චන්ද්රිකා + රනිල් ඒකත් ජයසිරී මංගලම්
With the 19th Amendment blocked, Ivan sees a stalemate that could push Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickremesinghe into a temporary political marriage: he to protect the peace process, she to halt inquiries into corruption and crimes linked to her security division and to secure her family’s political future. A second section argues she has turned to wrecking the peace process and defends talks with Prabhakaran. A third questions Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva’s handling of complaints against himself and his alliance with Hemantha Warnakulasuriya.
දූෂණයට වඩා වගකිව යුත්තේ දේශපාලකයා ද රාජ්ය නිලධාරියා ද
Using the purchase of armoured vehicles for the President, where Rs 2,400 million was spent against a parliamentary allocation of Rs 63 million on used BMWs bought through an intermediary, Ivan argues that senior officials bear greater blame than politicians because their posts are permanent and they are bound to uphold the law. He criticises the Treasury Secretary and the Auditor General, including over the President’s Fund, privatisation and Mangala Samaraweera’s credit-card spending, and calls for top officials and politicians to be prosecuted and jailed.
Who is More Responsible for Corruption: the Politician or the Bureaucrat?
This article argues that Sri Lanka’s greatest existential threat is not the war waged by Prabhakaran, but the pervasive cancer of state-level corruption and waste that has been rotting the country from within. Challenging the popular narrative that blames corruption entirely on politicians, the author places heavy responsibility on permanent state bureaucrats. Rather than acting as the legal backbone of the state, these officials frequently collude with temporary politicians for personal gain. The author concludes that until both corrupt politicians and their complicit bureaucratic enablers are prosecuted and imprisoned, Sri Lanka will never develop a strong, independent administrative service capable of upholding the rule of law.
ජනතා විමුක්ති පෙරමුණේ භූමිකාව
The editorial says the JVP aims to ally with favoured SLFP figures, derail the peace process with the President’s help and use the resulting disorder to form a government it can steer, much as Sirimavo Bandaranaike and N.M. Perera did in 1964, with Mangala Samaraweera as go-between. It argues the JVP offers the SLFP little beyond votes, and warns that the power struggle may push Prabhakaran to prepare for war or to claim that only a separate state is left.
ජනතාවගේ පරමාධිපත්යය බලය සමග සෙල්ලම් කිරීම
Ivan says the UNF government has failed to keep local elections civilised and has not appointed the promised inquiry into earlier poll malpractice, and traces state-level electoral fraud from the Dedigama by-election and the Jaffna development council poll through 1982 to its revival under Kumaratunga. A second section on the Constitutional Council recounts how the professionals’ draft was reshaped by Jayampathy Wickramaratne so that the President nominates key appointees, a trap the JVP fell into, and asks why the government has not corrected it.
රාවය ඉදිරිය දකින ආකාරය
Answering critics who say Ravaya has gone soft on the UNF government, the paper recalls its record of opposing both UNP and PA governments. It backs curbing the President’s powers even at the cost of a distorting amendment, prosecution of those responsible for PSD crimes, including the President, and the peace effort, including lifting the LTTE ban. It lists its campaigns on the Elections Commissioner, state gifts, assets declarations, the 17th Amendment and Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva, and reveals PSD plans to bomb Ravaya and kill its editor.
ප්රභාකරන් එන්න යන්නේ මොකාටද?
Ivan rejects the JVP-led reading that Prabhakaran’s press conference shows he still wants Eelam, arguing he had to address the international community, the government and his own followers at once. Facing hostile journalists was itself an achievement, and his regretful tone about past violence contrasted with the JVP’s justifications. Drawing on the JVP’s own history, the ANC and the IRA, he predicts the LTTE’s barracks culture will fade only slowly and that Prabhakaran’s real test will be governing.
විය හැකි දේ සහ විය යුතු දේ
Written on the eve of the local government elections, Ivan sets out what each side must prove against the 2001 results, and says a sharp JVP decline could mark the beginning of its end. He praises the government’s comparatively clean campaign, proposes reforming the executive presidency by removing the arbitrary dissolution power and simplifying removal of a president, and argues that Prabhakaran, like Mandela, could become a stronger leader by abandoning arms.
සාමයේ අනාගතය
As the President and the JVP line up against the government’s ceasefire memorandum of understanding with the LTTE, Ivan says Ranil Wickremesinghe misjudged her willingness to cooperate and failed to adapt the 1978 Constitution for cohabitation, as France did in 1986. He proposes constitutional reform giving domestic power to the Prime Minister, and urges that the chance for peace be seized after 18 years of war that neither side can win.
ජනාධිපතිනිය පෙනය පිප්පීම ඇරඹීම
Ivan notes that Chandrika Kumaratunga presents herself abroad as a supporter of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s peace effort while telling supporters at Horagolla that the UNP owes its victory to the LTTE and she will resist any sell-out. He faults the Prime Minister for not reforming his uncle J.R. Jayewardene’s constitution as France did for cohabitation, and proposes curbing presidential powers and simplifying the impeachment procedure, which he calls unique in the world.