99 ජනාධිපතිවරණය වංචාවෙන් ජයගැනීම සඳහා යොදා ගැනුණු

Ivan argues that Chandrika Kumaratunga’s 1999 victory rested on organised fraud rather than sympathy after the bomb attack. He describes S.B. Dissanayake’s push for an early poll, a Samurdhi scheme to seize the poll cards of opposition voters, ballot-box substitution with compliant officials, the removal of the acting Elections Commissioner, and a million forged ballots distributed with underworld and presidential-security help. He ends with practical safeguards for party agents at the coming election.

වැටත් නියරත් ගොයම් කා නම් කාට කියන්න ද?

The editorial argues that before bringing Prabhakaran under the law, the President, cabinet and Supreme Court must themselves respect the Constitution. It lists the caretaker government’s pay rises, regularisations, a Rs 1,000 million handout through divisional secretariats and use of state media, faults the Elections Commissioner’s inaction, and contrasts the Supreme Court’s past orders on free elections with its current dismissal of petitions under the Chief Justice.

ඇනීටා, ප්‍රභාකරන් හා චන්ද්‍රිකා

Prompted by Anita Pratap’s book Island of Blood, Ivan recalls his own part in the 1994–95 peace efforts: prison talks with Tamil detainees after 1971, his view that Chandrika Kumaratunga used the peace issue for Tamil votes, his attempt to broker trust between her and Ranil Wickremesinghe, and a March 1995 Jaffna visit where he helped secure the release of fifteen police prisoners. He also recounts learning from Anton Balasingham of a secret message she sent Prabhakaran through Pratap, and the resumption of war in April 1995.

රජ ගෙදරින් ඇසෙන ඝාතන සංවාදය

Chandrika Kumaratunga told a youth convention that S.B. Dissanayake had urged her to become a dictator and offered to have one or two critical editors killed. Dissanayake replied that she had discussed such matters with Baddegane Sanjeewa, the murdered presidential security officer linked to the Rohana Kumara killing. Ivan describes Sanjeewa’s wealth and protection, identifies the targeted editors as Lasantha Wickrematunge and himself, and recalls the threats and attacks they suffered.

The truth is out there

The accusations and counter-accusations in the quarrel between S.B. Dissanayake and the President are extremely serious, and both sides are holding fire — refraining from using all the bullets at once, and firing one or two at a time.

17 වැනි සංශෝධනය නොසලකා ක්‍රියා කිරීම

Ivan argues that state officials and institutions must stay neutral in elections, which the 17th Amendment was meant to guarantee. He lists the caretaker government’s pay rises, regularisation of casual staff and teacher promotions, the IGP’s refusal to reverse post-dissolution police transfers and the partisan conduct of state media, and says that such wilful breaches by a President who controls both the police and state media would alone justify impeachment and expose officials to prosecution.

රාවයට වසර 15යි

Marking fifteen years, the piece traces Ravaya from a monthly magazine under J.R. Jayewardene to a broadsheet weekly. It says the paper helped bring Chandrika Kumaratunga to power but then opposed her government, which subjected it to bomb attacks and record criminal defamation cases. It pledges the same scrutiny of a coming UNP government and continued pursuit of Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva, and recalls how Jayewardene and Premadasa responded to its criticism.

මැතිවරණයෙන් විය හැක්කේ කුමක්ද?

Ivan predicts a People’s Alliance defeat in the December 2001 election, citing curbs on rigging under the 17th Amendment, the defection of S.B. Dissanayake’s group, and the UNP’s alliance with the Muslim Congress and the Ceylon Workers’ Congress. Using vote shares from 1965 to 2000, he estimates the UNP-led front could near 50 per cent and about 125 seats, leaving the PA below 75, and warns of post-election back-door deals if the result is close.

සමසමාජ මග හා ජවිපෙ මග

The piece compares the JVP’s ‘probationary’ pact with Chandrika Kumaratunga’s government in 2001 with the LSSP’s 1964 coalition with Sirimavo Bandaranaike. It sets out the LSSP’s internal debate, the talents of its leaders such as N.M. Perera, and its ideological fit with the SLFP, and contrasts these with the JVP’s lack of debate and weak rationale. Both governments, it notes, then fell to parliamentary defections, in 1964 over the Press Bill.