topic: Ethnic Conflict & the North-East

The Joint Mechanism and the Coming Political Crisis 

Having promised the Kandy aid conference she would sign the joint mechanism for tsunami relief in the north-east regardless of extremist pressure, the President has been called. The JVP, under internal pressure that has made the issue one of survival and dignity, has resolved to quit the government if she signs. Victor Ivan sets out the arithmetic: the JVP’s departure costs 39 seats, the Hela Urumaya’s likely departure another nine, and the Tamil Alliance’s 22 do not cover the gap. Refusing to sign preserves the government but damages her standing internationally, in her party and among the people. Her alternatives are a coalition with a UNP leader who will not strengthen her hand, inducing a large group of UNP MPs to defect — for whom, Ivan notes, she could probably secure judicial protection through the Chief Justice — or dissolving parliament, possibly resigning the presidency and contesting as prime ministerial candidate herself. He judges a parliamentary election would hurt the JVP and Hela Urumaya most, and warns that whichever course she takes the turmoil will not end soon, still less if the LTTE abandons the ceasefire.

නැගෙනහිර කොටි නායක ඝාතනය

The assassination of Kaushalyan, the LTTE’s eastern political leader, amid the wreckage of the tsunami is a bad omen. The government condemned it as an attempt to wreck its efforts to reach agreement with the LTTE, but the editorial warns that it has changed the course of events and feeds the LTTE’s belief that the state is plotting to destroy it.

දැන් පවතින තත්ත්වය

A numbered twenty-point programme for the country after the tsunami: facing the challenge with a practical vision, an all-party government for two years, restarting peace talks with interim administration for the North-East that the Muslims can accept, rebuilding ten symbolic towns, reorganising the state, a higher court to settle disputes, and a new constitution before elections.

Overcoming the disaster

Victor Ivan treats the December 2004 tsunami as a test the Sri Lankan state failed. Warning instruments existed and went unused; the armed forces were instructed too late to be effective outside the north-east where they were already concentrated. Forty-eight hours after the waves the government allocated Rs 100 million in urgent relief — a hundred rupees a head for a million destitute — and eight days later the President’s office put reconstruction at Rs 100 billion against the Central Bank’s provisional Rs 400 billion, a sum equal to a full year of government spending or three years of Tokyo consortium aid. In twenty minutes the country lost lives and property comparable to twenty years of war. Ivan argues the two catastrophes cannot be addressed separately, since housing tsunami victims alone would affront those displaced by the fighting, and calls for a two-year all-party government charged with physical reconstruction and with enacting a new constitution — something he thinks civil society will have to compel the parties to accept.

ප්‍රභාකරන්ට දෙන්නට උත්තරයක් තිබේ ද?

The LTTE leader’s Heroes’ Day speech is read as a sharp analysis of southern politics: his differences with the Wickremesinghe government, his view of the President and the alliance, and his warning that Tamils will neither live bound within a Sinhala state nor wish to separate if given freedom. The editorial concludes that the President can neither tame the JVP and talk to him nor break with the JVP and join the UNP.

Does Prabhakaran have an answer?

Victor Ivan reads Prabhakaran’s Heroes’ Day speech as a shrewd account of southern politics. The LTTE leader traces the breakdown back to Washington, where the UNP’s participation in the aid conference denied his organisation equal-partner status; he rejects every interim administration draft the government produced, insists talks resume on the LTTE’s own ISGA proposals, and refuses to see an interim authority tied to a final settlement — suspecting the President of wanting to please the JVP, mislead the international community, or simply prolong matters indefinitely. He then challenges every southern party to state publicly where it stands on territory, nationhood and self-determination, and warns that Tamil patience has limits. Ivan judges the ball now in Sinhala hands and finds none of them willing to hold it: Wickremesinghe wanting the talks to last until he is President, the President subordinating the ethnic question to her own invalidation problem, and neither able to move without the JVP’s consent. He closes with a warning that the Sinhala people may come to detest their own leaders enough to say Prabhakaran is good for us too.

ශිෂ්ට සම්පන්න භාවයේ තරම

The Human Rights Committee has ruled against Sri Lanka again, this time over Nallaratnam Singarasa, jailed for 35 years under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, while Tony Fernando’s case is pending. Ivan holds President Kumaratunga responsible for appointing Sarath N. Silva as Chief Justice, and Ranil Wickremesinghe for allowing the system to take root.