ඇනීටා, ප්‍රභාකරන් හා චන්ද්‍රිකා

Prompted by Anita Pratap’s book Island of Blood, Ivan recalls his own part in the 1994–95 peace efforts: prison talks with Tamil detainees after 1971, his view that Chandrika Kumaratunga used the peace issue for Tamil votes, his attempt to broker trust between her and Ranil Wickremesinghe, and a March 1995 Jaffna visit where he helped secure the release of fifteen police prisoners. He also recounts learning from Anton Balasingham of a secret message she sent Prabhakaran through Pratap, and the resumption of war in April 1995.

විශ්වාසභංගය ජනමතවිචාරණය

Ivan argues that loss of a majority does not destabilise a country; clinging to power does. After Rauff Hakeem’s group crossed over, the President should have let the opposition form an all-party interim government pledged to constitutional reform and peace. Instead she prorogued Parliament and called a referendum. He rejects comparisons with Premadasa, who first proved his majority with 116 signatures, recalls the 1960 and 1994 precedents and the 1982 referendum, and asks how a leader who tolerates electoral fraud can deliver a better constitution.

රනිල්ගේ අනාගතය

After the failed budget vote, Ivan argues that most UNP MPs now believe the party needs new leadership to defeat the government and form an all-party interim administration, with Karu Jayasuriya as Opposition Leader and Gamini Atukorale as party leader. He traces Wickremesinghe’s weakness to his rapid rise after the assassinations, distrust of seniors and Gamini Dissanayake’s supporters, and soft opposition, and urges him at least to give up the Opposition leadership.

Ranil’s dilemma: Party or himself

The government avoided defeat on the budget without finding out who was adding to the four members of Thondaman’s group who had agreed to vote it down, and without uniting its own ranks against a repeat. The instability that produced is the setting for a question about the opposition leader.

සනත් ගුණතිලක සහ රුපියල

A profile of the actor Sanath Gunathilake after losing his post as the President’s media adviser, a fall Ivan likens to the rupee’s. He describes the vehicles, guards, free stays at the Galadari hotel and deference he once enjoyed, his habit of attaching himself to whoever held power from Gamini Dissanayake to Kumaratunga, and the income he drew from bar licences run by Neil Abeywardena, liquor distribution, advertising, teledramas and the Channel 9 deal with Lakshman Hulugalle.

චන්ද්‍රිකා පාලනයේ ඇතැම් ගති ලක්ෂණ අනාගතය

Ivan argues that Chandrika Kumaratunga reached power by chance, as Vijaya Kumaratunga, Lalith Athulathmudali, Ranasinghe Premadasa and Gamini Dissanayake left the scene and Anura Bandaranaike quit the SLFP. Lacking experience, she sidelined seasoned figures such as Dharmasiri Senanayake and Mahinda Rajapaksa in favour of S.B. Dissanayake and Mangala Samaraweera. He lists broken promises on the executive presidency, the ‘Pajero culture’, duty-free vehicle permits and liquor licences for MPs, condemns her record of rigged elections, and warns that the worst of her rule may come in a second six years.

Playing it right in the political arena

Unlike Jayewardene and Premadasa, President Kumaratunga did not come to power after long effort and sacrifice; she came to it by fortunate circumstance. What she did come to power on was a democratic political discourse — and this column measures her against it.

Way to peace is found within

Norway has come forward as a facilitator to help Sri Lanka find a way out of the ethnic crisis. Will the Norwegian intervention lead to a solution? Ivan’s answer turns on what both Sri Lankan leaders have already shown they will trade for Prabhakaran’s neutrality.

Why president’s office sent an angry reply to me

There is no disgrace for an elephant who breaks his tusks on a diamond rock. Reading the reply the President’s office sent to his answer to her January interview, Ivan writes, he felt they were living in an abuddassa age, in which the diamond rock pursues the elephant in anger and hatred.

එස්.බී. ගේ තප්පුලෑම

Ivan answers S.B. Dissanayake, who on television called him an extortionist working for an alleged arms dealer, Ananda Chittampalam, to bring Ranil Wickremesinghe to power. Ivan phoned into a live programme to question him, recounts his past association with Chittampalam, Harry Goonatilleke and Anuruddha Ratwatte in the 1988 campaign, and rebuts claims about his income, houses and English. He contrasts Dissanayake’s former hardship with his new wealth and recalls his own role in the impeachment move against Ranasinghe Premadasa.