At the aid conference held in Kandy the President gave an assurance that she would sign the agreement on the joint mechanism disregarding the pressure from the extremists. The President’s assessment had been that, although the JVP was unwilling to accept such a situation, the party would not give up the governmental power it had attained.
On this issue, the JVP itself was in a quandary. However, with the pres- sure coming from within, the matter had become a question of survival and dignity for the party. Its final decision now is that the JVP must leave the government if it signs the agreement on the joint mechanism.
What is the President going to do now? Is she going to choose the joint mechanism or is she going to choose the JVP?
If she abstains from signing the agreement in order to please the JVP, her acceptance, not only in the inter- national community, but also in her own party and among the people will decline.
If, on the other hand, she signs the document, as promised to the inter- national community, the JVP might leave the government and the Alliance government will lose its majority in parliament.
In such a context the President will have to refrain from signing the agree- ment on the joint mechanism in order to preserve the government.
Otherwise the gap created by the JVP’s departure will have to be filled by some other means. If the President signs the agreement on the joint mechanism, the government will ob- tain the support of the Tamil Alliance. That, however, will not be adequate for the government to survive. The question of the joint mechanism will affect not only the JVP but also the Hela Urumaya.
If the JVP leaves the government. it will deprive the government of 39 seats. When the nine seats of the Hela Urumaya are included, the figure amounts to 48. The Tamil Alliance has 22 seats only.
In order to obviate the shortfall, the President will either have to enter into a coalition with the leader of the UNP or will have to get a substantial number of MPs from the UNP to join the government.
At this moment, the leader of the UNP is not prepared to strengthen the hands of the President, nor is the President prepared to trust the UNP. In these circumstances one of the options available to the President is to win over a substantial number of MPs from the UNP to ensure her survival.
Although there is great perplexity in the UNP about its leadership, it will not be easy to get an adequately large group of UNP MPs to desert the party.
If the President is able to get such a group, she will probably be able to ob- tain the necessary judicial protection for them through the Chief Justice.
Although the government will be able to guarantee that those who desert the opposition and join the government will not lose their seats, such a large number are unlikely to leave the opposition and join the government because of that guarantee alone.
The other option available to the President is to dissolve the parliament and go for parliamentary elections.
Although it is possible for her to do so while continuing as the President, it is also possible for her to leave her Presidentship, appoint another to that post, and to contest the elections as a prime ministerial candidate.
The UNP is concentrating entirely on a presidential election and not a parliamentary election. There are constituencies to which no organizers have been appointed thus far, and there are disputes in the constituencies where organizers have been appointed.
In a parliamentary election where the JVP and the SLFP contest separately, the UNP will have the edge. However, if the President contests as the prime ministerial candidate of the SLFP, she will be able to minimize the UNP’s advantage.
If a parliamentary election is held. The JVP and the Hela Urumaya will be the parties which will enter the great- est crisis. There will be a collapse of the JVP’s popularity and a decline in the Hela Urumaya’s acceptability.
The President will also be able to get elected to the parliament after completing her term of office as the President.
Whatever option is resorted to, there will be no early end to the turmoil in the country. Moreover, if the LTTE gives up the ceasefire for whatever reason, a massive disaster will be inevitable.