The Donkey and the Carrot
This article critiques the Sri Lankan government’s flawed approach to peace negotiations following the LTTE’s temporary withdrawal from talks. Author Victor Ivan argues that the government treats the conflict using a simplistic “carrot and stick” model appropriate for a defeated adversary, rather than treating the LTTE as an undefeated entity requiring parity and genuine trust. The piece warns against over-relying on international clout—specifically the U.S. factor—to intimidate the LTTE, which risks alienating both the Tamil rebels and neighboring India. Additionally, it highlights critical administrative missteps, such as excluding the LTTE from the Washington pre-aid conference and failing to implement post-war rehabilitation and resettlement programs due to bureaucratic inefficiency.
රටේ පැවැත්ම සමග සෙල්ලම් නොකළ යුතුය
The LTTE’s temporary withdrawal from talks does not mean imminent war, yet the President appears to be stoking public fear of one, ordering roadblocks back in Colombo and extra guards for Anuruddha Ratwatte and state television. The editorial argues that she has no right to risk bloodshed for political advantage and that the LTTE must be kept within the negotiating process.
රැලේ සාමාජිකයින්ට පිස්සු නටන්නට ඉඩ හැර බලා සිටීම
The editorial credits Ranil Wickremesinghe with opening roads, keeping calm in the face of the President’s outbursts and internationalising the peace effort, but faults him for failing to discipline his team. It lists reports of ministers and MPs assaulting police, freeing detained supporters and demolishing a Matara sports club building, with endless inquiries and no action, and warns that repeating the lawlessness tolerated under Chandrika Kumaratunga would be ruinous.
සාම කතාවල අනාගතය
With the talks stalled but likely to resume, the editorial calls the ‘carrot’ approach, peace for aid, the weakest element of the process: peace is needed because relations between communities have been uncivilised. It argues that a settlement must address wider democratic problems, since anti-democratic conduct is not confined to Prabhakaran, citing the PA’s Wayamba poll and J.R. Jayewardene’s 1982 election, and must reach the grassroots and win UNP–PA agreement.
නීතියේ පාලනය ඔලුවෙන් සිටුවීම
Eighty days after Tony Fernando was jailed, the Bar Association has done nothing despite Param Cumaraswamy’s appeal, though his case was raised at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva and the Asian Human Rights Commission’s petition has gathered over 3,000 signatures. Ivan argues that the President cannot act because she appointed Sarath N. Silva to control the Supreme Court, and that responsibility therefore falls on the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
කෙළෙහි ගුණ දැක්වීම
Ivan notes that the President was met in London by Ronnie Peiris, who had helped her in exile after Vijaya Kumaratunga’s murder and has since grown rich, and says the UNP’s promised inquiries into such figures have gone quiet. Further sections note that she named Sarath N. Silva as a drafter of her constitution though he sat on the bench reviewing it, praise Anton Balasingham’s endorsement of Neelan Tiruchelvam’s 1996 devolution plan, and ask why no one has sought Tony Fernando’s release.
ඉරාක යුද්ධය
The editorial welcomes a Supreme Court ruling, on a Batticaloa voter’s petition over 55,000 people in an LTTE-held area being prevented from voting, which ordered compensation from the army commander and censured the Elections Commissioner, recalling that the President was allowed to vote from her residence in 1999. It argues that senior officials such as the Elections Commissioner and Attorney General, who served ruling parties and stood by during Tony Fernando’s jailing, have done more harm than politicians.
A UNP-PA Coalition in Place of a JVP-PA Coalition?
This article analyzes the strategic political maneuvering between Sri Lanka’s major parties—the UNP, PA, and JVP—over the formation of coalitions and control of the government. It outlines the internal divisions within the PA regarding whether to form a permanent alliance with the JVP to topple the ruling government, or to feign an alliance to eventually form a national government with the UNP. The piece highlights the President’s reluctance for a snap election and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s counter-strategy: maintaining stability to secure international aid for the peace process with the LTTE, and proposing a national referendum on peace to isolate the JVP and foster a UNP-PA coalition.
ජේවීපි -පීඒ සභාගයක් වෙනුවට යූඑන්පී -පීඒ සභාගයක්
The piece maps the calculations behind the PA–JVP rapprochement: Mangala Samaraweera and Anura Bandaranaike pushed for a firm alliance to topple the government, Wimal Weerawansa championed it in the JVP, while the President, wary of a snap election and focused on her own political survival, would not commit. Ranil Wickremesinghe held on until the aid conference and internationalised the peace process; a referendum on it could isolate the JVP and lead to a UNP–PA coalition, which could be good or dangerous.
දේශපාලන අස්ථාවරභාවය
Although a sea clash did not wreck the peace talks, uncertainty persists over whether the President, now allying with the JVP, will dissolve Parliament. The editorial argues that an early election is unlikely because the PA lacks a firm base, victory with the JVP could bring a worse war, and the international community backs the peace process. It adds that the government has failed to win respect beyond the peace effort, and that lasting peace requires deep reform of the political system rather than a mere truce.