The war between the LTTE and Government Security Forces is moving towards a decisive phase.
After the capture of the East, the Armed Forces succeeded in bringing all of the Mannar district under their control. Now they have entered Killinochchi, the LTTE’s main power base. According to some analysts, the LTTE has so far mobilised only second-tier fighters, inexperienced, newly conscripted cadres, to man their forward defense lines. For the Killinochchi battle however, the LTTE is mobilising its first grade fighters- hardened cadres with years of experience of guerrilla warfare.
However many analysts feel that in spite of their efforts, the LTTE’s attempts to defend Killinochchi will fail in the face of the security forces’ superior man-power and equipment and the group will have to withdraw into the Vanni Jungles in order to survive.
Other analysts argue however that the LTTE is deliberately allowing the security forces to penetrate deep into the Vanni in order to launch a counter-attack from within their stronghold and inflict severe damage to the military.
Public opinion among Sinhala people is strongly in favour of the ‘anti-LTTE’ war. Although the Tamil community’s views on the matter aren’t uniform, the majority of Tamils would prefer it if the LTTE was not defeated militarily.
Compulsory nature of the war
A minority among Sinhala society who believe in a just solution to the ethnic conflict would also rather not see the downfall of LTTE. This is not because of a special liking for the LTTE, but because of a fear that in the event of an outright victory for the Security Forces, the question of the rights of the Tamil people will be forgotten entirely. Those who favour a just solution to the conflict believe the Government should withdraw from the war and negotiate with the LTTE to find a political solution for the problem. Most western countries too more or less share this same line of thinking. However regardless of the apparent justness of a negotiated settlement, such a solution in the current context is unrealistic and utopian.
What the LTTE is seeking is a separate state, or else, the establishment of a confederation where they have the freedom to possess arms. They are not prepared to back down from this position. Even though it was stated that they agreed to Internal Self Determination at the peace talks held during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government, after the collapse of the peace talks, they said that they never had such an agreement.
The Government of Mahinda Rajapaksa, or for that matter, any Government, cannot agree to a separate state or a confederation solution. No government therefore has the ability to agree to their demands, even with several rounds of peace talks, unless the LTTE changes their unwavering stand. What must be understood is that if the LTTE stick to their present demands, there is no way they can achieve their objective through negotiations. It becomes compulsory therefore for them to fight to achieve their objectives while it becomes equally compulsory for the Sri Lankan Government to fight to defeat that objective.
The LTTE’s goal of a separate state cannot be achieved. It is not only the Sri Lankan state that will not allow them to achieve their objective, India too will not allow Eelam to come into existence. Under these circumstances, as long as the LTTE continues to dominate Tamil politics, there can only be constant war, with or without peace talks.
Under the circumstances, where an armed organisation such as the LTTE attempts to act as the sole representative of the Tamil people, the Tamil community will be unable to accept any political solution, even if it is ideal. Also, the LTTE will never allow any solution to be implemented.
Hence, even a Government with a fair solution to the conflict will be pushed into a war to defeat the LTTE, in order to implement this solution. Ultimately regardless of the government in power, the war cannot be prevented.
The compulsory nature of the war is clear from the fact that regardless of the government in power and peace talks for the past 25 years, war has continued with only brief interruptions.
Homeland
Another obstacle to negotiations is the LTTE central concept of a Tamil homeland. Even if they do away with the idea of a separate state or a confederation and agree to a Federal system, they are still seeking control not only of the North, where the majority are Tamils but over the East too. Ultimately the LTTE is claiming ownership for 30% of the island’s territory and nearly 50% of its coast.
The East however is not a Tamil majority province: the Sinhalese and Muslim population combined outnumbers Tamils in the East.
In the General election, held in 1977, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) seeking a mandate for a separate state contested in both Northern and Eastern Provinces. However they only won in the North. They received only about 36% of the votes in the East. Even India did not at first favour the merger of the two provinces.
Finally, in the Indo-Lanka Agreement, such a merger was agreed upon as an essential step to persuade all Tamil political parties to support the Agreement. However the decision was subject to a Referendum to be held in the East. But after the Agreement was signed, the LTTE and other Tamils, fearing that the people of the East would reject the merger, prevented the Referendum from taking place. The Northern and Eastern provinces should therefore remain separate unless the people of the Eastern Province demonstrate they wish to be part of a merged North-Eastern province in a Referendum.
It is clear therefore that once they get away from the path of the armed struggle, Tamil political parties will still need to withdraw from the concept of traditional homelands to evolve a just solution. In this crisis, myths prevail not only among the Sinhala community who are the supposed oppressors, but also among the Tamil community who are considered as oppressed. Myths on both sides act as obstacles to a justifiable solution.
The difference in the War
It should be expressed that there is a difference in the present war from the war that was waged for the most part of the previous two decades. One characteristic of the previous two decades of war was that it was waged to pressurise the LTTE to agree to a peaceful solution. But the present day war is waged with the intention of annihilating the LTTE. This war can also be considered a conflict initiated and asked for by the LTTE.
The LTTE had been granted enormous concessions by the Ranil Wickremesinghe government: concessions that no other government would have granted. If the LTTE genuinely wanted the continuation of the peace talks initiated by the Ranil Wickremesinghe Government, they should have supported Ranil Wickremesinghe at the Presidential election but they used all their resources to prevent his victory. Thus they brought to power the man who will dig their grave.
This can be considered to be one of the two most foolish decisions taken by the LTTE in their political career. The most foolish deed was the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. With his assassination the doors that had been open to the LTTE in India were closed. The LTTE not only allowed Mahinda Rajapaksa to come in to power by continuing their attacks in spite of the ceasefire, they created a strong environment for Mahinda Rajapaksa to start an anti-LTTE war with the support of the people.
In targeting but failing to assassinate Army Commander Sarath Fonseka and Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapksa, the LTTE also created two able warriors who are ready to fight the war on behalf of President Rajapaksa in a merciless manner without settling for half-way peace.
War benefits whom
Historically, the present war will not be beneficial to the LTTE, but will be beneficial to the Government. Before this, in the wars that were waged against the LTTE, the Security Forces did not have a clear aim. The Security Forces waged a war not to defeat the LTTE, but to weaken them. President Mahinda Rajapaksa restored the self-esteem of the armed forces and created a psychological environment in which they could wage a war with self-confidence. Disregarding local or international pressure, the President made it explicit that the war was being waged to annihilate the LTTE. For the first time, the LTTE was forced to fight a defensive war.
Previously, the LTTE had been almost unstoppable. Their tactics had been flawless and even when withdrawing strategically, they targeted important objectives causing massive disruption. After attacking and taking over the Elephant Pass Forces complex, they continued with their attacks on Katunayake Air Force Camp and Katunayake Airport. At that time they were at their highest level, militarily. They also had a favourable international environment.
They used Tamil Nadu as a base camp for their struggle. Due to the sympathy they received at the international level, they collected funds in Western countries without any hindrance. They received the necessary supplies by sea without any difficulty.
However in spite of their military strength they lacked the intellect to achieve their political objectives. Their violence failed to earn them the political recognition they desired.
Then came the historical era of their downfall and destruction. The international environment which was once favourable to them changed dramatically. A large number of countries in the world proscribed them as a terrorist organisation. There sprung the barriers for fund-raising. The ability to acquire supplies was limited. The breakaway of Karuna Amman from the LTTE weakened its authority in the East and limited the recruitment capability of the LTTE. It was during this historically crucial period where the LTTE had started its downward journey that Mahinda Rajapaksa came into power. Harnessing the support of India and America, he initiated a merciless war against the LTTE and pushed them into a position where they fight not for offence, but for defence. After the attack at Anuradhapura there have been no more serious surprise attacks by the LTTE.
During the SAARC Summit, when the LTTE declared a unilateral Ceasefire, the Government refused to accept it. The LTTE however was unable to carry out any attacks in Colombo during the Summit.
The Tamil people living in Colombo who had previously helped the LTTE due to their fear, now do not offer any support to LTTE out of a greater fear for the Armed Forces. The LTTE have been compelled to retreat, abandoning thousands of kilometres that were under their control and they seem unable to launch successful counter attacks in the North or terrorist attacks in the South. It is now clear that the demise of the LTTE is imminent.
War and the Tamil People
What is the good or the bad that will be caused to the Tamil people due to the defeat of the LTTE at this war? It may be that the Tamil people may suffer to some extent as a result of the defeat of the LTTE. But in the long term the Tamil community will benefit from the LTTE’s defeat. Even if they do not get any new political offers from the Rajapaksa government, after the conclusion of the war, they will benefit indirectly.
The government will not be able to carry on with the war once the LTTE is defeated. Therefore there will be no need to have expansive high security zones. Those who lost their lands and property due to high security zones will get the right to be resident in their lands. When there was a struggle to crush the JVP insurrection, the Sinhala people in the South had to bear the burden of that struggle. Once the insurrection was defeated, the Sinhala people in the South were able to live freely. In the same manner, once the war by Prabhakaran is defeated, the Tamil people in the North will be able to have a new life with freedom. The LTTE, by preventing free speech, prevented the emergence of an alternate Tamil leadership. After the elimination of the LTTE, new ideas will emerge in Tamil society and also new leadership. After defeating the LTTE, if the Government refuses to grant Tamil people their rights, the community could resort to new non-violent methods of struggle to win their rights. Instead of living continuously in a stagnating and never-ending war situation, the Tamil people will be able to come out of this doomed, desperate condition.
The Tamil people should consider seriously and in depth, the fact that even if it lacked the rights they desire, the life they had before the war was much better than the life they are now facing after the commencement of the violent struggle to win a separate state.
The State is the only authority vested with the right to hold arms. Even when there is severe injustice, the policy of taking up arms is disastrous. The Tamil people who are engulfed in a vicious cycle of violence can only be salvaged, by the defeat of Prabhakaran’s LTTE campaign, militarily. If there is a need to continue the struggle for obtaining their due rights, intelligent leadership will emerge from among the Tamil people in future who, even after a lapse of time, will revert to a civilised form of agitation.