The Donkey and the Carrot

May 1, 2003
Publication:
This article critiques the Sri Lankan government's flawed approach to peace negotiations following the LTTE's temporary withdrawal from talks. Author Victor Ivan argues that the government treats the conflict using a simplistic "carrot and stick" model appropriate for a defeated adversary, rather than treating the LTTE as an undefeated entity requiring parity and genuine trust. The piece warns against over-relying on international clout—specifically the U.S. factor—to intimidate the LTTE, which risks alienating both the Tamil rebels and neighboring India. Additionally, it highlights critical administrative missteps, such as excluding the LTTE from the Washington pre-aid conference and failing to implement post-war rehabilitation and resettlement programs due to bureaucratic inefficiency.

LTTE’s withdrawal from the process of discussion even temporarily is an adverse development although they have not so far been pushed to the extremist position of saying “we do not need peace with you.” It is the responsibility of the government to solve this problem soon without allowing it to get worse. Perhaps the weakness of the entire approach has contributed to this situation.

In bringing a solution, a defeated person and a person who cannot be defeated are not at the same level. If the transaction is with a person defeated by the other, then the condition of equality cannot be an essential one. The winner listens to the loser and arrives at an agreement for the purpose of preventing the other (loser) standing up again. The loser accepts what he receives because he wants to avoid a greater calamity that might come if he fights.

However, in a transaction with a person you were unable to defeat, you cannot satisfy him by giving him only what you choose to give him. It is also natural that the person you failed to defeat would expect a status of equality in all his transactions with you.

In a complex social conflict like this, the theory of the carrot in the story about the donkey and the carrot is not applicable. However, the government’s approach appears to be based on the theory of the carrot.

There may be some truth in the view that both sides have become so bankrupt economically that they cannot go on fighting. There may also be some truth in the view that if the war is given up and peace is sought then it will be possible to get much help from the international community. However, it is not due to these reasons that we must find a solution to this problem, but because it is necessary to solve it in a manner that would be to the credit of all concerned if we are to get back to a civilized life. For that purpose it would be essential to identify the causes of this inhuman conflict and to find remedies for them. In addition, it would be necessary to identify the wounds caused by the conflict so far and to cure them. Here, the cures are required to a greater extent for the internal wounds rather than for any visible external wounds.

The fact that a number of powerful countries are offering help to solve this crisis is a welcome aspect. However, even that factor can be fruitful only if the government is skilled enough to use it in such a way as not to kindle any doubts in the opposing side. The American factor, especially, must not be used to intimidate that opposing side. The leaders of the government might have the haughty view that we have nothing to fear as America is involved in the issue. Although it is desirable to get the help of the super power of the world to solve our problem, an attitude of “you must agree to everything we say because we have a bigger and tougher guy with us” would only complicate matters and not help a solution. Overplay of that factor will not please our neighbor India either.

This social turmoil cannot be solved by Ranil Wickremesinghe or Prabhakaran by toughness. Both sides need a policy of love and compassion. In the search for a solution to complicated disputes of this nature, no party should be permitted to harbor the feeling that it is going to cheat the other party. At the same time, LTTE’s help should not be sought to solve disputes in the south. It is a mistake that the President made, and this government too seems to be making the same mistake. President Chandrika Kumaratunga who came to power as the Prime Minister in 1994, sought help from the LTTE to secure the support of the Tamil people. That approach created a doubt in the LTTE about Chandrika’s sincerity. If this government too acts with the intention of obtaining the LTTE’s help at the next election, it might create a similar sentiment about this government too with the LTTE.

The government will be able to transact business successfully with a powerful organization like the LTTE which has been in the battle field a long time and which claims to have an army of its own, only if the government, without being either servile or haughty before it and without agreeing to or rejecting everything it says, can convince the LTTE that the government is working devotedly to understand the real problems that the Tamil people have and is trying to find honest solutions to them.

It is natural that the holding of a pre-aid conference in Washington without its participation has disappointed the LTTE. If the government had not foreseen it, that is an indication of the poverty of the government’s vision. If there had been an agreement between the two sides that the work of obtaining aid should be done with the participation of both sides, the government had a responsibility to abide by that agreement. Because of the prohibitory laws operating in the United States against the LTTE, it was not possible for that country to agree to the participation of the LTTE in a conference held there. If the government of Sri Lanka had foreseen that and had made an honest attempt to get the venue shifted to some other place, that would have increased the LTTE’s respect for the government, even if the attempt had failed. However, the LTTE got the impression that the government had made no attempt to make a change well knowing that the LTTE would not be able to participate in that conference. Perhaps the government’s action was prompted by the need to get India to participate in the Washington aid conference. If that was the true reason, the government had a duty to inform the LTTE beforehand and to get its consent.

The charges levelled by the LTTE against the government on the high security zone and on the resettlement of the displaced persons are quite reasonable. The government has not been able to implement even 10% of the program on which agreement had been reached for the purpose of restoring the public life destroyed by the war. Although it is a result of the inefficiency of officials rather than of any deliberate action of the government, it is the government which will get the ultimate blame. Problems are not solved by taking attractive decisions alone. There has to be an efficient mechanism to implement the decisions taken, and a program to supervise the process.

The attempt to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis has to be a full-time one made with understanding and dedication. The members of the groups who go to the discussions must not mix their own personal political agendas with this program. They must be there as a single group bound by unity.

The best that can be done in the present impasse is to look back honestly at the path traversed so far. Then it will be possible to understand properly the mistakes made and the shortcomings that have occured. There is no shame in admitting a mistake that has been made.