අෂ්රොෆ් ඔබට ආයුබෝවන්
A tribute to M.H.M. Ashraff, whom Ivan calls the most colourful Muslim leader since independence. He links Ashraff’s stand on Muslim identity to the concentrated farming Muslim community of the east, and recounts how in 1988 Badiudin Mahmud persuaded Sirimavo Bandaranaike to drop him from an opposition pact, driving him to back Ranasinghe Premadasa. Ivan recalls that Ashraff gave Chandrika Kumaratunga her 1994 majority yet privately criticised her, and that he publicly reversed his defence of Sarath N. Silva’s appointment after studying the documents.
චන්ද්රිකාගේ නව ආණ්ඩුක්රම ව්යවස්ථාව
Ivan calls the President’s constitution a scheme to keep power under the banner of an ethnic solution, as her father used Sinhala grievances in 1956. Tied to a new electoral system, it provoked the JVP, Sihala Urumaya and UNP, alarmed her own MPs, and she attacked rather than persuaded the Sangha. Using the analogy of complex surgery by an unqualified surgeon, he contrasts her with Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk, who gave up power for a settlement.
Reforms process: it’s a matter of trust
If Tamil and Muslim people saw the President’s attempt at a new constitution as a genuine effort to settle the ethnic question, its failure must pain them. And if she had succeeded, it might have brought not a solution but bloodshed between communities — because the thing missing was never the document.
විසඳුමක් අවශ්ය වුවත් එය සමග සෙල්ලම් කරන්නට යාම භයානකය
Ivan argues that peace in a long war fuelled by mutual hatred requires a serious, systematic effort, while politicians talk of peace mainly to please donors. Playing with the problem can make it worse, as the collapse of the Indo-Lanka Accord and the southern bloodshed showed. Before talks, the government must build a political climate through reforms that reduce hostility among parties and revive democracy.
ප්රශ්නය විසඳදිමේ හැකියාවක් ඉන්දියාවට ඇත්නම් මැදිහත්වීමත් යහපත් ය
India says it has a package to end the war based on an undivided Sri Lanka and a fair settlement of Tamil grievances. The editorial welcomes any Indian solution acceptable to both sides, since mutual hatred rules out an internal settlement, and sets out the cost of the war: defence spending doubled from Rs 25 billion in 1994 to 50 billion and has risen to 75 billion since Elephant Pass, dwarfing health, education and transport budgets.
සම්මානය හා අධිකරණ නිදහසේ මළගම
Ivan welcomes the attention foreign powers are paying to the government’s anti-democratic conduct as well as to the LTTE. He argues that the northern conflict is part of Sri Lanka’s democratic crisis and that southern rulers, though elected, rule partly by terror. He proposes third-party-guided talks, an all-party agreement on constitutional principles, independent institutions, a right to information law and an election followed by a five-year national government on the South African model.
External powers and internal undemocratic activities
It is welcome that the external powers interested in a solution are looking past Prabhakaran’s extremism to the anti-democratic conduct of the Chandrika government. The American Deputy Secretary of State has gone beyond refusing to recognise an Eelam state to saying his government wants free and fair elections and protected freedom of expression.
ඉන්දියානු මැදිහත් වීමක් විසඳුමක් ඇති කරලීමට සමත්වේද?
Ivan argues that India, itself a party to the crisis, cannot really resolve it. He traces the conflict to Sinhala Only under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and university standardisation, and to India’s training and arming of Tamil militants in reaction to J.R. Jayewardene’s policies, which Indira Gandhi failed to see would cost her son’s life. Neither a ban on separation nor a merged North-East would satisfy both communities, and no party offers a lasting vision.
තීන්දු ගැනීමේ ක්රියාවලිය සර්ව පාක්ෂෂික කළ නොහැක්කේ ඇයි?
The editorial argues that a crisis threatening the country’s survival demands that opposition parties share in decisions, not merely be briefed as at the 15 May all-party meeting. It calls for a temporary all-party administration, criticises concealment of events in the North, and notes the double standard by which cartoons of the President are banned while state media ridicule opposition politicians.
Can India be a genuine aide?
India has said it is ready to intervene as a third party if both sides ask. Both sides have stayed silent; only some of the bhikkhus who once rose against the Indo-Lanka Pact, and the leader of the opposition, have answered favourably. Whether India can be a genuine helper is the question the column puts.