Chandrika Kumaratunga’s government in 2001 with the LSSP’s 1964 coalition with Sirimavo Bandaranaike. It sets out the LSSP’s internal debate, the talents of its leaders such as N.M. Perera, and its ideological fit with the SLFP, and contrasts these with the JVP’s lack of debate and weak rationale. Both governments, it notes, then fell to parliamentary defections, in 1964 over the Press Bill.
Other side of executive presidency
The President called the 1978 constitution ridiculous and went on enjoying the privileges of the system it created, without even reforming away its contradictions. She is paying for that now.
Darkest period of judiciary
The UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges asked, through the Foreign Minister, that the Chief Justice be prevented from sitting while the impeachment was under way. The Justice Minister has protested that no power may interfere with the judiciary, which under our constitution is independent.
අන්තෝ ජටා බහි ජටා
Ivan likens the President to a man who, unable to climb out of a pit, digs deeper. Jayewardene had a five-sixths majority and Premadasa a comfortable one, but Kumaratunga, with a thin base, tried to rule like Jayewardene, trusted only a few sycophants and humiliated ministers who then conspired against her. Proroguing Parliament strengthened that internal revolt, and he argues her most dignified course is to convene Parliament on the 7th, let the opposition form a government and resign.