The rebellion of twenty two years ago in April 1971 was the first attempt made by the rural
Sinhala youth of Sri Lanka to move away from the accepted traditional paths and resort to
violent means with the aim of capturing state power. That rebellion which resembled a cavalry charge was defeated in a few short days. But we know that the same political movement which led that rebellion made another attempt seventeen years later. Unlike in the first instance, the second attempt came very near to achieving its aim of capturing power before it was crushed. Of the main leaders of the second rebellion, only Somawansa Amarasinghe remains alive today. Although its founder, Rohana Wijeweera, and all the other leaders of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna which considers the militant Sinhala village youth the motive force of the Sri Lankan revolution, were killed, it has not been possible to erase completely the acceptance the JVP has had among rural Sinhala youth. A survey conducted by the Ravaya newspaper among its readers recently showed that there is great prestige attached to the JVP among as much as 10% of Sinhala society. This shows that there is room for a third uprising.
If repeated bloodshed is to be avoided, it is very necessary to identify and remove the basic
factors that contribute to youth unrest. Many persons have inquired into this matter but such
inquiries do not appear to have gone beyond the surface. Among the main factors that are seen at first sight to cause unrest are poverty, the widening gap between the rich and the poor,
unemployment, the lack of coherence between education and employment opportunities, the
worsening divide between the town and the village, the lack of allowance and recognition for
youth in general, and so on. Although such obvious elements have received much focus, not
enough attention has been paid to less immediately apparent factors such as caste. The
reasons for this may be that caste influences the polity in less directly apparent ways than the
others. Moreover, caste-markers are not overtly visible. Thirdly, in the urban milieu, caste may appear to be side-stepped, and since most analyses are generated in the cities, they tend to undervalue the impact of caste in rural society.
These rebellions cannot be called caste struggles in their pure form. They were a peculiar
mixture of class and caste struggle. Some of the youth were driven to revolt by their poverty,
some others by unemployment. Some were driven by idealism. Among others were those who joined the rebellion due to caste discrimination. The JVP’s call to create an equitable society was received by different segments of rural youth in different ways. Those with the most harrowing experiences were the ones who had suffered caste oppression. In fact, they formed a large and the most militant stratum. Because they were the most militant, they were also the ones who suffered the greatest casualties. In this sense they were the segment which bore the brunt of the revolt and paid its greatest toll.
When one considers the regional spread of the JVP it is seen that their strengths were in the
areas where people of oppressed castes are concentrated. It was in those areas that severe
clashes took place in both the rebellions. This factor had been observed by Gananath
Obeyesekera and Janice Jiggins in relation to the rebellion of ’71. In relation to the second
rebellion too, this is a fact recognised by even the Presidential Commission on Youth Unrest.
That report says “according to available evidence, severe clashes appear to have taken place in villages of the Bathgama and Wahumpura and other sub-castes and not in Govigama villages.”
According to Brice Ryan’s Caste in Modern Ceylon, between the end of the nineteenth century and 1925, the most severe conflicts in Sri Lanka had taken place not between ethnic groups but between different castes. Those caste conflicts arose when the Karawa, Salagama, and Durawa which may be called coastal castes which were more speedily adapting themselves to the modern capitalist system were claiming to be equal if not superior to Govigama, and, in response, the Govigama had started to counter that claim. However, the situation is different now. Although there are differences between castes like Govigama, Karawa, Salagama and Durawa, they do not appear to be of a serious nature.
The differences that had existed among the castes have lessened to a very great extent with the opportunities they have had to join the modern bourgeois world. However, among some other groups which had not directly joined these caste controversies there is now emerging the flame of unrest. The groups which are most affected are Wahumpura, Bathgama and Nekathi castes.
Other castes that are even more discriminated against do not have the power to stand up to this systematic exploitation as a group, but, no doubt, join in the disaffection as individuals.
People of all the castes were not able to adapt themselves to the capitalist system with equal
speed. Not only this, but capitalism itself fed into the unequal nature of the caste system. While some caste groups were able to do so very early some others were able to do it only much later. The opportunities to share in the benefits introduced by the capitalist system too came to different groups at different times. The first groups to be able to make use of the new business opportunity offered by capitalism were those belonging to the coastal castes. Although the Govigama caste too joined in to benefit from those opportunities, the people of castes like Wahumpura, Bathgama and Nekathi took a very much longer time to do so. Consequently, their opportunities were very few when compared with the numerical strength of the hegemonic groups. This inequality was apparent even in the access to modern education. Educational opportunities too came to them long after they had come to other groups. As a result, the proportion of educated persons in those caste groups is comparatively low. Poverty among these groups is also very high. The problem of landlessness in rural society too has the greatest effect on these caste groups. As Janice Jiggins points out with factual data, these caste groups have not had even parliamentary representation commensurate with their numbers. It must also be stated that in addition to these disadvantages, the acceptance of these groups in society too is at a very low level.
In these circumstances, it is natural that among educated persons of these caste groups there is an eagerness to free themselves from this shameful state of affairs. If they feel that there is no possibility in the existing political set up to achieve their aim, it is inevitable that they will be driven to modes of action that violate accepted traditions.
It must be stated that the caste factor has contributed not only to the Sinhala revolt in the South, but also to the Tamil revolt in the North. The struggle of the militant Tamil youth of the North is not only a struggle for national freedom but also a struggle against Vellala domination. The reason for the LTTE’s reluctance to lay down arms under any circumstances can be understood only in the light of this factor.
The struggle of the militant Tamil youth of the north is not purely an ethnic struggle, a class
struggle, or a caste struggle. It is really a peculiar combination of all these three factors. Caste
interests as well as general Tamil national interests play a role in that struggle. Although various class groups and caste groups are represented in it, it is the people belonging to various oppressed caste groups who have become its motive force. They fulfil two tasks simultaneously. On the one hand they fight for the common national interests of the Tamil nation and on the other they are acting for removal of the shameful bonds imposed on them by the traditional Tamil social organisation. By becoming the main force waging the struggle for the freedom of the Tamil nation they have also been able to achieve an unprecedented social acceptance.
The only reason why they will not agree to lay down their arms under any circumstances is that, if they give up arms and are compelled to go back to a democratic set up, they feel they will also have to revert to the old shameful social structure where the high castes will dominate. That was also the reason why the JVP evaded every reason for a peaceful settlement.
Thus it is clear that the ethnic factor is not the only one that leads to riots and revolts in Sri
Lanka. Caste also plays a role which sometimes cuts across class identity. If the present
bloodshed is to be ended and future ones are to be prevented, an acceptable solution to both these issues will have to be found. As I see it, both these explosive issues are now part of the
crisis of democracy in Sri Lanka. If in decentralising power and creating a new political
framework the policy makers take into consideration not only the ethnic crisis but also the caste crisis, it will certainly help solve these two problems which are intertwined though they express themselves in two different forms.