චන්ද්රිකාගේ නව ආණ්ඩුක්රම ව්යවස්ථාව
Ivan calls the President’s constitution a scheme to keep power under the banner of an ethnic solution, as her father used Sinhala grievances in 1956. Tied to a new electoral system, it provoked the JVP, Sihala Urumaya and UNP, alarmed her own MPs, and she attacked rather than persuaded the Sangha. Using the analogy of complex surgery by an unqualified surgeon, he contrasts her with Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk, who gave up power for a settlement.
Prabhakaran is not our only threat
An answer to the problem of Prabhakaran can be found only if the collapse running through the whole political system can be stopped and the country’s political spirit revived by a successful reform. The threat named in the headline is not the one the country talks about.
මැතිවරණයට පෙර සර්ව පාක්ෂික සාකච්ඡාවක්
Ivan argues that dealing with Prabhakaran requires first arresting the decay of the whole political system. Public trust in leaders and institutions has collapsed, the executive has captured legislative and judicial power, and even the Elections Commissioner and Auditor General fail in their duties, as the unauthorised gas company compensation shows. He proposes an all-party dialogue before the election to agree on reform principles binding whoever wins.
සම්මානය හා අධිකරණ නිදහසේ මළගම
Ivan welcomes the attention foreign powers are paying to the government’s anti-democratic conduct as well as to the LTTE. He argues that the northern conflict is part of Sri Lanka’s democratic crisis and that southern rulers, though elected, rule partly by terror. He proposes third-party-guided talks, an all-party agreement on constitutional principles, independent institutions, a right to information law and an election followed by a five-year national government on the South African model.
External powers and internal undemocratic activities
It is welcome that the external powers interested in a solution are looking past Prabhakaran’s extremism to the anti-democratic conduct of the Chandrika government. The American Deputy Secretary of State has gone beyond refusing to recognise an Eelam state to saying his government wants free and fair elections and protected freedom of expression.
Can India be a genuine aide?
India has said it is ready to intervene as a third party if both sides ask. Both sides have stayed silent; only some of the bhikkhus who once rose against the Indo-Lanka Pact, and the leader of the opposition, have answered favourably. Whether India can be a genuine helper is the question the column puts.
ඉන්දියානු මැදිහත් වීමක් විසඳුමක් ඇති කරලීමට සමත්වේද?
Ivan argues that India, itself a party to the crisis, cannot really resolve it. He traces the conflict to Sinhala Only under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and university standardisation, and to India’s training and arming of Tamil militants in reaction to J.R. Jayewardene’s policies, which Indira Gandhi failed to see would cost her son’s life. Neither a ban on separation nor a merged North-East would satisfy both communities, and no party offers a lasting vision.
යළි ඉන්දියානු මැදිහත්වීමක්
Ivan assesses India’s offer to mediate if both sides ask, after it refused the President’s request for air support. India distrusts the Norwegian process, dislikes Pakistani and Israeli involvement, and will not allow outside powers to crush the LTTE, yet even its intervention seems unlikely to bring a solution before the election. He notes rifts within the Ceylon Workers’ Congress and the Muslim Congress, and emergency rules used to hobble the opposition.
රට ඇත්තේ විනාශයක එළිපත්තේ ය
Ivan says Prabhakaran’s offensive on Jaffna has evaporated the government’s plans to extend Parliament or win an election through constitutional change. A defeat in Jaffna could topple the government; any election would exclude the North. He notes MPs’ retrospective pay rise, doubts the new Sinhala nationalist party can offer a practical answer, and warns that the war could move south and force the whole country into bunkers.
අර්බුදයක විෂම චක්රයක්
The editorial traces a vicious cycle of ever larger crises from the 1958 riots, the 1971 insurrection and 1983 to the 1988–90 revolt, and says the country now stands at the threshold of a bigger one as the army faces decisive defeat in Jaffna. It weighs the fate of the troops there, the likely collapse of the People’s Alliance government, Prabhakaran’s push into the East, and the prospect of two de facto states at war.