A UNP-PA Coalition in Place of a JVP-PA Coalition?

April 1, 2003
Publication:
This article analyzes the strategic political maneuvering between Sri Lanka's major parties—the UNP, PA, and JVP—over the formation of coalitions and control of the government. It outlines the internal divisions within the PA regarding whether to form a permanent alliance with the JVP to topple the ruling government, or to feign an alliance to eventually form a national government with the UNP. The piece highlights the President's reluctance for a snap election and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's counter-strategy: maintaining stability to secure international aid for the peace process with the LTTE, and proposing a national referendum on peace to isolate the JVP and foster a UNP-PA coalition.

There were, near the President, a few persons who held the view that a permanent alliance must be established with the JVP in disregard of the inherent weaknesses of JVP’s ideology, and thereafter the government must be toppled and the power seized. The main spokesman for this idea was Mangala Samaraweera. Anura Bandaranaike is of the view that he himself must be PA’s next presidential candidate. Anura Bandaranaike thought that JVP’s support was essential to make his dream a reality, and he stood for a permanent alliance with JVP.

JVP too held the view that it must enter into an alliance with PA disregarding the class and ideological differences with it, and get her to bring down the government using her executive powers, and thereafter form a coalition government with PA. JVP thought that a government so brought to existence could be taken in a direction that JVP wanted. The leading personality who with Somawansa Amarasinghe’s blessings, stood for that option was Wimal Weerawansa. Mangala Samaraweera had the ability to influence JVP through Wimal Weerawansa. The idea that the two parties would very soon get together and capture power had created a euphoria among the members of both the parties and also created a sense of political instability in the country. This fact affected the peace talks too to some extent.

Among those who are close to the President there were also a group who think in a way different from that of the President. Their view was that, even if PA in combination with JVP captured power, the resultant government would not be able to move forward even by one step. They thought that it would be more appropriate to create uneasiness in the government by pretending to move towards a permanent alliance with JVP and thereafter to get together with the government and form a national government.

The President’s view of things is different from that of all of them. Her idea was that, if it was possible to get a majority in parliament with the help of a group of UNPers, the government must be changed by using the executive powers: However she was gradually realizing that the braggadocio of easily getting a majority of 113 lacked substance. Collaboration with JVP for the purpose of keeping her party in a state of activity as an opposition party was not unwelcome to her. However she had no desire to go in for a permanent alliance with JVP and then to dissolve the parliament using her executive powers and thereafter to hold a general election. She knew that a majority of her MPs did not like a snap general election. She also knew that a defeat in such an election would push her party from the frying pan into the fire. She knew, in addition, that even if she won the election, it was not possible to go to war as expected by JVP. However, she also thought that she should show her powers when the occasion warranted it. The most sensitive question she faced was how to stay in politics after completing her term as President. She wanted to remain in politics until she could get a successor from the family into the arena.

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s assessment of the situation was that, although the executive powers were with the President, he should hold on without allowing the boat to capsize until the work of the aid conference was over and money started flowing into the country. Ranil’s scheme was to take the problem to an international level in order to create pressure so that neither the President nor the LTTE would be able to capsize the boat until the work of the aid conference ended and money started flowing into the country. In the circumstances, he waited in silence and without any reactions.

He knew that due to the extent of the world’s greater involvement in the peace program, the ability of the President or LTTE to rock the boat at this moment would be limited. LTTE also had a need to refrain from being headstrong at this moment, due to the very reason of the President’s threats. He knew that the President was unable to act in total disregard of international opinion that had built up. He also knew that LTTE too could not afford to be headstrong at this time. His target was a sum of US$1 billion. If the country was going to get that sum, he reckoned, the economic environment of the country would improve and his own position would be strengthened.

Ranil’s next trump card is to go in for a referendum to get the approval of the people for the peace program. The aim of that scheme is to take away JVP from the PA and to isolate and defeat PA thereafter.

At a referendum on whether the peace program should be proceeded with or not, PA cannot afford to canvass for a negative vote. In such a situation the result will be that the JVP will be isolated and defeated by the people. The consequent line up might lead to a UNP-PA coalition. It is only such a coalition that will be able to secure parliamentary approval for a lasting solution to the question of peace.

Collaboration between the two main parties on issues of national importance is welcome, but if it leads to a situation where the two parties get together and go berserk, the consequences for the country can be more dangerous.