A UNP-PA Coalition in Place of a JVP-PA Coalition?
This article analyzes the strategic political maneuvering between Sri Lanka’s major parties—the UNP, PA, and JVP—over the formation of coalitions and control of the government. It outlines the internal divisions within the PA regarding whether to form a permanent alliance with the JVP to topple the ruling government, or to feign an alliance to eventually form a national government with the UNP. The piece highlights the President’s reluctance for a snap election and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s counter-strategy: maintaining stability to secure international aid for the peace process with the LTTE, and proposing a national referendum on peace to isolate the JVP and foster a UNP-PA coalition.
ජේවීපි -පීඒ සභාගයක් වෙනුවට යූඑන්පී -පීඒ සභාගයක්
The piece maps the calculations behind the PA–JVP rapprochement: Mangala Samaraweera and Anura Bandaranaike pushed for a firm alliance to topple the government, Wimal Weerawansa championed it in the JVP, while the President, wary of a snap election and focused on her own political survival, would not commit. Ranil Wickremesinghe held on until the aid conference and internationalised the peace process; a referendum on it could isolate the JVP and lead to a UNP–PA coalition, which could be good or dangerous.
දේශපාලන අස්ථාවරභාවය
Although a sea clash did not wreck the peace talks, uncertainty persists over whether the President, now allying with the JVP, will dissolve Parliament. The editorial argues that an early election is unlikely because the PA lacks a firm base, victory with the JVP could bring a worse war, and the international community backs the peace process. It adds that the government has failed to win respect beyond the peace effort, and that lasting peace requires deep reform of the political system rather than a mere truce.
ස්වාධීන කොමිෂන් හා ජවිපෙ
The editorial reminds the JVP that it claimed the 17th Amendment as its own victory, yet it stays silent while the President undermines the independent commissions by refusing to approve their nominees, in breach of the Constitution. It asks why the JVP, which talks most of an early election, does not use its new friendship with the President to get the Independent Elections Commission set up, and whether it would accept a repeat of the Wayamba poll operation.
සෙන්පතියන් ගොළුවීම
Ivan describes how a petitioner who appeared without a lawyer was jailed for a year for contempt by a bench including two respondents to his petition, just as the Attorney General was drafting a law defining contempt at the Editors’ Guild’s request, and asks why the Guild and most media stayed silent. Short items follow on arbitrary VIP death compensation, a study of LTTE tax revenue, and the JVP’s dilemma over the PA’s 2000 regional-council package.
විය යුත්තේ කුමක්ද?
Opposition to the ceasefire is growing: the JVP wants the LTTE destroyed militarily, and the PA, including Opposition Leader Mahinda Rajapaksa, joined a protest against Ranil Wickremesinghe’s ‘treacherous pact’. Recalling the JVP’s violent response to the Indo-Lanka Accord, the editorial argues that the memorandum’s flaws should be debated, not used to return to war, that neither side will give up readiness to fight overnight, and that the country needs a policy of untangling the knot.
දැන් වියහැකි දේ කුමක්ද?
Ivan tests the JVP claim that a JVP–People’s Alliance coalition could have formed a government on 2001 results, pairing the UNP with its Tamil and Muslim allies against the PA, JVP and EPDP, and noting the collapse in both parties’ votes at the 2002 local elections. Policy differences and public fear of renewed war make a lasting alliance unlikely, so an early election is improbable; he urges civil society to widen the government–LTTE talks into a broader state reform.
Silence Must End
This article addresses Sri Lanka’s intellectual stagnation, arguing that high literacy rates mask a deeply backward social consciousness starved of meaningful public debate. Contrasting Sri Lanka’s superficial modernism with Europe’s Enlightenment and India’s inclusive movement under Mahatma Gandhi, the author criticizes Sri Lanka’s past reform attempts for fragmenting society along racial, religious, and class lines. The text delivers a sharp warning to the educated class, asserting that their persistent silence and fear of controversy create a dangerous vacuum—one historically filled by violent extremists like Wijeweera and Prabhakaran—and calls on intellectuals to fulfill their civic duty by sparking dynamic social discussion across all areas of national life.
හදිසි ආණ්ඩු පෙරළියකට තිබෙන ඉඩ
With Parliament a year old, the editorial weighs the President’s options. Anura Bandaranaike says she can dissolve it once a pact with the JVP is reached, but an election soon after the last one could anger voters and the JVP is a poor partner in government. Counting seats, it shows the People’s Alliance and allies cannot reach 113 without UNP defectors, and argues that a coup would anger the international community and not serve her aim of amending the constitution to stay in politics.
Democratization of the Country
This article explores the deeper socio-political fractures in Sri Lanka, arguing that the nation’s violent conflicts have been driven as much by caste oppression as by ethnic divisions. The author points out that both Prabhakaran in the North and Wijeweera in the South led armed rebellions that fundamentally challenged the entrenched dominance of the Vellala and Govigama castes. Highlighting historical examples of political exclusion based on caste—such as C.P. de Silva being denied party leadership—the article contends that Sri Lanka’s rigid political framework fails to accommodate marginalized voices. Ultimately, the author calls for a new, flexible constitution that guarantees true democratic participation and protects all minority groups from the tyranny of the majority.