චන්ද්රිකාගේ ගැටලු ජයගන්නට රනිල්ට හැකි ද?
Ivan notes that President Kumaratunga still controls ambassadors, provincial governors, who would head any interim administration, and the power to dissolve Parliament after a year. Curbing these needs a two-thirds majority, and her strategy is to deny the government PA votes unless investigations into crimes of her era, which could threaten her and the Bandaranaike name, are dropped. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s political future, he says, depends on how he handles this.
ජනතාවගේ පරමාධිපත්යය බලය සමග සෙල්ලම් කිරීම
Ivan says the UNF government has failed to keep local elections civilised and has not appointed the promised inquiry into earlier poll malpractice, and traces state-level electoral fraud from the Dedigama by-election and the Jaffna development council poll through 1982 to its revival under Kumaratunga. A second section on the Constitutional Council recounts how the professionals’ draft was reshaped by Jayampathy Wickramaratne so that the President nominates key appointees, a trap the JVP fell into, and asks why the government has not corrected it.
රාවය ඉදිරිය දකින ආකාරය
Answering critics who say Ravaya has gone soft on the UNF government, the paper recalls its record of opposing both UNP and PA governments. It backs curbing the President’s powers even at the cost of a distorting amendment, prosecution of those responsible for PSD crimes, including the President, and the peace effort, including lifting the LTTE ban. It lists its campaigns on the Elections Commissioner, state gifts, assets declarations, the 17th Amendment and Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva, and reveals PSD plans to bomb Ravaya and kill its editor.
ප්රභාකරන් එන්න යන්නේ මොකාටද?
Ivan rejects the JVP-led reading that Prabhakaran’s press conference shows he still wants Eelam, arguing he had to address the international community, the government and his own followers at once. Facing hostile journalists was itself an achievement, and his regretful tone about past violence contrasted with the JVP’s justifications. Drawing on the JVP’s own history, the ANC and the IRA, he predicts the LTTE’s barracks culture will fade only slowly and that Prabhakaran’s real test will be governing.
විය හැකි දේ සහ විය යුතු දේ
Written on the eve of the local government elections, Ivan sets out what each side must prove against the 2001 results, and says a sharp JVP decline could mark the beginning of its end. He praises the government’s comparatively clean campaign, proposes reforming the executive presidency by removing the arbitrary dissolution power and simplifying removal of a president, and argues that Prabhakaran, like Mandela, could become a stronger leader by abandoning arms.
පැවැත්ම සමග කරන සූදුවක්
Ivan argues that the JVP is gambling its political survival by opposing Ranil Wickremesinghe’s peace effort as it once opposed the Indo-Lanka Accord. He recalls that the party called provincial councils a division of the country, killed people over them and then became their keen participants without apology, and now stays silent on the executive presidency and the President’s stalling of the 17th Amendment. Nationalism, he says, can wreck a settlement but no longer carries anyone to power.
සාමයේ අනාගතය
As the President and the JVP line up against the government’s ceasefire memorandum of understanding with the LTTE, Ivan says Ranil Wickremesinghe misjudged her willingness to cooperate and failed to adapt the 1978 Constitution for cohabitation, as France did in 1986. He proposes constitutional reform giving domestic power to the Prime Minister, and urges that the chance for peace be seized after 18 years of war that neither side can win.
ජනාධිපතිනිය පෙනය පිප්පීම ඇරඹීම
Ivan notes that Chandrika Kumaratunga presents herself abroad as a supporter of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s peace effort while telling supporters at Horagolla that the UNP owes its victory to the LTTE and she will resist any sell-out. He faults the Prime Minister for not reforming his uncle J.R. Jayewardene’s constitution as France did for cohabitation, and proposes curbing presidential powers and simplifying the impeachment procedure, which he calls unique in the world.
ආනමඩුවට තලගොයි පාලනය අවසන් වී කබරගොයි පාලනයක් ලැබීම
Ivan describes how in Anamaduwa the violent rule of PA strongman D.M. Dassanayake, known as ‘Thalagoya’, has been replaced after the election by that of the UNP’s Ranga Bandara, a former policeman, with nine killings, 250 injured and over 150 houses burned, while the police and the Prime Minister look away. A second section welcomes a Supreme Court ruling ordering IGP Lucky Kodituwakku and others to pay compensation personally over biased police promotions.
යුද හමුදාව නින්දාවට පත් කිරීම
Ivan argues that Anuruddha Ratwatte used army commandos in the election, including the Madawala and Polgolla polling-station attacks and the Udathalawinna massacre, and faults army commander Lionel Balagalle for permitting it. He then examines the Athurugiriya safe-house affair, questioning why an intelligence unit working in Batticaloa kept thermobaric weapons in Colombo, the irregular rent and uniform contracts, and Charitha Ratwatte’s earlier complaint of a plot to kill Ranil Wickremesinghe.