ජවිපෙට සිදුවුණේ කුමක් ද?
Ivan argues that the President used alliance talks with the JVP to strengthen her own hand, while the JVP paid any price, even abandoning its opposition to the executive presidency, before realising it had been deceived. Contrasting the JVP’s shallow leadership with the traditional Left, which taught the country democracy and won lasting social reforms, he says the party remains where it was in 1971. Further sections attack Mahinda Wijesekara’s claim that developing countries have too much democracy and question Mangala Samaraweera’s leadership of a media-freedom protest.
ඉදිරි පළාත් සභා මැතිවරණයේ ගමන් මග
Ivan weighs the President’s plan to test her strength in early provincial elections, comparing the 2001 parliamentary results with the later local government polls, in which the JVP fell from about a million votes to under 600,000. Recalling vote-rigging by the UNP from 1977 to 1994, the 1982 referendum and the PA’s North Western Province poll, he argues that all three main parties prefer a ‘thieves’ system’ of election plunder, and reads the President’s remarks to editors about using thuggery as a sign of a looming fight to the death.
බල අරගලයේ කෙළවර කුමක් ද?
Barred from a third term, Chandrika Kumaratunga now wants the executive presidency she once enjoyed reformed so she can keep her party leadership, while Ranil Wickremesinghe wants it untouched until he inherits it. Ivan traces her options, from a JVP alliance and a snap dissolution to a caretaker cabinet, and warns that with Sarath N. Silva controlling the courts the rivalry could slide into a civil conflict decided by which side the police and army take.
රටට අමතක වී ඇති විධායක ජනාධිපති ක්රමය
The editorial notes that the once-powerful campaign to abolish or reform the executive presidency, begun by N.M. Perera and carried forward by Lalith Athulathmudali, Gamini Dissanayake, Chandrika Kumaratunga and the JVP, has fallen silent. With the President’s second term ending in 2005 and the Prime Minister hoping to succeed her, it argues that at minimum presidential immunity should be confined to official acts and removal for deliberate constitutional violations made easier.
ස්වයං විනාශයකට යෑම
Ivan asks why the LTTE demands an interim administration it knows the government cannot grant, and argues that it seeks recognition as an equal state, as it did when excluded from the Indo-Lanka Accord. He recalls that the Accord already conceded much the Sinhalese now resent, and that the JVP, which bombed Parliament in 1987, now backs the President’s resistance. Examining Sinhala Mahavamsa myths and the Tamil claim to the East, he warns that both leaderships are steering the country towards anarchy.
මුට්ටියට පෙර හොරා යැවීම
Ivan describes Mangala Samaraweera’s push for the President to seize power quickly, possibly driven by a pending case over an attack on poster-pasting youths during the last election, and reads her takeover of the Development Lottery Board as a test of the Prime Minister. He warns that a clash between presidential and parliamentary power could turn bloody, and urges a French-style cohabitation in which the President leaves domestic government to the majority, while faulting the JVP, PA and UNP for opportunism over the 1978 Constitution and the independent commissions.
A UNP-PA Coalition in Place of a JVP-PA Coalition?
This article analyzes the strategic political maneuvering between Sri Lanka’s major parties—the UNP, PA, and JVP—over the formation of coalitions and control of the government. It outlines the internal divisions within the PA regarding whether to form a permanent alliance with the JVP to topple the ruling government, or to feign an alliance to eventually form a national government with the UNP. The piece highlights the President’s reluctance for a snap election and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s counter-strategy: maintaining stability to secure international aid for the peace process with the LTTE, and proposing a national referendum on peace to isolate the JVP and foster a UNP-PA coalition.
ජේවීපි -පීඒ සභාගයක් වෙනුවට යූඑන්පී -පීඒ සභාගයක්
The piece maps the calculations behind the PA–JVP rapprochement: Mangala Samaraweera and Anura Bandaranaike pushed for a firm alliance to topple the government, Wimal Weerawansa championed it in the JVP, while the President, wary of a snap election and focused on her own political survival, would not commit. Ranil Wickremesinghe held on until the aid conference and internationalised the peace process; a referendum on it could isolate the JVP and lead to a UNP–PA coalition, which could be good or dangerous.
දේශපාලන අස්ථාවරභාවය
Although a sea clash did not wreck the peace talks, uncertainty persists over whether the President, now allying with the JVP, will dissolve Parliament. The editorial argues that an early election is unlikely because the PA lacks a firm base, victory with the JVP could bring a worse war, and the international community backs the peace process. It adds that the government has failed to win respect beyond the peace effort, and that lasting peace requires deep reform of the political system rather than a mere truce.
ස්වාධීන කොමිෂන් හා ජවිපෙ
The editorial reminds the JVP that it claimed the 17th Amendment as its own victory, yet it stays silent while the President undermines the independent commissions by refusing to approve their nominees, in breach of the Constitution. It asks why the JVP, which talks most of an early election, does not use its new friendship with the President to get the Independent Elections Commission set up, and whether it would accept a repeat of the Wayamba poll operation.