What Can Happen?
Reading the April 2004 election result, Victor Ivan opens with a fable of three fish: the green fish stripped of its dominance by a blue-and-red alliance, and the victors fused into one distorted creature, the red fish triumphant but immobilised by the half of the blue fish it cannot finish swallowing. Beneath the allegory he argues that a real change has begun — the system in which either main party’s turn in office amounted to an official permit to plunder public property may not survive the JVP’s new strength. But he judges the JVP’s positions on the economy and the ethnic question neither progressive nor practical: it accepts decentralisation while rejecting devolution, when only maximum devolution can settle the war, and its coercive route to constitutional change invites Prabhakaran to conclude that a minority may also impose its way. With the SLFP reduced to a dwarf and both leaders’ ambitions evaporating, Ivan proposes an all-party interim administration on an agreed reform programme.
What is going to happen?
Writing days before the April 2004 parliamentary election, Victor Ivan argues that no result can reduce the country’s instability. Two nationalist blocs have each split — the Jathika Hela Urumaya’s monks drawing away from the JVP’s claim to represent Sinhala nationalism, and Karuna’s break dividing the Tamil National Alliance between north and east. If no party reaches 105 seats, the balancing seats cannot come from the TNA, since courting Prabhakaran means fighting Karuna and courting Karuna means fighting Prabhakaran. Ivan sets out the manoeuvres open to Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickremesinghe in each scenario, warns that a prolonged failure to form a government would weaken the economy and the rule of law and choke off international aid, and notes that Prabhakaran — who had watched the earlier crisis with amusement — is now as bogged down as the two leaders he was observing.
What must happen
In this article, Victor Ivan addresses the major constitutional crisis triggered by President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s unilateral takeover of three key government ministries—including the Defense Ministry—while Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe was abroad. Ivan characterizes the President’s actions as an immoral, well-planned “constitutional coup,” while simultaneously criticizing the Prime Minister and cabinet for sabotaging political co-habitation by attempting to marginalize the President while willingly cooperating with LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. Warning that the deadlock threatens both the national economy and the peace process, Ivan asserts that the crisis cannot be solved through street protests or snap elections. Instead, he argues that the crisis must serve as a catalyst for a bipartisan agreement on structural constitutional reforms, electoral changes, and the revitalization of independent commissions.
ප්රචණ්ඩ අරගලයේ දුෂ්ට චක්රය
Writing in the first person, Ivan defends a view that angered Tamil intellectuals at a seminar: that the LTTE’s demand for absolute power should be met but confined to Tamil areas. He argues that every violent movement ends by devouring its own dissenters, citing Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky and Bukharin, the JVP’s killing of former comrades and the LTTE’s murder of Amirthalingam and Neelan Tiruchelvam, and advises dissident Tamils to stand aside while Prabhakaran is judged by the Tamil people.
ස්වයං විනාශයකට යෑම
Ivan asks why the LTTE demands an interim administration it knows the government cannot grant, and argues that it seeks recognition as an equal state, as it did when excluded from the Indo-Lanka Accord. He recalls that the Accord already conceded much the Sinhalese now resent, and that the JVP, which bombed Parliament in 1987, now backs the President’s resistance. Examining Sinhala Mahavamsa myths and the Tamil claim to the East, he warns that both leaderships are steering the country towards anarchy.
ප්රශ්න සමග චත්ගුඩ ගැසීම
With talks stalled and the LTTE rejecting the government’s proposed authority in place of an interim administration, the Japan aid conference will go ahead without it. The piece argues that Ranil Wickremesinghe’s strategy of holding on without resolving anything until the President’s term ends in 2005 cannot satisfy the LTTE or Tamils, that using American backing as a threat is futile, and that he should have reached an honest deal with the President or pro-peace PA forces and informed the public.
බූරුවා සහ කැරට් අලය
The LTTE’s withdrawal from talks is a setback the government must resolve quickly. The piece argues that an undefeated adversary cannot be handled with the carrot of aid, warns against using American backing to intimidate the LTTE or irritate India, and says the government should not seek LTTE help for southern electoral ends as Chandrika Kumaratunga did in 1994. It faults the exclusion of the LTTE from the Washington pre-aid meeting and the failure to implement resettlement and rehabilitation.
The Donkey and the Carrot
This article critiques the Sri Lankan government’s flawed approach to peace negotiations following the LTTE’s temporary withdrawal from talks. Author Victor Ivan argues that the government treats the conflict using a simplistic “carrot and stick” model appropriate for a defeated adversary, rather than treating the LTTE as an undefeated entity requiring parity and genuine trust. The piece warns against over-relying on international clout—specifically the U.S. factor—to intimidate the LTTE, which risks alienating both the Tamil rebels and neighboring India. Additionally, it highlights critical administrative missteps, such as excluding the LTTE from the Washington pre-aid conference and failing to implement post-war rehabilitation and resettlement programs due to bureaucratic inefficiency.
ස්වාධීන කොමිෂන් සභාවල ගෙල මිරීකීම
The 17th Amendment was meant to make the police, elections, public service, judicial service, human rights and bribery bodies independent, but the PA distorted it and the UNP government is now quietly strangling the commissions. The editorial notes that the Police Commission has no staff, the Bribery Commission cannot function, the Human Rights Commission has not met, the Judicial Service Commission is left to the Chief Justice and no Elections Commission has been appointed.
සාම කතාවල අනාගතය
With the talks stalled but likely to resume, the editorial calls the ‘carrot’ approach, peace for aid, the weakest element of the process: peace is needed because relations between communities have been uncivilised. It argues that a settlement must address wider democratic problems, since anti-democratic conduct is not confined to Prabhakaran, citing the PA’s Wayamba poll and J.R. Jayewardene’s 1982 election, and must reach the grassroots and win UNP–PA agreement.