බූරුවා සහ කැරට් අලය
The LTTE’s withdrawal from talks is a setback the government must resolve quickly. The piece argues that an undefeated adversary cannot be handled with the carrot of aid, warns against using American backing to intimidate the LTTE or irritate India, and says the government should not seek LTTE help for southern electoral ends as Chandrika Kumaratunga did in 1994. It faults the exclusion of the LTTE from the Washington pre-aid meeting and the failure to implement resettlement and rehabilitation.
The Donkey and the Carrot
This article critiques the Sri Lankan government’s flawed approach to peace negotiations following the LTTE’s temporary withdrawal from talks. Author Victor Ivan argues that the government treats the conflict using a simplistic “carrot and stick” model appropriate for a defeated adversary, rather than treating the LTTE as an undefeated entity requiring parity and genuine trust. The piece warns against over-relying on international clout—specifically the U.S. factor—to intimidate the LTTE, which risks alienating both the Tamil rebels and neighboring India. Additionally, it highlights critical administrative missteps, such as excluding the LTTE from the Washington pre-aid conference and failing to implement post-war rehabilitation and resettlement programs due to bureaucratic inefficiency.
රැලේ සාමාජිකයින්ට පිස්සු නටන්නට ඉඩ හැර බලා සිටීම
The editorial credits Ranil Wickremesinghe with opening roads, keeping calm in the face of the President’s outbursts and internationalising the peace effort, but faults him for failing to discipline his team. It lists reports of ministers and MPs assaulting police, freeing detained supporters and demolishing a Matara sports club building, with endless inquiries and no action, and warns that repeating the lawlessness tolerated under Chandrika Kumaratunga would be ruinous.
සාම කතාවල අනාගතය
With the talks stalled but likely to resume, the editorial calls the ‘carrot’ approach, peace for aid, the weakest element of the process: peace is needed because relations between communities have been uncivilised. It argues that a settlement must address wider democratic problems, since anti-democratic conduct is not confined to Prabhakaran, citing the PA’s Wayamba poll and J.R. Jayewardene’s 1982 election, and must reach the grassroots and win UNP–PA agreement.
නීතියේ පාලනය ඔලුවෙන් සිටුවීම
Eighty days after Tony Fernando was jailed, the Bar Association has done nothing despite Param Cumaraswamy’s appeal, though his case was raised at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva and the Asian Human Rights Commission’s petition has gathered over 3,000 signatures. Ivan argues that the President cannot act because she appointed Sarath N. Silva to control the Supreme Court, and that responsibility therefore falls on the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
A UNP-PA Coalition in Place of a JVP-PA Coalition?
This article analyzes the strategic political maneuvering between Sri Lanka’s major parties—the UNP, PA, and JVP—over the formation of coalitions and control of the government. It outlines the internal divisions within the PA regarding whether to form a permanent alliance with the JVP to topple the ruling government, or to feign an alliance to eventually form a national government with the UNP. The piece highlights the President’s reluctance for a snap election and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s counter-strategy: maintaining stability to secure international aid for the peace process with the LTTE, and proposing a national referendum on peace to isolate the JVP and foster a UNP-PA coalition.
ජේවීපි -පීඒ සභාගයක් වෙනුවට යූඑන්පී -පීඒ සභාගයක්
The piece maps the calculations behind the PA–JVP rapprochement: Mangala Samaraweera and Anura Bandaranaike pushed for a firm alliance to topple the government, Wimal Weerawansa championed it in the JVP, while the President, wary of a snap election and focused on her own political survival, would not commit. Ranil Wickremesinghe held on until the aid conference and internationalised the peace process; a referendum on it could isolate the JVP and lead to a UNP–PA coalition, which could be good or dangerous.
සිංහයා, වෘකයා, කැනහිලා හා නිලමැස්සා
Tony Fernando’s jailing and beating shocked the world but not Sri Lanka’s conscience. Ivan notes Param Cumaraswamy’s appeal to the Bar Association, the President’s refusal to pardon Tony, which he ties to her mutual protection pact with Sarath N. Silva, and the Prime Minister’s indifference. He attacks three newspapers backed by the President and Mangala Samaraweera for smearing Tony and Ravaya, recalls their defence of PA-era crimes, and ends with a fable of scavengers to rank their journalists.
සෙන්පතියන් ගොළුවීම
Ivan describes how a petitioner who appeared without a lawyer was jailed for a year for contempt by a bench including two respondents to his petition, just as the Attorney General was drafting a law defining contempt at the Editors’ Guild’s request, and asks why the Guild and most media stayed silent. Short items follow on arbitrary VIP death compensation, a study of LTTE tax revenue, and the JVP’s dilemma over the PA’s 2000 regional-council package.
විය යුත්තේ කුමක්ද?
Opposition to the ceasefire is growing: the JVP wants the LTTE destroyed militarily, and the PA, including Opposition Leader Mahinda Rajapaksa, joined a protest against Ranil Wickremesinghe’s ‘treacherous pact’. Recalling the JVP’s violent response to the Indo-Lanka Accord, the editorial argues that the memorandum’s flaws should be debated, not used to return to war, that neither side will give up readiness to fight overnight, and that the country needs a policy of untangling the knot.