අන්තර්වාර පාලන උභතෝකෝටිකය
With peace talks stalled over the LTTE’s demand for an interim administration, Ivan argues that the Tigers may fairly be given absolute power over the overwhelmingly Tamil North, but not over the East, where 1981 census figures show Muslims and Sinhalese together make up 58.7 per cent. He sets out options such as treating the East as a separate unit with proportional representation and veto powers, and concludes that a transitional LTTE-dominated administration in Tamil areas is a lesser evil than renewed war.
ස්වයං විනාශයකට යෑම
Ivan asks why the LTTE demands an interim administration it knows the government cannot grant, and argues that it seeks recognition as an equal state, as it did when excluded from the Indo-Lanka Accord. He recalls that the Accord already conceded much the Sinhalese now resent, and that the JVP, which bombed Parliament in 1987, now backs the President’s resistance. Examining Sinhala Mahavamsa myths and the Tamil claim to the East, he warns that both leaderships are steering the country towards anarchy.
ජාතික ආණ්ඩුවක් හරහා හෝ අවුල ලිහාගත යුතු ය
The government lacks the constitutional power to grant the interim administration the LTTE demands, and the main parties’ power struggle blocks consensus. The editorial proposes a two-year national government to agree a solution, negotiate with the LTTE and identify principles for a new constitution, followed by an election open to the LTTE and a constituent assembly of all elected members.
ජපන් ආධාර සමුළුව
Despite the LTTE’s absence, the Tokyo conference pledged $4.5 billion against the $3 billion sought, huge relative to government revenue, though much of it is loans and past aid use has been poor. The editorial finds the Prime Minister’s vision attractive but says good governance must begin with an independent judiciary and a disciplined party, and that the LTTE, having rejected his interim proposal, is unlikely to accept reconstruction outside its control.
අවුල පැලැස්තරවලින් විසඳිය නොහැක
The ethnic conflict needs surgery, not plasters, the editorial argues. Since the New York pre-aid meeting, the LTTE has boycotted the Tokyo conference and rejected the Prime Minister’s interim proposal as a renamed version of one it had already refused. Aid can only be used if trust is restored; granting the interim administration the LTTE wants requires opposition support, and if the main parties cannot agree, the alternative is war.
මින්පසු කොයිබටද?
With the peace talks stalled, the editorial warns that mishandling could make the breakdown permanent and holds both the government and the President-led opposition responsible. Since war failed to subdue the LTTE’s de facto state, it can only be absorbed by recognising its power within a federal arrangement it has said it would accept, with an interim administration meanwhile; treating that as betrayal leads back to war.
සාම කතා වැඩපිළිවෙළත් අවුලක
Johan Galtung’s prediction that a peace process built on the carrot of aid would fail seems to be coming true. The piece argues that people fight over grievances, not money, and cites Willy Brandt and Desmond Tutu on healing inner wounds through apology and truth. It says the LTTE, undefeated and running its own institutions, must be dealt with as a quasi-government, and that its withdrawal over the Washington meeting and unmet resettlement pledges leaves the Tokyo aid conference without it.
ප්රශ්න සමග චත්ගුඩ ගැසීම
With talks stalled and the LTTE rejecting the government’s proposed authority in place of an interim administration, the Japan aid conference will go ahead without it. The piece argues that Ranil Wickremesinghe’s strategy of holding on without resolving anything until the President’s term ends in 2005 cannot satisfy the LTTE or Tamils, that using American backing as a threat is futile, and that he should have reached an honest deal with the President or pro-peace PA forces and informed the public.
බූරුවා සහ කැරට් අලය
The LTTE’s withdrawal from talks is a setback the government must resolve quickly. The piece argues that an undefeated adversary cannot be handled with the carrot of aid, warns against using American backing to intimidate the LTTE or irritate India, and says the government should not seek LTTE help for southern electoral ends as Chandrika Kumaratunga did in 1994. It faults the exclusion of the LTTE from the Washington pre-aid meeting and the failure to implement resettlement and rehabilitation.
The Donkey and the Carrot
This article critiques the Sri Lankan government’s flawed approach to peace negotiations following the LTTE’s temporary withdrawal from talks. Author Victor Ivan argues that the government treats the conflict using a simplistic “carrot and stick” model appropriate for a defeated adversary, rather than treating the LTTE as an undefeated entity requiring parity and genuine trust. The piece warns against over-relying on international clout—specifically the U.S. factor—to intimidate the LTTE, which risks alienating both the Tamil rebels and neighboring India. Additionally, it highlights critical administrative missteps, such as excluding the LTTE from the Washington pre-aid conference and failing to implement post-war rehabilitation and resettlement programs due to bureaucratic inefficiency.