රාජ්ය පාලකයන්ට රතු සංඥාවක්
During the President’s visit to the Netherlands, a lawyer for Tamil refugees sought a court order for her arrest under the Convention against Torture; the Dutch court rejected it only because it was not properly framed. The editorial draws the lesson that rights violations, attacks on democratic rights and plunder of public money are increasingly treated as international crimes, limiting where rulers can travel or flee.
ප්රභාකරන්ගේ ඊළග පියවර කුමක් ද?
The editorial argues that the LTTE is trapped not by military strength but by a world order that no longer legitimises armed struggle, as the fall of Elephant Pass and the outside help that saved Jaffna showed. Mandela, the PLO, the IRA and the JVP adapted; governments that crush just grievances also face isolation. It assesses Prabhakaran as a gifted but ruthless commander, groups him with Wijeweera, Premadasa and Vijaya Kumaratunga, and says a turn to peace would multiply his strength.
ස්ථාවර ආණ්ඩුවක් පිහිටුවීම අසීරුයි
Ivan calls the October 2000 poll the biggest ballot plunder in parliamentary history, yet the People’s Alliance won only 107 seats and lacks a majority even with the EPDP. He compares the 1994 arithmetic, notes the Muslim Congress’s resentment after Ashraff’s death and his National Unity Alliance’s four seats, and warns that EU observers’ findings could hit aid or bring sanctions. The JVP emerged strong and disciplined, the UNP was complacent, and the Sihala Urumaya was routed.
ප්රශ්නය විසඳදිමේ හැකියාවක් ඉන්දියාවට ඇත්නම් මැදිහත්වීමත් යහපත් ය
India says it has a package to end the war based on an undivided Sri Lanka and a fair settlement of Tamil grievances. The editorial welcomes any Indian solution acceptable to both sides, since mutual hatred rules out an internal settlement, and sets out the cost of the war: defence spending doubled from Rs 25 billion in 1994 to 50 billion and has risen to 75 billion since Elephant Pass, dwarfing health, education and transport budgets.
සම්මානය හා අධිකරණ නිදහසේ මළගම
Ivan welcomes the attention foreign powers are paying to the government’s anti-democratic conduct as well as to the LTTE. He argues that the northern conflict is part of Sri Lanka’s democratic crisis and that southern rulers, though elected, rule partly by terror. He proposes third-party-guided talks, an all-party agreement on constitutional principles, independent institutions, a right to information law and an election followed by a five-year national government on the South African model.
ඉන්දියානු මැදිහත් වීමක් විසඳුමක් ඇති කරලීමට සමත්වේද?
Ivan argues that India, itself a party to the crisis, cannot really resolve it. He traces the conflict to Sinhala Only under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and university standardisation, and to India’s training and arming of Tamil militants in reaction to J.R. Jayewardene’s policies, which Indira Gandhi failed to see would cost her son’s life. Neither a ban on separation nor a merged North-East would satisfy both communities, and no party offers a lasting vision.
යළි ඉන්දියානු මැදිහත්වීමක්
Ivan assesses India’s offer to mediate if both sides ask, after it refused the President’s request for air support. India distrusts the Norwegian process, dislikes Pakistani and Israeli involvement, and will not allow outside powers to crush the LTTE, yet even its intervention seems unlikely to bring a solution before the election. He notes rifts within the Ceylon Workers’ Congress and the Muslim Congress, and emergency rules used to hobble the opposition.