Ensuring healthy peace talks

May 20, 2001
Publication:
After the failure of Agni Khiela the government has had to soften the hard conditions it set for starting talks. It now enters negotiations from weakness rather than strength, and the talks are likelier to deepen its crisis than to steady it.

After the failure of the Agni Khiela operation, the government has been compelled to relax the tough conditions it had earlier set for starting peace talks.

Previously the government had said that a ceasefire was not necessary to start peace talks and that a ceasefire could be agreed upon only if there was progress after talks had started. However, the government now says that it is prepared to talk while a ceasefire is on.

This has been conveyed by Norwegian representative Erik Solheim to LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham at the discussion they had in London on the 9th.

However, the LTTE’s official view is that they are not prepared for a secret and temporary cease-fire. Their stance is that it must be a permanent and publicly declared cease-fire. Further, they say that its other two conditions, namely, the lifting of the ban imposed on the organisation and the total removal of the embargo on goods, too must be fulfilled.

The government has to enter into negotiations not from a position of strength but from a position of weakness. Although the government forces attempted to recapture Elephant Pass which was lost before possible peace talks, the LTTE succeeded in frustrating that attempt and imposing a major loss on the army. On the political front and in the south too, the government is weak. Although it might be possible to temporarily suppress the threat of defeating the government by a no-confidence motion, a quickening of the government’s declines become inevitable if the government fails to enter into successful peace talks. Although international pressure, set-backs on the military front and threats of no-confidence motions have driven the government to take steps towards peace negotiations, the government does not seem to have a strong and clear vision required for negotiations.

It is only through a commitment to negotiations that it will be possible to prevent the Tamil parties from giving a no-confidence motion. However, it is not possible for the government to fulfil the pre-conditions that the LTTE demands. The SLMC demands that, they too be made a partner of the negotiations. However, there is a serious conflict between the demands of the SLMC and those of the LTTE. Although Norway, India and the United States want at least the UNP, which is the main opposition party, to be made a partner of the peace programme, this will be possible only if the government agrees to lawfully set up the four commissions which they demand.

The air of enmity between the leaders of the two parties will probably have a decisive effect on these talks. The fact that the LTTE made a serious attempt to take her life, depriving her of one of her eyes in the process will have an effect on the President as well as on Prabhakaran. This will inevitably function as a main determining factor of the peace process.

Finally, although this process of peace talks will help create an atmosphere required for effecting a solution, it is likely to worsen the crisis which the government is facing rather than bring any stability to the government.