If an armed movement fails to give up its armed struggle and switch to a political path at the opportune moment, that movement could well end up losing everything. Had the LTTE, after securing an advantageous ceasefire agreement from the Ranil Wickremesinghe government, ceased to commit “unofficial” acts of murder and refrained from committing acts of war, the political picture in Sri Lanka may have changed completely, and the cause the LTTE is fighting for could well have been greatly strengthened.
In the South, the JVP made the same mistake. When the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa offered the JVP cabinet posts in 1989, the offer was reportedly rejected by the politburo by a majority of one vote. This decision contributed decisively to the subsequent wiping out of the JVP in a bloody crackdown.
Although the armed conflicts launched by the JVP and the LTTE were dissimilar proportionately, the political immaturity of the two organizations was similar. The JVP, calculating that a triumph for the incumbent UNP at the presidential election of 1988 would lead to conditions that would ensure victory in their armed struggle, worked towards defeating Sirima Bandaranaike and ensuring Ranasinghe Premadasa’s success. After winning the election, Premadasa attempted to draw the JVP into the political mainstream. Perhaps influenced by its self perceived success in the armed struggle, the JVP rejected the President’s overtures and moved towards overthrowing the government and capturing state power. The final outcome of that struggle was the JVP’s destruction at the hands of the Premadasa government.
At the last presidential election, the LTTE followed a policy of defeating its erstwhile “helper,” Ranil Wickremesinghe, and helping Mahinda Rajapakse instead. But subsequently, by resorting to Claymore mine attacks on the Army, the LTTE pushed President Mahinda Rajapakse to a position where he is retaliating against it mercilessly. There is a historical possibility of the LTTE being destroyed by President Mahinda Rajapakse in much the same way that the JVP was destroyed by President Ranasinghe Premadasa in the late 1980s. It was Ranjan Wijeratne who headed the anti-JVP crackdown. He took control of strengthening and directing the armed services and the paramilitary forces in the merciless onslaught on the JVP.
Today, Gothabhaya Rajapakse is cast in a similar role in relation to the LTTE. The unyielding policy being followed by the state today to crush the LTTE, and the equally ruthless strategy followed by the state to crush the JVP uprising almost two decades ago, is roughly the same. It cannot be said that a soft policy was followed against the JVP because it was Sinhala and that a “hard” policy is being followed against the LTTE because it is Tamil. Large scale disappearances and abductions took place during the repression of the JVP in the late 80s. Then, as now, there were also abductions which were carried out for the purpose of extortion. The large majority of those who were killed then by government and paramilitary forces were not “innocent”. Even Richard de Zoysa, who seemed to be guiltless, with no connection at all to the second JVP insurrection, was known to have played an important role in that uprising; and many of those who talk of human rights today were known to have taken up arms to defend themselves against the JVP at that time. The expectation of the public too, was that the JVP insurrection should be crushed at whatever cost. After the cold blooded quelling of the insurrection, the abductions and disappearances, which had been heard of frequently prior to that, ended. With the defeat of the insurrection, the large scale violations of human rights also came to an end.
An internecine war is not pleasant or pretty; in such a scenario the only law that can exist is the law of the jungle. The rule of law, unfortunately, has no place in a situation which is harsh and ruthless in its nature.
Approximately sixty thousand are believed to have died during the second JVP uprising and its brutal suppression in the South of this country. Sixty thousand died in the South within two years. In the North and East, amongst government forces and Tamil militant organizations, the number of people who have died so far in the war is estimated to be another sixty thousand. In the North and East, these sixty thousand combatants died over a period of 20 years.
The path of armed struggle cannot be the best path available for securing justice. The monopoly on violent power lies with the state. When that power is challenged, the state is pushed to a position of crushing the challenger by violence. In such a struggle, the state can be defeated only if the challenger can release a power of violence that can overcome the state’s power of violence. When the issues are ones of such aggression and violence, the destruction they cause to society, too, are immense. The course of armed struggle has not given the people of this country hope and liberation; it has given both the Sinhala South and the Tamil North only blood, tears and destruction.